

# *American* SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

The Official Journal of the American Sociological Society

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## *Contents*

White-Collar Criminality . . .	EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND	I
Fact and Factitiousness in Ethnic Opinionnaires. . . . .	ROBERT K. MERTON	13
The Measurement of Socioeconomic status . . . . .	GEORGE A. LUNDBERG	29
Constructive Typology in the Social Sciences. . . . .	HOWARD BECKER	40
Democracy Under Three Different Cultures . . . . .	NEWELL L. SIMS	56
Official Reports and Proceedings—Membership List for 1940		67
Official Reports and Proceedings—Annual Reports for 1939		88
Current Items. . . . .		112
Errata in Gillin's "Personality in Preliterate Cultures"		112
A Communication—Kirchheimer-Timasheff . . . . .		112
Meetings and Announcements. . . . .		116
News from Colleges and Universities . . . . .		119
Obituary Notice—Edward Alexander Westermarck . . . . .		122
Book Reviews. . . . .		126

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## WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALITY

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

*Indiana University*

THIS PAPER<sup>1</sup> is concerned with crime in relation to business. The economists are well acquainted with business methods but not accustomed to consider them from the point of view of crime; many sociologists are well acquainted with crime but not accustomed to consider it as expressed in business. This paper is an attempt to integrate these two bodies of knowledge. More accurately stated, it is a comparison of crime in the upper or white-collar class, composed of respectable or at least respected business and professional men, and crime in the lower class, composed of persons of low socioeconomic status. This comparison is made for the purpose of developing the theories of criminal behavior, not for the purpose of muckraking or of reforming anything except criminology.

The criminal statistics show unequivocally that crime, *as popularly conceived and officially measured*, has a high incidence in the lower class and a low incidence in the upper class; less than two percent of the persons committed to prisons in a year belong to the upper class. These statistics refer to criminals handled by the police, the criminal and juvenile courts, and the prisons, and to such crimes as murder, assault, burglary, robbery, larceny, sex offenses, and drunkenness, but exclude traffic violations.

The criminologists have used the case histories and criminal statistics derived from these agencies of criminal justice as their principal data. From them, they have derived general theories of criminal behavior. These theories are that, since crime is concentrated in the lower class, it is caused by poverty or by personal and social characteristics believed to be associated statistically with poverty, including feeble-mindedness, psychopathic deviations, slum neighborhoods, and "deteriorated" families. This statement, of course, does not do justice to the qualifications and variations in the con-

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<sup>1</sup> Thirty-fourth Annual Presidential Address delivered at Philadelphia, Pa., Dec. 27, 1939 in joint meeting with the American Economic Society (its Fifty-second) at which President Jacob Viner spoke on the relations of economic theory to the formulation of public policy.

ventional theories of criminal behavior, but it presents correctly their central tendency.

The thesis of this paper is that the conception and explanations of crime which have just been described are misleading and incorrect, that crime is in fact not closely correlated with poverty or with the psychopathic and sociopathic conditions associated with poverty, and that an adequate explanation of criminal behavior must proceed along quite different lines. The conventional explanations are invalid principally because they are derived from biased samples. The samples are biased in that they have not included vast areas of criminal behavior of persons not in the lower class. One of these neglected areas is the criminal behavior of business and professional men, which will be analyzed in this paper.

The "robber barons" of the last half of the nineteenth century were white-collar criminals, as practically everyone now agrees. Their attitudes are illustrated by these statements: Colonel Vanderbilt asked, "You don't suppose you can run a railroad in accordance with the statutes, do you?" A. B. Stickney, a railroad president, said to sixteen other railroad presidents in the home of J. P. Morgan in 1890, "I have the utmost respect for you gentlemen, individually, but as railroad presidents I wouldn't trust you with my watch out of my sight." Charles Francis Adams said, "The difficulty in railroad management . . . lies in the covetousness, want of good faith, and low moral tone of railway managers, in the complete absence of any high standard of commercial honesty."

The present-day white-collar criminals, who are more suave and deceptive than the "robber barons," are represented by Krueger, Stavisky, Whitney, Mitchell, Foshay, Insull, the Van Sweringens, Musica-Coster, Fall, Sinclair, and many other merchant princes and captains of finance and industry, and by a host of lesser followers. Their criminality has been demonstrated again and again in the investigations of land offices, railways, insurance, munitions, banking, public utilities, stock exchanges, the oil industry, real estate, reorganization committees, receiverships, bankruptcies, and politics. Individual cases of such criminality are reported frequently, and in many periods more important crime news may be found on the financial pages of newspapers than on the front pages. White-collar criminality is found in every occupation, as can be discovered readily in casual conversation with a representative of an occupation by asking him, "What crooked practices are found in your occupation?"

White-collar criminality in business is expressed most frequently in the form of misrepresentation in financial statements of corporations, manipulation in the stock exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of public officials directly or indirectly in order to secure favorable contracts and legislation, misrepresentation in advertising and salesmanship, embezzlement and misapplication of funds, short weights and measures and misgrading of com-

modities, tax frauds, misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies. These are what Al Capone called "the legitimate rackets." These and many others are found in abundance in the business world.

In the medical profession, which is here used as an example because it is probably less criminalistic than some other professions, are found illegal sale of alcohol and narcotics, abortion, illegal services to underworld criminals, fraudulent reports and testimony in accident cases, extreme cases of unnecessary treatment, fake specialists, restriction of competition, and fee-splitting. Fee-splitting is a violation of a specific law in many states and a violation of the conditions of admission to the practice of medicine in all. The physician who participates in fee-splitting tends to send his patients to the surgeon who will give him the largest fee rather than to the surgeon who will do the best work. It has been reported that two thirds of the surgeons in New York City split fees, and that more than one half of the physicians in a central western city who answered a questionnaire on this point favored fee-splitting.

These varied types of white-collar crimes in business and the professions consist principally of violation of delegated or implied trust, and many of them can be reduced to two categories: misrepresentation of asset values and duplicity in the manipulation of power. The first is approximately the same as fraud or swindling; the second is similar to the double-cross. The latter is illustrated by the corporation director who, acting on inside information, purchases land which the corporation will need and sells it at a fantastic profit to his corporation. The principle of this duplicity is that the offender holds two antagonistic positions, one of which is a position of trust, which is violated, generally by misapplication of funds, in the interest of the other position. A football coach, permitted to referee a game in which his own team was playing, would illustrate this antagonism of positions. Such situations cannot be completely avoided in a complicated business structure, but many concerns make a practice of assuming such antagonistic functions and regularly violating the trust thus delegated to them. When compelled by law to make a separation of their functions, they make a nominal separation and continue by subterfuge to maintain the two positions.

An accurate statistical comparison of the crimes of the two classes is not available. The most extensive evidence regarding the nature and prevalence of white-collar criminality is found in the reports of the larger investigations to which reference was made. Because of its scattered character, that evidence is assumed rather than summarized here. A few statements will be presented, as illustrations rather than as proof of the prevalence of this criminality.

The Federal Trade Commission in 1920 reported that commercial bribery was a prevalent and common practice in many industries. In certain chain stores, the net shortage in weights was sufficient to pay 3.4 percent on the

investment in those commodities. Of the cans of ether sold to the Army in 1923-1925, 70 percent were rejected because of impurities. In Indiana, during the summer of 1934, 40 percent of the ice cream samples tested in a routine manner by the Division of Public Health were in violation of law. The Comptroller of the Currency in 1908 reported that violations of law were found in 75 percent of the banks examined in a three months' period. Lie detector tests of all employees in several Chicago banks, supported in almost all cases by confessions, showed that 20 percent of them had stolen bank property. A public accountant estimated, in the period prior to the Securities and Exchange Commission, that 80 percent of the financial statements of corporations were misleading. James M. Beck said, "Diogenes would have been hard put to it to find an honest man in the Wall Street which I knew as a corporation lawyer" (in 1916).

White-collar criminality in politics, which is generally recognized as fairly prevalent, has been used by some as a rough gauge by which to measure white-collar criminality in business. James A. Farley said, "The standards of conduct are as high among officeholders and politicians as they are in commercial life," and Cermak, while mayor of Chicago, said, "There is less graft in politics than in business." John Flynn wrote, "The average politician is the merest amateur in the gentle art of graft, compared with his brother in the field of business." And Walter Lippmann wrote, "Poor as they are, the standards of public life are so much more social than those of business that financiers who enter politics regard themselves as philanthropists."

These statements obviously do not give a precise measurement of the relative criminality of the white-collar class, but they are adequate evidence that crime is not so highly concentrated in the lower class as the usual statistics indicate. Also, these statements obviously do not mean that every business and professional man is a criminal, just as the usual theories do not mean that every man in the lower class is a criminal. On the other hand, the preceding statements refer in many cases to the leading corporations in America and are not restricted to the disreputable business and professional men who are called quacks, ambulance chasers, bucket-shop operators, dead-beats, and fly-by-night swindlers.<sup>2</sup>

The financial cost of white-collar crime is probably several times as great as the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps it should be repeated that "white-collar" (upper) and "lower" classes merely designate persons of high and low socioeconomic status. Income and amount of money involved in the crime are not the sole criteria. Many persons of "low" socioeconomic status are "white-collar" criminals in the sense that they are well-dressed, well-educated, and have high incomes, but "white-collar" as used in this paper means "respected," "socially accepted and approved," "looked up to." Some people in this class may not be well-dressed or well-educated, nor have high incomes, although the "upper" usually exceed the "lower" classes in these respects as well as in social status.

"crime problem." An officer of a chain grocery store in one year embezzled \$600,000, which was six times as much as the annual losses from five hundred burglaries and robberies of the stores in that chain. Public enemies numbered one to six secured \$130,000 by burglary and robbery in 1938, while the sum stolen by Krueger is estimated at \$250,000,000, or nearly two thousand times as much. *The New York Times* in 1931 reported four cases of embezzlement in the United States with a loss of more than a million dollars each and a combined loss of nine million dollars. Although a million-dollar burglar or robber is practically unheard of, these million-dollar embezzlers are small-fry among white-collar criminals. The estimated loss to investors in one investment trust from 1929 to 1935 was \$580,000,000, due primarily to the fact that 75 percent of the values in the portfolio were in securities of affiliated companies, although it advertised the importance of diversification in investments and its expert services in selecting safe securities. In Chicago, the claim was made six years ago that householders had lost \$54,000,000 in two years during the administration of a city sealer who granted immunity from inspection to stores which provided Christmas baskets for his constituents.

The financial loss from white-collar crime, great as it is, is less important than the damage to social relations. White-collar crimes violate trust and therefore create distrust, which lowers social morale and produces social disorganization on a large scale. Other crimes produce relatively little effect on social institutions or social organization.

White-collar crime is real crime. It is not ordinarily called crime, and calling it by this name does not make it worse, just as refraining from calling it crime does not make it better than it otherwise would be. It is called crime here in order to bring it within the scope of criminology, which is justified because it is in violation of the criminal law. The crucial question in this analysis is the criterion of violation of the criminal law. Conviction in the criminal court, which is sometimes suggested as the criterion, is not adequate because a large proportion of those who commit crimes are not convicted in criminal courts. This criterion, therefore, needs to be supplemented. When it is supplemented, the criterion of the crimes of one class must be kept consistent in general terms with the criterion of the crimes of the other class. The definition should not be the spirit of the law for white-collar crimes and the letter of the law for other crimes, or in other respects be more liberal for one class than for the other. Since this discussion is concerned with the conventional theories of the criminologists, the criterion of white-collar crime must be justified in terms of the procedures of those criminologists in dealing with other crimes. The criterion of white-collar crimes, as here proposed, supplements convictions in the criminal courts in four respects, in each of which the extension is justified because the crimi-

nologists who present the conventional theories of criminal behavior make the same extension in principle.

First, other agencies than the criminal court must be included, for the criminal court is not the only agency which makes official decisions regarding violations of the criminal law. The juvenile court, dealing largely with offenses of the children of the poor, in many states is not under the criminal jurisdiction. The criminologists have made much use of case histories and statistics of juvenile delinquents in constructing their theories of criminal behavior. This justifies the inclusion of agencies other than the criminal court which deal with white-collar offenses. The most important of these agencies are the administrative boards, bureaus, or commissions, and much of their work, although certainly not all, consists of cases which are in violation of the criminal law. The Federal Trade Commission recently ordered several automobile companies to stop advertising their interest rate on installment purchases as 6 percent, since it was actually  $11\frac{1}{2}$  percent. Also it filed complaint against *Good Housekeeping*, one of the Hearst publications, charging that its seals led the public to believe that all products bearing those seals had been tested in their laboratories, which was contrary to fact. Each of these involves a charge of dishonesty, which might have been tried in a criminal court as fraud. A large proportion of the cases before these boards should be included in the data of the criminologists. Failure to do so is a principal reason for the bias in their samples and the errors in their generalizations.

Second, for both classes, behavior which would have a reasonable expectancy of conviction if tried in a criminal court or substitute agency should be defined as criminal. In this respect, convictability rather than actual conviction should be the criterion of criminality. The criminologists would not hesitate to accept as data a verified case history of a person who was a criminal but had never been convicted. Similarly, it is justifiable to include white-collar criminals who have not been convicted, provided reliable evidence is available. Evidence regarding such cases appears in many civil suits, such as stockholders' suits and patent-infringement suits. These cases might have been referred to the criminal court but they were referred to the civil court because the injured party was more interested in securing damages than in seeing punishment inflicted. This also happens in embezzlement cases, regarding which surety companies have much evidence. In a short consecutive series of embezzlements known to a surety company, 90 percent were not prosecuted because prosecution would interfere with restitution or salvage. The evidence in cases of embezzlement is generally conclusive, and would probably have been sufficient to justify conviction in all of the cases in this series.

Third, behavior should be defined as criminal if conviction is avoided

merely because of pressure which is brought to bear on the court or substitute agency. Gangsters and racketeers have been relatively immune in many cities because of their pressure on prospective witnesses and public officials, and professional thieves, such as pickpockets and confidence men who do not use strong-arm methods, are even more frequently immune. The conventional criminologists do not hesitate to include the life histories of such criminals as data, because they understand the generic relation of the pressures to the failure to convict. Similarly, white-collar criminals are relatively immune because of the class bias of the courts and the power of their class to influence the implementation and administration of the law. This class bias affects not merely present-day courts but to a much greater degree affected the earlier courts which established the precedents and rules of procedure of the present-day courts. Consequently, it is justifiable to interpret the actual or potential failures of conviction in the light of known facts regarding the pressures brought to bear on the agencies which deal with offenders.

Fourth, persons who are accessory to a crime should be included among white-collar criminals as they are among other criminals. When the Federal Bureau of Investigation deals with a case of kidnapping, it is not content with catching the offenders who carried away the victim; they may catch and the court may convict twenty-five other persons who assisted by secreting the victim, negotiating the ransom, or putting the ransom money into circulation. On the other hand, the prosecution of white-collar criminals frequently stops with one offender. Political graft almost always involves collusion between politicians and business men but prosecutions are generally limited to the politicians. Judge Manton was found guilty of accepting \$664,000 in bribes, but the six or eight important commercial concerns that paid the bribes have not been prosecuted. Pendergast, the late boss of Kansas City, was convicted for failure to report as a part of his income \$315,000 received in bribes from insurance companies but the insurance companies which paid the bribes have not been prosecuted. In an investigation of an embezzlement by the president of a bank, at least a dozen other violations of law which were related to this embezzlement and involved most of the other officers of the bank and the officers of the clearing house, were discovered but none of the others was prosecuted.

This analysis of the criterion of white-collar criminality results in the conclusion that a description of white-collar criminality in general terms will be also a description of the criminality of the lower class. The respects in which the crimes of the two classes differ are the incidentals rather than the essentials of criminality. They differ principally in the implementation of the criminal laws which apply to them. The crimes of the lower class are handled by policemen, prosecutors, and judges, with penal sanctions in the

form of fines, imprisonment, and death. The crimes of the upper class either result in no official action at all, or result in suits for damages in civil courts, or are handled by inspectors, and by administrative boards or commissions, with penal sanctions in the form of warnings, orders to cease and desist, occasionally the loss of a license, and only in extreme cases by fines or prison sentences. Thus, the white-collar criminals are segregated administratively from other criminals, and largely as a consequence of this are not regarded as real criminals by themselves, the general public, or the criminologists.

This difference in the implementation of the criminal law is due principally to the difference in the social position of the two types of offenders. Judge Woodward, when imposing sentence upon the officials of the H. O. Stone and Company, bankrupt real estate firm in Chicago, who had been convicted in 1933 of the use of the mails to defraud, said to them, "You are men of affairs, of experience, of refinement and culture, of excellent reputation and standing in the business and social world." That statement might be used as a general characterization of white-collar criminals for they are oriented basically to legitimate and respectable careers. Because of their social status they have a loud voice in determining what goes into the statutes and how the criminal law as it affects themselves is implemented and administered. This may be illustrated from the Pure Food and Drug Law. Between 1879 and 1906, 140 pure food and drug bills were presented in Congress and all failed because of the importance of the persons who would be affected. It took a highly dramatic performance by Dr. Wiley in 1906 to induce Congress to enact the law. That law, however, did not create a new crime, just as the federal Lindbergh kidnapping law did not create a new crime; it merely provided a more efficient implementation of a principle which had been formulated previously in state laws. When an amendment to this law, which would bring within the scope of its agents fraudulent statements made over the radio or in the press, was presented to Congress, the publishers and advertisers organized support and sent a lobby to Washington which successfully fought the amendment principally under the slogans of "freedom of the press" and "dangers of bureaucracy." This proposed amendment, also, would not have created a new crime, for the state laws already prohibited fraudulent statements over the radio or in the press; it would have implemented the law so it could have been enforced. Finally, the Administration has not been able to enforce the law as it has desired because of the pressures by the offenders against the law, sometimes brought to bear through the head of the Department of Agriculture, sometimes through congressmen who threaten cuts in the appropriation, and sometimes by others. The statement of Daniel Drew, a pious old fraud, describes the criminal law with some accuracy, "Law is like a cobweb; it's

made for flies and the smaller kinds of insects, so to speak, but lets the big bumblebees break through. When technicalities of the law stood in my way, I have always been able to brush them aside easy as anything."

The preceding analysis should be regarded neither as an assertion that all efforts to influence legislation and its administration are reprehensible nor as a particularistic interpretation of the criminal law. It means only that the upper class has greater influence in moulding the criminal law and its administration to its own interests than does the lower class. The privileged position of white-collar criminals before the law results to a slight extent from bribery and political pressures, principally from the respect in which they are held and without special effort on their part. The most powerful group in medieval society secured relative immunity by "benefit of clergy," and now our most powerful groups secure relative immunity by "benefit of business or profession."

In contrast with the power of the white-collar criminals is the weakness of their victims. Consumers, investors, and stockholders are unorganized, lack technical knowledge, and cannot protect themselves. Daniel Drew, after taking a large sum of money by sharp practice from Vanderbilt in the Erie deal, concluded that it was a mistake to take money from a powerful man on the same level as himself and declared that in the future he would confine his efforts to outsiders, scattered all over the country, who wouldn't be able to organize and fight back. White-collar criminality flourishes at points where powerful business and professional men come in contact with persons who are weak. In this respect, it is similar to stealing candy from a baby. Many of the crimes of the lower class, on the other hand, are committed against persons of wealth and power in the form of burglary and robbery. Because of this difference in the comparative power of the victims, the white-collar criminals enjoy relative immunity.

Embezzlement is an interesting exception to white-collar criminality in this respect. Embezzlement is usually theft from an employer by an employee, and the employee is less capable of manipulating social and legal forces in his own interest than is the employer. As might have been expected, the laws regarding embezzlement were formulated long before laws for the protection of investors and consumers.

The theory that criminal behavior in general is due either to poverty or to the psychopathic and sociopathic conditions associated with poverty can now be shown to be invalid for three reasons. First, the generalization is based on a biased sample which omits almost entirely the behavior of white-collar criminals. The criminologists have restricted their data, for reasons of convenience and ignorance rather than of principle, largely to cases dealt with in criminal courts and juvenile courts, and these agencies are used principally for criminals from the lower economic strata. Consequently,

their data are grossly biased from the point of view of the economic status of criminals and their generalization that criminality is closely associated with poverty is not justified.

Second, the generalization that criminality is closely associated with poverty obviously does not apply to white-collar criminals. With a small number of exceptions, they are not in poverty, were not reared in slums or badly deteriorated families, and are not feeble-minded or psychopathic. They were seldom problem children in their earlier years and did not appear in juvenile courts or child guidance clinics. The proposition, derived from the data used by the conventional criminologists, that "the criminal of today was the problem child of yesterday" is seldom true of white-collar criminals. The idea that the causes of criminality are to be found almost exclusively in childhood similarly is fallacious. Even if poverty is extended to include the economic stresses which afflict business in a period of depression, it is not closely correlated with white-collar criminality. Probably at no time within fifty years have white-collar crimes in the field of investments and of corporate management been so extensive as during the boom period of the twenties.

Third, the conventional theories do not even explain lower class criminality. The sociopathic and psychopathic factors which have been emphasized doubtless have something to do with crime causation, but these factors have not been related to a general process which is found both in white-collar criminality and lower class criminality and therefore they do not explain the criminality of either class. They may explain the manner or method of crime—why lower class criminals commit burglary or robbery rather than false pretenses.

In view of these defects in the conventional theories, an hypothesis that will explain both white-collar criminality and lower class criminality is needed. For reasons of economy, simplicity, and logic, the hypothesis should apply to both classes, for this will make possible the analysis of causal factors freed from the encumbrances of the administrative devices which have led criminologists astray. Shaw and McKay and others, working exclusively in the field of lower class crime, have found the conventional theories inadequate to account for variations within the data of lower class crime and from that point of view have been working toward an explanation of crime in terms of a more general social process. Such efforts will be greatly aided by the procedure which has been described.

The hypothesis which is here suggested as a substitute for the conventional theories is that white-collar criminality, just as other systematic criminality, is learned; that it is learned in direct or indirect association with those who already practice the behavior; and that those who learn this criminal behavior are segregated from frequent and intimate contacts

with law-abiding behavior. Whether a person becomes a criminal or not is determined largely by the comparative frequency and intimacy of his contacts with the two types of behavior. This may be called the process of differential association. It is a genetic explanation both of white-collar criminality and lower class criminality. Those who become white-collar criminals generally start their careers in good neighborhoods and good homes, graduate from colleges with some idealism, and with little selection on their part, get into particular business situations in which criminality is practically a folkway and are inducted into that system of behavior just as into any other folkway. The lower class criminals generally start their careers in deteriorated neighborhoods and families, find delinquents at hand from whom they acquire the attitudes toward, and techniques of, crime through association with delinquents and in partial segregation from law-abiding people. The essentials of the process are the same for the two classes of criminals. This is not entirely a process of assimilation, for inventions are frequently made, perhaps more frequently in white-collar crime than in lower class crime. The inventive geniuses for the lower class criminals are generally professional criminals, while the inventive geniuses for many kinds of white-collar crime are generally lawyers.

A second general process is social disorganization in the community. Differential association culminates in crime because the community is not organized solidly against that behavior. The law is pressing in one direction, and other forces are pressing in the opposite direction. In business, the "rules of the game" conflict with the legal rules. A business man who wants to obey the law is driven by his competitors to adopt their methods. This is well illustrated by the persistence of commercial bribery in spite of the strenuous efforts of business organizations to eliminate it. Groups and individuals are individuated; they are more concerned with their specialized group or individual interests than with the larger welfare. Consequently, it is not possible for the community to present a solid front in opposition to crime. The Better Business Bureaus and Crime Commissions, composed of business and professional men, attack burglary, robbery, and cheap swindles, but overlook the crimes of their own members. The forces which impinge on the lower class are similarly in conflict. Social organization affects the two classes in similar ways.

I have presented a brief and general description of white-collar criminality on a framework of argument regarding theories of criminal behavior. That argument, stripped of the description, may be stated in the following propositions:

1. White-collar criminality is real criminality, being in all cases in violation of the criminal law.
2. White-collar criminality differs from lower class criminality principal-

ly in an implementation of the criminal law which segregates white-collar criminals administratively from other criminals.

3. The theories of the criminologists that crime is due to poverty or to psychopathic and sociopathic conditions statistically associated with poverty are invalid because, first, they are derived from samples which are grossly biased with respect to socioeconomic status; second, they do not apply to the white-collar criminals; and third, they do not even explain the criminality of the lower class, since the factors are not related to a general process characteristic of all criminality.

4. A theory of criminal behavior which will explain both white-collar criminality and lower class criminality is needed.

5. An hypothesis of this nature is suggested in terms of differential association and social disorganization.

## FACT AND FACTITIOUSNESS IN ETHNIC OPINIONNAIRES\*

ROBERT K. MERTON

*Tulane University*

"FOR A desperate disease, a desperate cure"; therefore, if opinionnaires are to be used they must be discussed. This is a preliminary report on one phase of an extended study of opinions on ethnic groups. The major objectives are (1) to suggest certain lines of internal and external criticism of opinionnaire 'results' and (2) to present certain materials pertaining to group differences in the endorsement of a range of judgments about Negroes.<sup>1</sup>

It has been largely agreed for the last decade that the various 'attitude scales' introduced by L. L. Thurstone represent the most exact means of assaying group attitudes toward various social values. It is argued here that some of the procedures used in the scoring and interpretation of Thurstonian 'scales' involve methodological contradictions and sociological inadequacies. Although it is believed that this is true of the various Thurstonian opinionnaires (on War, Prohibition, Communism, 'the' Church, 'the' Negro, etc.), the present discussion is restricted to ethnic opinionnaires.

*'Attitudes' of Religious Groups toward 'The' Negro.* The following tabulation is presented as an introductory basis for this discussion. The table summarizes results obtained through a printed opinionnaire concerning 'the' Negro which was administered to 679 college students registered in sociology courses at Harvard University, Radcliffe College, Pennsylvania State College, Tulane University, and Louisiana State University, at various times between October 1938 and October 1939.<sup>2</sup> The opinionnaire consists of thirty statements about the Negro. It was adapted from a 'scale' con-

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<sup>1</sup> Limitations of space preclude the extended discussion merited by each of the several points in question. Hence, the full evidence for various conclusions and inferences can be only imperfectly reported. The fault is not necessarily lessened by its admission.—Throughout the paper, certain terms have been consistently set off by inverted commas ('thus'). Terms thus qualified are to be read: so-called. This device lessens the likelihood of equivocation, of using the same term to denote two or more significantly different concepts.

<sup>2</sup> The opinionnaire (which is appended to this paper) is part of a larger test battery which is not treated here. I am indebted to the following persons for aid in administering these opinionnaires: at Harvard and Radcliffe, E. Y. Hartshorne, Logan Wilson, Edward Devereux and Dudley Kirk; at Pennsylvania State, Kingsley Davis and Gordon T. Bowden; at Louisiana State University, Edgar A. Schuler, T. Lynn Smith and M. B. Smith. The Harvard-Radcliffe sample was obtained between October 1-11, 1938 (except for retests which are not reported here); the Pennsylvania State sample, between February 18 and March 5, 1939; the Tulane-Newcomb sample on Sept. 30, 1939; the Louisiana State sample between Oct. 13-19, 1939.

structed by I. D. MacCrone according to the Thurstone-Chave-Droba method of equal-appearing intervals.<sup>3</sup>

TABLE I. 'MEAN SCORES' ON OPINIONNAIRES CONCERNING 'THE' NEGRO, ACCORDING TO SEX, COLLEGE, AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF SUBJECTS

Colleges	MALES															
	Catholics			Protestants			Jews			None			Unknown		Total	
	N	MS	R <sup>1</sup>	N	MS	R	N	MS	R	N	MS	R	N	MS	N	MS
Harvard	25	4.3	1	82	3.9	2	51	3.1	3	22	2.6	4	35	3.8	215	3.6
Penn State	15	5.0	1	27	3.9	2	16	3.0	4	5	3.4	3	13	4.0	76	3.9
Tulane	18	6.3	1	12	5.2	2	4	4.3	3	1	4.0	4	—	—	35	5.5
L. S. U.	25	6.1	1	56	6.0	2	2	3.4	4	8	5.4	3	1	5.4	92	5.9
Total	83	—	—	177	—	—	73	—	—	36	—	—	49	—	418	—
Colleges	FEMALES															
	N	MS	R <sup>1</sup>	N	MS	R	N	MS	R	N	MS	R	N	MS	N	MS
Radcliffe	21	4.4	1	40	3.4	2½	18	3.4	2½	5	2.7	4	5	3.9	89	3.6
Penn State	6	4.8	1	24	3.5	2	3	3.1	3	1	3.0	4	3	4.1	37	3.7
Newcomb	5	7.1	1	14	5.6	2	1	3.5	3	—	—	—	—	—	20	6.1
L. S. U.	40	6.1	1	66	5.5	2	5	4.1	3	4	2.3	4	—	—	115	5.6
Total	72	—	—	144	—	—	27	—	—	10	—	—	8	—	261	—

CRITICAL RATIOS  $\left( \frac{\text{diff.}}{\sigma \text{ diff.}} \right)$

Classes of Subjects Compared	"Northern" Subjects <sup>2</sup> (males and females) <sup>3</sup>	"Southern" Subjects <sup>2</sup> (males and females) <sup>3</sup>
Protestants versus Catholics	3.4	2.2
Protestants versus Jews	3.6	3.1
Protestants versus No Religious Affiliation	4.4	2.1
Catholics versus Jews	5.6	3.9
Catholics versus No Religious Affiliation	6.2	2.9
Jews versus No Religious Affiliation	1.8	0.7

<sup>1</sup> R is the rank order of religious groups according to an interpretation which will be presently criticized; MS is the 'mean score.'

<sup>2</sup> "Northern" subjects are: Harvard, Radcliffe, and Pennsylvania State subjects; "Southern" subjects are: Tulane, Newcomb and Louisiana State subjects.

<sup>3</sup> Inasmuch as the differences in means between males and females of the same geographical region and the same religious affiliation are insignificant, these groups have been combined in the computation of critical ratios.

The foregoing computations exhibit uniformities which appear to be statistically significant, despite the paucity of cases in some of the subgroup-

<sup>3</sup> See I. D. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes in South Africa*, chap. IX, New York, 1937. The original opinionnaire referred to the South African 'native' and the scale-values were based upon the judgments of 200 persons of European descent and 100 Bantu. Only those statements

ings. In all of the eight samples, the Catholics rank first in the endorsement of judgments 'unfavorable' to 'the' Negro. With almost equal regularity, the Protestants rank second; the Jews are usually third and those with no religious affiliation rank fourth (or 'least unfavorable'). The conventional indexes of statistical significance suggest that these are 'real' differences, particularly between the 'Northern' religious aggregates. (However, as the critical ratios indicate, the differences between the Jews and the 'non-religious' groups are anything but significant.) The consistency of these results is so pronounced that, despite occasionally insignificant differences between averages, there would appear some justification for proclaiming that "Catholics are least favorable toward the Negro whereas the nonreligious and Jews are most favorable, with the Protestants consistently between these extremes." In point of fact, conclusions of this general sort based upon the same kind of evidence are current in the literature on ethnic and racial attitudes.<sup>4</sup> When so based, such conclusions may be at once impugned.

*Methodological Fallacies of the Thurstone Attitude Scales.* The basic objections to such a conclusion questions the meaning of summed or averaged scores of group responses to 'scales' using the Thurstone technique of construction. What do these 'averaged scores' denote? The usual answer is that they constitute an 'index' of the degree of 'favorableness' or 'unfavorableness' toward 'the' Negro. This answer is based on the conviction that the judgments which make up the inventory represent a 'linear continuum' and that the scale-values of endorsed judgments may be algebraically summed and averaged.<sup>5</sup> This assertion can be and has been challenged but, to my knowledge, the various criticisms have not been satisfactorily met.<sup>6</sup> The ob-

which were ordered similarly by both groups were included in the inventory. It will be noted that substitution of the term 'Negro' for the term 'the native' leads to a series of judgments which are substantially similar to those in the Hinckley-Thurstone 'attitude-toward-the-Negro scale.' The same assumptions underlie our adaptation of MacCrone's inventory and the use of 'generalized scales,' except that our adaptation involves the generalizing process to a lesser extent. See H. H. Remmers and E. B. Silance, "Generalized Attitude Scales," *J. Soc. Psychol.*, 5:298-312, 1934.

<sup>4</sup> E.g., for sex differences in 'mean attitude scores,' see V. F. Sims and J. R. Patrick, "Attitude toward the Negro of Northern and Southern College Students," *J. Soc. Psychol.*, 7:196-197, 1936.

<sup>5</sup> See the explicit statement of L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave on this point. "It is legitimate to determine a central tendency for the frequency distribution of attitudes in a group. Several groups of individuals may then be compared as regards the means of their respective frequency distributions of attitudes. The differences between the means of several such distributions may be directly compared because of the fact that a rational base line has been established." *The Measurement of Attitudes*, 82, Chicago, 1929.

<sup>6</sup> For basic methodological criticism of the Thurstonian assumption of a linear continuum, see the incisive papers by H. M. Johnson, "Pseudo-Mathematics in the Mental and Social Sciences," *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 48:342-351, 1936, and by Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Assumptions and Methods in Attitude Measurements," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1:75-88, 1936. See also Kirkpatrick's further papers on this subject cited therein, and the general methodological discussions of measurement by N. R. Campbell, *An Account of the Principles of Measurement and Calculation*, New York, 1928, and by Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to*

jections to the assumption of a linear continuum (involving additivity and determination of central tendencies) are of at least three interrelated kinds.

1. It can be shown that Thurstone's scale-values are not additive, inasmuch as his collections of statements do not have the 'group-property', i.e., do not constitute closed systems.<sup>7</sup> To put this more concretely, let us examine Thurstone's assertion that "we may assign the scale-value to each of the statements that a subject has endorsed and then calculate their arithmetic mean."<sup>8</sup> Suppose (1) that a person, *A*, who is extremely unfavorable toward 'the' Negro, endorses Statement 6 ("I consider that the Negro is more like an animal than a human being") with a scale-value of 10.6. Suppose (2) that individual *B* is even more intensely unfavorable to 'the' Negro, and that he likewise endorses Statement 6 and also several other statements disparaging to Negroes (e.g., Statements 1, 2, 8 and 30, with scale-values of 10.3, 10.2, 9.7, and 8.8 respectively). *B*'s 'score' (arithmetical mean) thus becomes 9.9 which is less 'unfavorable' than *A*'s score of 10.6, which contradicts the hypothesis. The inevitable result of multiple endorsements of statements lying at either extreme of the 'scale' is a score which is less extreme than that obtained by endorsing *only* the limiting statements in the series. Given a finite number of statements, the 'score' of endorsed statements may thus become an inaccurate index of subjects' convictions concerning the value in question.<sup>9</sup>

2. That Thurstone's inventories do not constitute a linear 'scale' may be seen in another connection. Were the inventory a linear scale, endorsement of a statement with a given scale-value would involve "acceptance of all positions less extreme and in the same direction from the neutral position."<sup>10</sup> In other words, were the Thurstone inventory actually a 'scale', in

*Logic and Scientific Method*, chap. XV, New York, 1934. For a paper which purports to demonstrate the logical validity of such techniques of 'measurement' as those of Thurstone, see George A. Lundberg, "The Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1:703-723, 1936. Relevant to this discussion is the unpublished critique of Lundberg's paper read by R. K. Merton at the Eastern Sociological Conference, New Haven, April 18, 1936.

<sup>7</sup> For a demonstration of this inadequacy, see Johnson, *op. cit.*, 349-350. For a brief discussion of the group-property, see Cassius J. Keyser, *Mathematical Philosophy*, chap. XII, New York, 1922.

<sup>8</sup> Thurstone and Chave, *op. cit.*, 64. In the Hinckley-Thurstone 'attitude-toward-the-Negro scale,' 'scores' are constituted by the median scale value. This is a difference which makes no difference to our argument. Likewise, the use of MacCrone's statements and scale-values, rather than Hinckley's, does not affect the *logical* basis of our discussion.

<sup>9</sup> For Thurstonian inventories which contain statements of the "A" and "E" types ('All,' 'No') this difficulty becomes readily apparent. The "A" proposition includes all the "I" propositions, yet the subject who endorses both the "A" statement and any or all of the "I" propositions will obtain a lower score than the subject who simply endorses the "A" statement. As Johnson suggests, "Perhaps the procedure should be worked over." *op. cit.*, 350.

<sup>10</sup> G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, 906, New York, 1937. The fact that Thurstone has chosen not to indicate a 'neutral' position on his 'scale' is irrelevant for, as he indicates, "The origin is arbitrarily assigned. We could have placed the origin in the middle of the scale, but that would necessitate dealing with negative class-intervals and nothing is statistically gained thereby." Thurstone and Chave, *op. cit.*, 63.

the strict sense, persons endorsing items graded as 'very unfavorable' might be assumed to endorse all statements involving slightly less depreciation of the social value in question. Likewise, endorsements of statements with scale-values of 8 and 10.3, let us say, would logically entail endorsement of all statements with scale-values falling between 8 and 10.3. This is a most elementary consideration. "No one could use a ruler on which he could not tell whether the point marked 7 would fall between 6 and 8 or whether it would have a capricious preference for some other point on the instrument."<sup>11</sup> In actual practice, however, as those who have used Thurstone's inventories can testify, there is no assurance that subjects will check all the statements with scale-values intermediate between the extremes of those actually endorsed. If this be a linear 'scale,' it is one belonging to a newly created species of scales.

- ✓ 3. Not unrelated to these considerations is the question of *interchangeability of units* in a measurable collection. The Thurstone units are not interchangeable, as can be illustrated by the following case. Individual *A* endorses Statement 6 ("I consider that the Negro is more like an animal than a human being") with a scale-value of 10.6 and also endorses Statement 25 ("I consider that the white man is neglecting to do his duty by not doing more to improve the lot of the Negro") with a scale-value of 2.8. By the Thurstone method of scoring, his score is 6.7. Individual *B* endorses Statement 24 ("I think that all the Negro needs to make him happy is the satisfaction of his material needs") with a scale-value of 6.7. In both cases, then, the score is 6.7. In what sense can we conclude that these two persons are equally 'favorable' (or equally 'unfavorable') to 'the' Negro? Interviews with various subjects who have identical 'scores' indicate that they will not readily substitute endorsement of one *set* of endorsed statements for another *set* of statements, even though the two sets result in identical or insignificantly different 'average scores.' If so, what is the denotation of 'equally favorable' scores? Can we conclude with such proponents of unalloyed operationalism as Lundberg that in this way "the term *attitude* would . . . have a very much narrower but a more definite meaning than at present?"<sup>12</sup> Narrower, perhaps, but hardly more definite, Thurstone *assumes* an interchangeability of judgments with identical scale-values which does not in fact exist. Statistical fiat does not make empirical fact.

In this connection, various investigators have maintained that these 'scales' are not designed to represent 'attitudes' pictorially. They assert that Thurstone's 'scales', like scientific measuring instruments in general, do not measure *all* aspects of events. These instruments respond selectively to one aspect or property, e.g., 'favorableness', just as the balance responds only to one property, weight. Hence, it is argued, criticisms which

<sup>11</sup> Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb, *op. cit.*, 897.

<sup>12</sup> Lundberg, *op. cit.*, 711.

hold that Thurstone's 'scales' force complex attitudes into one dimension are wholly beside the point, since no scientific construct "attempts to cover all enumerable details of a class of phenomena."<sup>13</sup> To my mind, the analogy seems to be slightly misplaced. The fault of Thurstone's constructs is not their abstractness but their failure to constitute a continuum involving assignable magnitudes. Despite the complicated operations involved in the construction of these 'scales', there is no introduction of *cardinal* numbers at any point. Thurstone's inventories are usable if they are treated for what they are: ordered series of statements concerning social values. In terms of certain criteria, they rank, but they do not 'measure', opinions.

*Sociological Inadequacies of the Thurstone Attitude Scale.* When we shift our attention from the inventory-as-a-whole to its component statements, several sociological assumptions come into view. In an effort to eliminate 'undifferentiating elements' from his 'scale,' Thurstone introduced such criteria as 'ambiguity' (Q-value) and 'irrelevance.' To be sure, these criteria are necessary if the sole objective is to develop an instrument that will 'measure' a given property, but this very emphasis on linearity may obscure the sociological utility of including in an inventory some statements which, on the basis of these criteria, are not 'differentiating,' i.e., statements endorsed with equal frequency by persons with differentiated responses to other statements. In other words, if we abandon or modify the notion that these inventories 'measure' a single 'attitude,' opinions involving the coalescence of several cultural values may be included in the inventory, although conventional tests of reliability may lead us to designate these opinions as 'undifferentiating.' Otherwise, we rule out access to *those opinions which are shared* by most of our sample, irrespective of their differences about other opinions.

In the case of such opinions, we are no longer dealing with 'pure,' highly distilled opinions concerning 'the' Negro (as a 'pure' abstraction) but rather with complex opinions concerning Negroes within certain cultural contexts. Thus, using Thurstone's criteria, such statements as "I think that the Negro ought to be given every opportunity of education and development—just like the white man" would be discarded because they are endorsed by a large proportion of subjects with 'scores' lying near both extremes of the 'scale.' This statement would be suspect, for although our 'Northern' samples consistently endorsed it more frequently than did our 'Southern' samples, yet 45 percent of the latter also endorsed it. Apparently, then, this statement does not exclusively reflect 'attitudes' toward 'the' Negro, 'as such,' but involves also the 'halo-effect' induced by the prestige of 'universal education' as a cultural value in our society. Endorsement may thus be

<sup>13</sup> L. L. Thurstone, *The Vectors of Mind*, 44-48, Chicago, 1935; see also Lundberg, *op. cit.*, 714.

a resultant of opinions concerning 'the' Negro and of opinions concerning the cultural premise that "every American citizen has a right to an education." Thus, even though statements of this type are irrelevant by Thurstonian standards, frequency of endorsement can be adopted as a crude index of current opinions concerning Negroes-and-education as a value-complex. Combining separate tests of 'attitudes toward education' and 'attitudes toward the Negro' would no more provide an index of this opinion-configuration than combining encyclopedia articles on "France" and on "disease" would provide discussion of "the French disease." Otherwise stated, the effort to attain a linear scale should not be permitted to divert all attention from the sociologically and psychologically relevant question of opinion-configurations.<sup>14</sup> Group differentials in the endorsement or rejection of complex opinions constitute valuable descriptive data.<sup>15</sup>

If opinionnaires are to serve as indexes of current opinion concerning social values, their component statements should be analyzed with reference to values besides those to which the inventory-as-a-whole is devoted. This assertion has implications for determining 'internal consistency' of an inventory by means of the association between each statement in the inventory and the total score. An item is said to be discriminating according to the extent to which it leads to differential responses by persons with markedly different total scores. It is further believed that nondiscriminating items should be discarded. Although this procedure is statistically impeccable,<sup>16</sup> it obscures fallacious assumptions by assuming a disputable 'logic of relations' between judgments involving social evaluations. Let us turn to cases.

The investigator who shelves his psychology and sociology while he deals with mathematical formulas will doubtless conclude that if a considerable proportion of subjects endorse both of the following statements, the 'internal consistency' is to this extent lessened.

<sup>14</sup> Clifford Kirkpatrick and Sarah Stone have evolved a 'belief pattern method' of appraising configurations of opinions. However, they also assert the 'unsatisfactory' nature of inventory-statements which are "ambiguous since either factual, evaluational or logical considerations may have motivated the acceptance or rejection of the statements." It may be suggested, however, that statements which are 'ambiguous' in terms of imputable motivation may nevertheless prove useful in ascertaining group differences in maintaining complex opinions. See Kirkpatrick and Stone, "Attitude Measurement and the Comparison of Generations," *J. Applied Psychol.*, 19:575, 1935.

<sup>15</sup> G. Murphy and R. Likert note "the importance of considering the qualitative significance of each item as well as the significance of the whole scales." *Public Opinion and the Individual*, 50-51, New York, 1938. See also Keith Sward's observation that 'mean scores' in rating scales are inadequate "except as the very roughest of devices." He finds that item-analysis contains an assortment of traits that are significant numerically and qualitatively." See his "Patterns of Jewish Temperament," *J. Applied Psychol.*, 19:410-425, 1935.

<sup>16</sup> However, R. F. Sletto has demonstrated that "measurement of a single common variable cannot be safely inferred from the fact that items satisfy the criterion of internal consistency, as usually applied." See his "Critical Study of the Criterion of Internal Consistency in Personality Scale Construction," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1:61-68, 1936; and the valuable discussion of this paper by R. V. Bowers, *ibid.*, 69-74.

"To my mind the Negro is so childish and irresponsible that he cannot be expected to know what is in his best interests" (scale-value = 8.4, i.e., 'unfavorable').

"I think that the Negro ought to be given every opportunity of education and development—just like the white man" (scale-value = 1.1, i.e., 'very favorable').

Endorsement by the same subjects of both these statements, rated as 'unfavorable' and 'favorable' respectively, will presumably cast suspicion on their reliability and validity.<sup>17</sup> A reconstruction of the implicit reasoning may be hazarded. If a person believes Negroes to be childish and irresponsible, he will scarcely favor their being given every opportunity of education. Hence, if the same subjects endorse both these judgments, they are not giving their 'real' opinions but are checking statements facetiously or at random. Or, it is inferred, the statements do not adequately reflect 'attitudes' toward the same entity, 'the' Negro. Both of these inferences contain a suppressed premise which, I suggest, is fallacious. This premise holds that subjects do not 'really' subscribe to 'logically' contradictory judgments. In making this assumption, the investigator is playing the role of logician rather than psychologist or sociologist. He is, in effect, tacitly assuming that these presumably incompatible assertions *should not* be endorsed by the same persons. Such a prejudgment minimizes the possibility of securing an adequate representation of the inconsistencies of social judgments which in many instances actually obtain. This 'test of internal consistency' is based on a dubious rationalist assumption. In making this assumption, the investigator is using *norms* of logic, not facts of sociology.

Once we shift from the level of logical norms to the level of psychosocial fact, we observe that incompatible judgments are often made by the same person.<sup>18</sup> Thus, in the previous illustration, persons who subscribe to both the national democratic ideology—including the belief in education as a 'moral right'—and to the regional ideology which insists on the childishness and irresponsibility of the Negro, will readily and honestly endorse both statements. To assume, as Thurstone does, that persons hold rigorously consistent social opinions is to fly in the face of a store of clinical observations by psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and John Doe himself. It is not pertinent to our present problem to discuss the level on which these coexisting judgments are 'not consistent.' It is sufficient to indicate

<sup>17</sup> The explicit relevant statement reads: "If we find considerable inconsistency [in endorsements], we might attribute [it to the carelessness of the subjects in making their check marks more or less at random, or we might attribute it to defects in the statements themselves. . . . But the inconsistencies vary with the statement that is chosen as a basis of comparison with all the rest, and such differences are due primarily no doubt to defects in the statements themselves. We have so regarded them. . . ." Thurstone and Chave, *op. cit.*, 46-47.

<sup>18</sup> A paraphrase of an observation by Jean Piaget is pertinent. "For it is not by taking the ready-made schema of adult reasoning (and of explicit scientific . . . reasoning at that) and by submitting this schema to, say syllogistic tests so as to see whether the [subject] conforms to our practical and scholastic habits of thought, that we shall succeed in finding the true nature of [social opinions]." *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*, 135, New York, 1928.

that Thurstone's criterion of 'irrelevancy' is loaded with assumptions which are contrary to fact; that here again mathematical technique has supplanted and obscured sociological considerations.<sup>19</sup>

A further mooted point in connection with opinionnaires is the relation of opinion to overt behavior. The current vogue of semanticism and Paretoism leads some to draw questionable inferences from these systems of thought and to urge that verbal responses are "really of minor importance." The metaphysical assumption is tacitly introduced that in one sense or another overt behavior is 'more real' than verbal behavior. This assumption is both unwarranted and scientifically meaningless. In some situations, it may be discovered that overt behavior is a more reliable basis for drawing inferences about future behavior (overt or verbal). In other situations, it may be found that verbal responses are a tolerably accurate guide to future behavior (overt or verbal). It should not be forgotten that overt actions may deceive; that they, just as 'derivations' or 'speech reactions' may be deliberately designed to disguise or to conceal private attitudes. The question of the relative 'significance' of verbal and overt responses must as yet be solved anew for each class of problems. The apriori assumption that verbal responses are simply epiphenomenal is to be accorded no greater weight than the assumption that words do not deceive nor actions lie. It is unnecessary to repeat additional considerations in this connection except to state, in company with Thurstone, Murphy, Likert and others, that the expression of opinion is itself a recurrent phase of social activity. Hence, reliable and valid opinionnaires may be useful even if unrelated to overt behavior.

Another issue in this controversy has not received adequate attention. It is not simply a question of whether or not overt behavior 'coincides' with expressed or endorsed opinions. This way of formulating the problem obscures one of its basic aspects, namely, may we assume the amount and direction of spread between opinion and action to be relatively constant for members of different groups? To my knowledge, no systematic research on this problem has been carried out.<sup>20</sup> It may be tentatively (and speculatively) suggested that the spread between opinion and action is not the same for different groups but that the 'differences in direction of spread' are relatively constant. Thus, the hypothesis may be advanced that 'the Northern index of *verbalized* tolerance' of Negroes is consistently *higher* than their 'index of *behavioral* tolerance' of Negroes. And, contrariwise, that 'the Southern index of *verbalized* tolerance' is consistently *lower* than their 'index of behavioral tolerance.' Put in less idiomatic but possibly more intelligible terms, it is possible that Northerners treat Negroes less 'favorably' than they talk about them and that Southerners talk about Negroes less 'favor-

<sup>19</sup> A close reading of the method of constructing the criterion of 'irrelevance' shows that these invalid assumptions underlie the 'index of similarity.' See Thurstone and Chave, *op. cit.*, 46-56.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Richard T. LaPiere, *Collective Behavior*, 49-50, New York, 1938.

ably' than they treat them.<sup>21</sup> Or possibly the difference is one of degree rather than direction. In any event, setting the problem in these terms shifts the discussion from the question of correlation between opinion and action *in general* to comparisons of degree and direction of correlation in various groups. To be sure, these notions about possibly consistent group differences in spread between opinion and action are largely speculative at the present juncture.<sup>22</sup> But the very hypothesis emphasizes the need for caution in the use of 'attitude scores' derived from opinionnaires as indexes of predispositions to act in a determinate fashion toward a given value. Identical scores may well be associated with sharply diverging forms of overt behavior.

*Regional Differences in Opinions Concerning 'The' Negro.* With these strictures in mind, we may now consider a preliminary report of regional differences in endorsement of statements about 'the' Negro. Some studies have assumed that student-subjects hold opinions which represent the mores of the region where they attend school. This assumption may or may not square with the facts; in any event, it should not be assumed without further ado that subjects represent the particular geographical region in which they are tested. Using the sixfold division into 'regions' developed by Odum,<sup>23</sup> we find considerable variations between our samples with regard

<sup>21</sup> The terms 'favorable' and 'unfavorable' are suspiciously inexact and at times misleading. They should be interpreted within the context of considerations introduced in the next note.

<sup>22</sup> "Largely speculative," because the theory of social stereotypes suggests that such differences in spread may occur through the varying roles played by stereotypes in propositions and in overt behavior. Thus, 'Southerners,' when asked to respond to propositions about 'the' Negro may show an unequivocally 'unfavorable' and 'intolerant attitude,' although their relations with specific Negroes may involve a larger component of 'intimacy,' 'favorableness' and 'tolerance' than would be the case with 'Northerners' interaction with specific Negroes. In the proposition, there may be a response to a verbal stereotype, 'the Negro'; in behavior, there may be response to a concrete personality standing in a complex set of relations to the white, e.g., Herman-the-colored-handyman-who-has-been-with-the-family-for-years-and-knows-more-about-my-dahlias-than-I-do, etc. (John Dollard's speculations concerning the relative frequency and intensity of stereotypes of Negroes among Northern and Southern whites partly agree and partly disagree with these suggestions. See his *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 73, 84, 390, New Haven, Conn., 1937.) These suggestions indicate the vacuity of such one-dimensional terms as 'favorableness,' 'tolerance,' 'appreciation,' 'depreciation,' and the like. It would seem expedient to reassess the denotations of such crude abstractions, especially when one investigator can conclude that 'Northerners' have greater "good-will" toward 'the' Negro than 'Southerners'; while others conclude that "on the whole, a greater 'aversion' was shown toward 'the' Negro by Northern than by Southern students"; and a third study informs us that Northern students are "more favorable" to 'the' Negro than are Southern students. Item-analyses of actual frequencies of endorsements of specific statements would do much to eliminate or to minimize such indulgence in verbalism. See C. W. Hunter, *A Comparative Study of the Relationship Existing Between the White Race and the Negro Race in the State of North Carolina and in the City of New York* (unpublished Columbia University M.A. thesis summarized by G. and L. B. Murphy, *Experimental Social Psychology*, 639-645, New York, 1931); D. Katz and F. H. Allport, *Students' Attitudes*, 102, Syracuse, 1931; Sims and Patrick, *op. cit.*, 194-195.

<sup>23</sup> For an itemization of the states included in each of the six regions—Southeast, Southwest, Northeast, Middle States, Northwest, Far West—and a discussion of the criteria adopted in this classification, see Howard W. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States*, 1-205, Chapel Hill, N. C., 1936.

to the percentages of subjects who have lived for the past decade in the same region as that in which their school is located. Thus, in the Harvard-Radcliffe sample, 68, or 21.6 percent had their residence outside the Northeastern region; of the Pennsylvania State sample, only 4, or 3.5 percent, derived from outside this region; of the Tulane-Newcomb sample, 5, or 9 percent, and of the Louisiana State University sample, 28, or 13.5 percent, had their homes outside the Southeastern region.<sup>24</sup> Thus, with respect to these samples, the assumption that the subjects' endorsements were those of persons living in the cultural region wherein their schools are located would lead to a significant error. The original data were reclassified according to the subjects' place of residence for ten years prior to 1938-39. This shifts the frequency distributions of endorsements to some extent and decreases the standard deviations.<sup>25</sup>

The following item-analyses, then, pertain to 346 subjects recruited from the Northeastern region and 233 from the Southeastern region. A synopsis of the percentages of these two samples who endorsed each of the thirty statements in the opinionnaire is presented in the following chart. An arbitrary definition leads to the inclusion of all statements endorsed by fifty percent or more of either sample in an 'inventory of assent.' It was likewise decided that statements which were endorsed by ten percent or less of a sample would be taken to comprise the 'inventory of dissent' for that group.<sup>26</sup> Thus, we obtain four classes of statements which we call the 'Northern credo,' 'the Southern credo,' 'Northern dissent' and 'Southern dissent.'<sup>27</sup>

An empirical classification of the Northern and Southern inventories follows.<sup>28</sup>

## NORTHERN CREDO

## A. Expressions of Democratic Mores.

4. Negro should have every opportunity of education and development—just like the white man. (83.2%)
10. Negroes' rights have nearly always been ignored by the white man. (51.2%)

## SOUTHERN CREDO

## A. Expressions of Caste Mores.

8. Negro should always occupy an inferior position in the community. (64.4%)
9. Present social system is fundamentally not unjust to the Negro. (60.9%)

<sup>24</sup> Fourteen cases in the Harvard-Radcliffe sample and four cases in the Pennsylvania State sample did not state their place of residence.

<sup>25</sup> Of course, when the research is designed with "practical objectives of college administration" in mind, breakdowns by residence are not necessary. See, e.g., Katz and Allport, *op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> These labels do not imply that these opinion-aggregates are typical of 'the North' or 'the South.' The results (frequencies of endorsements) should not be extrapolated beyond the groups actually involved nor can we simply assume that these opinions are stable.

<sup>27</sup> The arbitrariness of these definitions should be apparent. Differing magnitudes of critical ratios could instead be adopted as the criterion of the various credos. Note also that 'inventory of dissent' is a somewhat misleading phrase; it would be more accurate to say 'inventory of nonassent,' inasmuch as subjects were asked to check only those statements which they endorsed. Thus, failure to check a statement is ambiguous; it may signify anything from sharp disagreement to incomplete agreement with the opinion.

<sup>28</sup> Numbers refer to statements in the *Opinionnaire* appended to this article.



19. Negroes' rights should not be subordinated to selfish interests of the white man. (68.5%)

16. No Negro should be allowed to compete with a white man. (52.8%)

26. I have no objection to the Negro provided he keeps his proper place. (88.8%)

*B. Qualities Imputed to the Negro.*

28. I admire the Negro for his many good qualities. (61.6%)

*B. Qualities Imputed to the Negro.*

24. All the Negro needs to make him happy is the satisfaction of his material needs. (57.1%)

*C. Ambivalence toward Caste-system, with Dominant Negative Valence.*

20. I am not very happy about the way the Negro is treated, but I find it difficult to decide which is the right way. (54.6%)

*C. Ambivalence toward Caste-system, with Dominant Positive Valence.*

14. Sometimes I feel the Negro is not getting a square deal, but at other times I feel he has a lot to be thankful for. (62.7%)

NORTHERN DISSENT

*A. Nonendorsement of Antidemocratic Mores.*

8. (See under Southern Credo, A.) (9.5%)  
13. Negro ought not to be helped until all the white people in need have been helped. (5.5%)  
16. (See under Southern Credo, A.) (5.5%)  
29. I feel very strongly that the white man cannot maintain his proper position unless he discriminates against the Negro. (6.1%)

*B. Nonendorsement of Imputation of Qualities to the Negro.*

1. Negro is fit to do only the 'dirty' work of the white community. (3.2%)  
7. Negro can profit by education only to a very limited extent. (9.0%)  
15. The Negro cannot be relied upon in a position of trust or responsibility. (9.2%)  
17. The Negro is childish and irresponsible. (4.0%)  
30. The Negro's failure to develop a civilization before he arrived in this country is proof of his innate inferiority. (8.1%)

SOUTHERN DISSENT

*A. Nonendorsement of Anticaste Mores.*

11. I would rather see the white people lose their position in this country than keep it at the expense of injustice to the Negro. (3.4%)

*B. Nonendorsement of Imputation of Qualities to the Negro.*

5. If Negro were given the chance he would be just as good as the white man. (9.9%)  
21. Negro has a great future and a valuable contribution to make to world civilization. (9.9%)

*Seldom Endorsed by Either.*

6. I consider that the Negro is more like an animal than a human being. (Northern sample = .9%; Southern sample = 8.6%)

On the whole, fifty percent or more of our 'Northern' subjects subscribe to the 'democratic mores' which allege the right to equal opportunity for individual development, irrespective of race. These convictions are supported by a series of beliefs which deny the intrinsic inferiority of 'the' Negro. Contrariwise, Southern subjects largely assent to statements which endorse the current caste structure and justify their convictions by imputing inferiority to 'the' Negro. It should be noted, however, that the extreme statement which asserts that the Negro is more like an animal than a human is seldom endorsed by either Northerners or Southerners. It is the one item on which there is substantial agreement by both regional groups, representing, as it were, an asymptotic nadir in the Southerners' imputation of inferiorities to the Negro.<sup>29</sup>

Two statements (14, 20) in the opinionnaire may be interpreted as expressions of ambivalence toward the caste-system. The Northern sample more often endorses one of these, and the Southern sample, the other; yet, even in the choice of ambivalent statements, there is a consistent difference. The Northern sample more often endorsed that ambivalent statement which implicitly weights more heavily a negative opinion concerning the caste-system; the Southern group more often assented to that ambivalent statement which weights more heavily a positive opinion concerning the caste-system. However, this difference should not be permitted to obscure the similarity: both groups are apparently subject to the conflict between co-existing democratic and caste ideologies. In all this, it should be remembered, we are dealing with opinions and not with overt behavior.

It should not be inferred from the foregoing discussion that the 'Northern' and the 'Southern' samples are wholly homogeneous in their respective opinions concerning the Negro. It can be shown that there are more or less consistent differences of opinion between subjects coming from different localities within the same general 'region.' Thus, in the 'Northeastern region,' on eight items<sup>30</sup> the frequency of endorsement by Pennsylvania subjects is intermediate between the frequencies of Massachusetts and Louisiana subjects. Although only one of these differences between Massachusetts

<sup>29</sup> In this connection should be noted Dollard's observation that some residents of 'Southerntown' were quite prepared to assert that "the Negro is a mere animal." Some nine percent of our Southern sample assented to this notion. This case incidentally illustrates the utility of opinionnaires; they help to establish, however crudely, the *relative frequency* of folk beliefs and thus serve as a check on observations of scattered cases. Opinionnaires do not supplant direct observations of opinions advanced in 'life-situations,' but they are a useful supplement, as Hortense Powdermaker has shown in her study of 'Southerntown.' See her *After Freedom*, 381-391, New York, 1939, also Dollard, *op. cit.*, 368-369. On page 387, Dollard remarks that not all Southern whites hold all of the 'defensive beliefs' which he itemizes, and adds that "it would be desirable, but it is impossible, to give a statistical delineation of the degree to which various attitudes are held."

<sup>30</sup> The eight statements are numbers 5, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19, 24, 26, with critical ratios (Massachusetts subjects vs. Pennsylvania subjects) respectively, of 1.1 2.2, 2.0, 1.8, 1.4, 1.7, 1.8 and 3.7. Note that all of these statements are included in the regional inventories.

and Pennsylvania subjects is conventionally 'significant'—26, with a C.R. of 3.7—the fact that the Pennsylvanians are *consistently* intermediate between the Massachusetts and Louisiana subjects suggests that the Pennsylvanians are, in a sense, 'marginal' with respect to 'Northeastern' and 'Southeastern' opinion-inventories. As far as these results are concerned, then, we are not justified in treating Odum's 'Northeastern region' as reasonably homogeneous in opinions about the Negro. Pennsylvania subjects, although largely sharing the opinions of the Massachusetts sample, tend toward the 'Southeastern' configuration of opinions, in some respects. However, differences in frequency of endorsement by Pennsylvania and Louisiana subjects even with regard to these eight statements are conventionally significant (except for statement 14, with a C.R. of 2.4). For Statement 14, which is taken to express ambivalence toward the caste-system (with a dominant positive valence), the Pennsylvanians' frequency of endorsement more nearly approximates that of the Louisiana subjects. These data suggest that the populations of areas as extensive as Odum's regions may not have relatively similar distributions of opinions concerning the Negro (and, possibly, a range of other social values).

This report is admittedly incomplete. It is to be taken primarily as an indication of one way in which opinionnaire results may be legitimately employed without recourse to dubiously applicable mathematical operations. Further papers will check some of the hypotheses advanced here.

#### OPINIONNAIRE USED IN THIS RESEARCH<sup>21</sup>

CHECK (✓) ONLY THOSE STATEMENTS WHICH MOST NEARLY EXPRESS YOUR  
SENTIMENT TOWARDS THE NEGRO

Scale-  
Values

- |       |   |
|-------|---|
| 10.3  | 1. I consider that the Negro is only fit to do the 'dirty' work of the white community.   |
| 10.2  | 2. The idea of contact with the black or dark skin of the Negro excites horror and disgust in me.   |
| ✓ 3.1 | 3. It seems to me that the white man, by placing restrictions, such as the 'Color Line,' upon the Negro is really trying to exploit him economically. |
| ✓ 1.1 | 4. I think that the Negro ought to be given every opportunity of education and development—just like the white man.                                   |
| ✓ 1.3 | 5. I think that the Negro, if he were given the chance, would prove to be just as good as the white man.  |
| 10.6  | 6. I consider that the Negro is more like an animal than a human being.   |
| 7.8   | 7. I do not think that the Negro is capable of profiting by education except to a very limited extent.  |
| 9.7   | 8. I think that the Negro should always occupy an inferior or menial position in the community.   |

<sup>21</sup> Adapted from MacCrone, *op. cit.*

- 6.5 9. I do not consider that the present social system is fundamentally unjust to the Negro.
- 2.6 10. It seems clear to me that the rights of the Negro in this country have nearly always been ignored by the white man.
- .8 11. I would rather see the white people lose their position in this country than keep it at the expense of injustice to the Negro.
- 5.6 12. I am not interested in the Negro or in his relations to the white man because I think that in the end economic factors will decide his fate.
- 7.5 13. I do not think that we ought to help the Negro until all the white people who are in need have been helped.
- 5.4 14. Sometimes I feel that the Negro is not getting a square deal, but at other times I feel he has a lot to be thankful for.
- 8.6 15. I do not think that the Negro can be relied upon in a position of trust or of responsibility.
- 9.4 16. I think that no Negro should ever be allowed to enter into competition with a white man.
- 8.4 17. To my mind the Negro is so childish and irresponsible that he cannot be expected to know what is in his best interests.
- 1.4 18. I consider that the Negro has been unjustly deprived of his rights by the white man.
- 1.7 19. I do not think that the rights of the Negro should be subordinated to the selfish interests of the white man.
- 4.8 20. I am not very happy about the way in which the Negro is treated in this country, but I find it very difficult to decide which is the right way.
- 1.2 21. I believe that the Negro has a great future ahead of him and that he has a valuable contribution to make to the world's civilization.
- 3.8 22. I consider that the white community in this country owes a real debt of gratitude to the churches for the way in which they have tried to uplift the Negro.
- 4.4 23. I would like to see the Negro advance in the scale of civilization, but only very slowly and step by step.
- 6.7 24. I think that all the Negro needs to make him happy is the satisfaction of his material needs.
- 2.8 25. I consider that the white man is neglecting to do his duty by not doing more to improve the lot of the Negro.
- 6.2 26. I have no objection to the Negro provided that he keeps his proper place.
- 5.1 27. Until the Negro has been given more time and opportunity of showing what he is capable of doing, I think that it is foolish to try to judge him.
- 2.2 28. I admire the Negro for his many good qualities and would like to see him being given an opportunity of developing them.
- 8.2 29. I feel very strongly that the white man cannot maintain his proper position in the United States unless he discriminates against the Negro.
- 8.8 30. The fact that the Negro had developed no civilization of his own before he arrived in this country, is to my mind more than sufficient proof of his innate inferiority.

# THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

*Bennington College*

THIS PAPER presents the results of an experiment to answer two questions: 1. What is the degree of agreement in "commonsense" judgments of socioeconomic status of the population of a community by two persons who are themselves of radically different socioeconomic status, that is, how are informal ratings of socioeconomic status influenced by the socioeconomic status of the rater?; 2. What is the degree of correspondence of both of these judgments with the results secured for the same population by means of the Chapin *Social Status Scale*, 1933.<sup>1</sup> In addition to the answers to these questions, the results are evaluated from two points of view: 1. is the conformity of the results of a standardized scale to "commonsense" judgments an important test of the validity or usefulness of the scale?; 2. is it necessary or possible to describe what a scale measures except in terms of the scale itself?

A New England village of about 300 families was the field of the experiment. Two hundred nineteen homes were scored by means of the Chapin scale. A local banker of this community, a resident for forty years, and a local janitor, a resident for forty-five years, were asked to rate the same population on a six-point scale, with the following instructions.

## INSTRUCTIONS TO THE RATER

Please indicate by numbers from 1 to 6 your opinion as to the relative socioeconomic status of each of the families or individuals on this list. [An accompanying list of names of heads of all families rated by the Chapin scale.]

By "socioeconomic status" we mean in general *how comfortably people live in their homes and in their community.*

Number as follows:

Upper class { 1—upper part  
                  2—lower part

Middle class { 3—upper part  
                  4—lower part

Lower class { 5—upper part  
                  6—lower part

Omit all names which you don't feel you know well enough to rate. Of course all ratings are entirely confidential.

<sup>1</sup> See F. S. Chapin, *Contemporary American Institutions*, New York, 1935, chap. 19; or *The Measurement of Social Status by the Use of the Social Status Scale*, 1933, Minneapolis, 1933. For details of the survey of the village referred to in the present study, see G. A. Lundberg and Mary Steele, "Social Attraction-Patterns in a Village," *Sociometry*, I, Jan.-Apr. 1938, 375-419. I am indebted to Miss Joan Rockwood for statistical help with the present paper.


Each of these two members of the community rated over two hundred of their fellow-citizens according to these instructions. Including only those cases rated by both of these persons *and* by the Chapin scale, a total of 196 cases were secured for comparison. The comparative results of these ratings are shown in Table I and Figure 1.<sup>2</sup>

TABLE I. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF 196 FAMILIES ON A SIX-POINT SCALE BY (A) A LOCAL BANKER, (B) THE CHAPIN SCALE, AND (C) A LOCAL JANITOR

Rated by	Number of Families Assigned to each Gradation of the Six-Point Scale						Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
The Chapin Scale	0	10	72	68	42	4	196
The Banker	3	10	42	81	50	10	196
The Janitor	22	15	88	49	22	0	196

FIGURE I

*Comparative Socio-Economic Rating of 196 Homes by a Janitor, a Banker, and the Chapin Scale*



It will be seen that although the three ratings are in high agreement, (1) the ratings of the banker are consistently toward the upper end of the

<sup>2</sup> The Chapin scores were translated into the six-point scale according to the following equivalents: Class 1, 250 up; class 2, 200-249; class 3, 150-199; class 4, 100-149; class 5, 50-99; class 6, 0-49.

scale, (2) the janitor's ratings are consistently toward the lower end, and (3) the distribution of the Chapin scores falls between the other two. Between the ratings of the janitor and the Chapin scale, there was complete agreement in 55.8 percent of the cases and an agreement of 87.8 percent ( $n=206$ ) if we include in addition all cases for which scores differ only by one point of the scale. The corresponding figures for the Chapin score and the banker's ratings were 48.9 percent and 90.0 percent ( $n=208$ ). The janitor's ratings, therefore, coincide completely with the Chapin scores in a higher percentage of the cases, but the banker's ratings show a slightly higher percentage of agreement if we include also all cases differing by only one point on the six-point scale. The agreement between the ratings of the banker and those of the janitor are markedly less than the agreement of either with the Chapin scale. The figures are: complete agreement between banker and janitor, 31.1 percent; agreement including all cases differing by only one point, 78.6 percent.

It will be seen from the above comparisons that in 10 percent and 12 percent of the cases, respectively, the banker's and the janitor's ratings varied from the rating derived from the Chapin score by two or more points of the six-point scale. Twelve of these cases, or somewhat more than one half of them, represent differences of three or more points on the scale (either as between the two raters or between either of them and the Chapin scale). These major discrepancies were made the subject of special inquiry from the raters and from other sources, in order to gain some clue as to the type of cases in which the Chapin scale is likely to vary widely from the commonsense estimates of residents of the community, and also as a clue to the type of cases in which commonsense ratings are likely to disagree.

There was only one case of disagreement with the Chapin scale by as much as four points. This turned out to be a case of mistaken identity. There was likewise only one case of disagreement by as much as four points between the banker and the janitor. This turned out to be the case of a summer resident living in a rented house and running a summer resort near by. The banker, being perhaps privy to information not available to the janitor, rated this family "1" whereas the janitor rated the case "5." The latter admitted that his rating was based on very vague impressions. Again, the Chapin score of this case fell between the other two, namely at 3.

There remain ten cases of differences of three points. A glance at Table 2 will indicate the types of cases on which such disagreement is likely to occur. Three of these cases (1, 2, and 3) were differences between the Chapin scale and the banker's rating. Three (4, 5, and 6) were differences between the ratings of the janitor and the Chapin scale. The other four were differences between the ratings of the banker and the janitor.

It will be noted that the large differences (three points) in rating between the Chapin scale and the banker are all cases of white-collar employment, and one of them is a member of a profession of considerable honorific status.

TABLE 2. CLASSIFICATION OF THE TEN CASES OF DISAGREEMENT OF THREE POINTS IN RATING

Cases	Rating			Characterization of case
	Chapin Scale	Janitor	Banker	
Case 1	6	4	3	Bookkeeper in factory Preacher Office worker
Case 2	4	3	1	
Case 3	4	3	1	
Case 4	5	2	4	Steadily employed laborer; janitor admits little information as basis of rating
Case 5	2	5	2	Janitor admits error due to temporary confusion in interpretation of scale
Case 6	3	6	3	Janitor admits error due to temporary confusion in interpretation of scale
Case 7	3	4	1	Superintendent in factory
Case 8	4	6	3	Widow without generally known source of income
Case 9	3	4	1	Bank teller, brother of banker
Case 10	2	4	1	Social worker, relative of wealthy and socially important family

The banker was apparently much more influenced by these considerations than was either the Chapin scale rating or the janitor's rating. Turning next to the three cases of large differences between the ratings of the Chapin scale and the janitor, we find that two of these are immediately accounted for as admitted errors on the part of the janitor. On being asked to rate these cases again without being told what his previous rating had been, he placed both cases within one point of the ratings of the Chapin scale and the banker. The janitor admitted some difficulty in keeping in mind the fact that in the six-point scale used, a *high* serial rating corresponds to *low* socioeconomic status. The overrating of the other cases in this group also appears to have been based on very inadequate data.

The large disagreement between the janitor and the banker on the last four cases appears to have been largely due to an admitted tendency on the part of the janitor to consider primarily income and property in his rating, whereas the banker gave more weight to the instruction which emphasizes "how comfortably people live in their homes and in their community."<sup>3</sup> We have already mentioned the case of a preacher, which the banker rated in Class 1, whereas the janitor rated this case in Class 3 and the Chapin

<sup>3</sup> In the oral instructions to the raters, the four general bases of the Chapin scale (income, participation in community life, material, and cultural possessions) were mentioned as the factors to be taken into consideration. The phrases used in the written instructions are an attempt to summarize these factors or at least to emphasize that gross income should not be considered the only factor. The difficulty of communicating the meaning of "socioeconomic status" without formulating a crude scale of some sort specifying components and weights becomes very evident in attempting to instruct these raters as to "what" to rate.

scale rated it in Class 4. Cases 7, 9, and 10 further reflect the tendency of the banker to give high ratings on the basis of white-collar employment, positions of authority and family connections, whereas the janitor seemed to have kept the matter of known income in the foreground of his mind. In Case 8, for example, the janitor seems to have been governed entirely by the traditional idea of a widow without visible means of support.

In general, it may be said that the striking discrepancies (more than two points) in these ratings are accounted for (1) by the tendency of the banker to skew his ratings toward the upper and middle classes, in part at least due to a bias in favor of white-collar occupations and positions of honorific status; (2) by errors in interpretation of the rating system on the part of the janitor and his tendency to consider chiefly income in his rating; and (3) by the failure of the Chapin scale and the janitor to give as much weight as the banker to family and social connections and professional and other honorific considerations. The banker's general attitude that "people are not as badly off as they think they are" and the opposite bias of the janitor undoubtedly are also reflected in their ratings.

We have answered above two of the four questions with which we started, namely (1) the agreement of common sense judgments of socioeconomic status among members of a community who are themselves of very different socioeconomic status, and (2) the agreement of both of these ratings with that of the Chapin scale. We consider next the question of whether the conformity of the results of a standardized scale to a consensus of common-sense judgment is a legitimate or even a significant test of the validity of either.

I shall here defend the view that the conformity of a standardized measuring instrument to the findings of commonsense, is clearly not a necessary or final criterion at all. Indeed, it is a criterion very generally disregarded in fields where well-recognized measuring instruments have been developed. For example, no one would think of regarding his own commonsense impressions of temperature, weight, distance, or composition of the liquid in the radiator of his car, as more reliable than the readings of the appropriate instrument in each case. What, then, have been the criteria upon which the validity of these instruments have gained acceptance?

Putting the answer in general terms, the crucial test has been whether the readings of the instruments, when applied to the solution of some adjustment problem other than the mere confirmation of commonsense, have contributed toward the solution of this larger problem, toward the solution of which the individual measurement in question was only a means. That is, the criterion of the validity of the hydrometer is not whether it confirms our commonsense estimate based on smell or taste as to the amount of alcohol in the solution in the radiator of our car. The criterion is whether an acceptance of the reading of the instrument and acting on it keeps our radia-

tor from freezing in a higher proportion of cases than by following our commonsense impressions. The same point could be illustrated even more strikingly with reference to the measuring instruments of height and weight. Note that the conformity of the readings of the hydrometer to our commonsense impressions of the amount of antifreeze liquid in the radiator is in this case wisely regarded as *completely irrelevant* as a test of the validity of the instrument.

The assumption that instruments for the measurement of social phenomena to be valid must necessarily conform in their results to a consensus of common sense findings is, therefore, entirely unwarranted. This does not mean that when, as in the case of the Chapin scale which I have described, the results of commonsense estimates and standardized scales are in high agreement, this may not be of interest and value. I am merely emphasizing that this criterion is not a necessary or even a primary one as bearing on the validity or usefulness of measuring instruments of any kind. The more important criterion is the capacity of the instrument to achieve with high reliability *any designated type of result* in which we may be interested. The conformity of the readings of standardized scales to our commonsense reactions to the (presumably) same phenomenon may be said to be chiefly of esthetic or linguistic rather than of scientific interest.

It is in this latter connection that our fourth and final question is likely to arise. This is the question of "what" scales measure in the sense of some entity outside and beyond the conditions and behaviors referred to by the symbols of the scale. The problem involves certain theoretical questions regarding the nature of linguistic and semantic phenomena, as well as some more general philosophical questions. Some of these questions are, however, quite fundamental to the advancement of social science in general and to the problem of measurement in particular. We conclude, therefore, with a brief consideration of the question as it applies to devices like socioeconomic status scales.

When a new measuring instrument is invented in any field, the question always arises as to what it measures. Since a measuring scale is a symbolic device consisting of a serial set and system of symbols for the designation of a gradation of certain kinds of conditions, qualities, events, or behaviors, the question of what is referred to by the scale is, of course, not fundamentally different from a similar question with regard to any new word which may be proposed to designate some phenomenon. The answer in the latter case, on elementary levels, is to point, gesticulate, or engage in some other overt and nonlinguistic form of behavior. That is, as we shall see, also the only final way to answer the question of what a scale measures. In the case of folk-language designations and in the case of well-established measuring devices, however, we learn these meanings as we learn language in general and never have occasion to analyze exactly what we mean by

them. As a result, we frequently reify these designations into entities, which are then assumed to have a self-sufficient existence quite apart from the conditions, qualities, events, and behaviors which the word was originally invented to designate. The word "intelligence" is a good illustration, as generally used today.<sup>4</sup> Any attempt to formalize, objectify, and render more explicit such a term is, therefore, likely to encounter the objection that the referent (e.g., behaviors or conditions considered in constructing a scale) designated by the new term unfortunately *is not* the original entity. Of course, it is not. Symbols never *are* that which they designate. A slightly more sophisticated objection is that the new symbol does not refer to all referential aspects or implications of some well-known term which the new term aims to supplant. If the new term has been adequately defined, it will of course make explicit exactly what it does or does not cover. We do not thereby declare omitted aspects unimportant or less significant. The omitted aspects or referents may be designated by some equally explicit additional symbol.

Consider, for example, how readily the term "socioeconomic status" passes from mouth to mouth even among sociologists and social workers on the assumption that all competent people know what it designates. When a formal and rigorously defined scale for measuring socioeconomic status is invented and applied, the question arises as to "what" after all it measures; whether what it measures is "really" socioeconomic status, etc. Why do these appear to be difficult and important questions in the case of the scale, but more or less selfevident in the case of our everyday use of such a term as socioeconomic status? The question of what is designated by the term is a highly proper one *in both cases*.<sup>5</sup> The amusing thing is that only in

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, M. May, "Ten Tests of Measurement," *The Educational Record*, April 1939, "Supposed the candidate is intelligent. How can we be sure that it exists (*sic*) as a detectable quality of human beings in the sense that mass is a detectable quality of objects in the physical world? . . . From the standpoint of common sense, this is a foolish question. Everybody, in civilized cultures at least, knows that it does exist. . . (p. 205) . . . How can the psychologist be sure that it (the intelligence test) detects only intelligence and nothing else?" (p. 207). I have discussed this subject at some length in *Foundations of Society*, New York, 1939, 446-457.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. C. Kirkpatrick, "A Methodological Analysis of Feminism in Relation to Martial Adjustment," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, June 1939, 311, "A third step, therefore, was the operational definition of 'attitude toward feminism' by the construction of a scale for the measuring of such attitudes. At this point, a sin against the Holy Ghost of pure operationalism must be confessed. *The writer did attempt to find out what he was measuring before beginning the measurement.*" (Italics mine.) After repeated and careful perusal of the whole article, I am still unable to find any designation of "what" the author was measuring *other than the phenomena to which the words finally used in his scale refer*. He describes with characteristic care and competence the considerations and methods (accumulated knowledge, interpretations, inferences, hypotheses, etc., regarding the whole subject) which preceded his construction of the scale, and refers to the long and laborious steps in its construction, and then makes this significant remark: "The net result was the possibility of redefining 'attitude toward feminism' as a score on a particular test constructed to yield scores ranging from -40 to +40." (p. 331) (Italics mine). I am genuinely curious, in view of this last statement, to know what answer

the case of the scale can an adequate answer be given, whereas the reverse is supposed to be the case. Scales had their origin, of course, in precisely this fact that the more perspicacious individuals realized that it is only in such form that we can answer the question of what we mean by given expressions of gradations in socioeconomic status. This meaning, in terms of the conditions and behaviors taken into consideration by the scale, is also the only possible answer to the question of what any scale or any informal judgment measures. The statement that socioeconomic status *is* what a scale for measuring socioeconomic status measures, has therefore the same validity as to say that the conditions and the behaviors which any group calls high socioeconomic status *is* high socioeconomic status for that group. To deny either statement and to argue that, in addition to the above explicit and avowedly relativistic definition, there is an absolute definition of socioeconomic status, independent of any culture, conditions or behavior, is surely a linguistic delusion. It is like arguing that we are making a mistake in calling water wet, because it really is not wet at all. Formal instruments of measurement, by explicitly recognizing the conditions, behaviors, and standards involved in all measurement, strip the mystery off many words and hence cause temporary resistance to the acceptance of new instruments. To assume that any scales whatever can be said to measure some more ultimate "what" than the conditions, events, and behaviors its symbolism refers to, is pure mysticism, not to say a type of superstition.

A further reason for the above confusion seems to be that formal scales undoubtedly and necessarily neglect some components which each individual includes in that complex response to which he attaches the words

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he would give to the question as to "what" his scale measures, *other than* to point to the referents of the symbols constituting that scale.

Possibly the reason for misunderstanding on this subject is failure to keep in mind that all the operations in the construction and calibration of a measuring device *are part of the measurement process*. Every time we use a measuring instrument, the operations involved in its calibration are implicitly involved, as I have pointed out in the article to which Kirkpatrick refers ("Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, June 1939, 715, and footnote quoting E. Nagel, "Measurement," *Erkenntnis*, 1931, 2:316-317. See also my *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. 2, New York, 1939). Another possible reason for the misunderstandings regarding such a statement as "intelligence is what the tests test" may be the assumption that *only a certain way of doing the particular acts* involved in taking a given test (e.g., putting round pegs in round holes) constitute the referent of the word "intelligence." Actually, the word is used to designate a way of doing these particular acts *and* certain ways of doing all other acts which are so highly correlated with the way of doing the particular acts of the test, that the former can be predicted from the latter and *vice versa*. Under these circumstances, it is still true that the particular intelligence test tests all the correlated behavior as well as the particular acts involved in the test, hence the statement that intelligence is what the tests test. "What" here refers to *all* the certain ways of behaving which the test reliably discriminates and names in terms of scores. Intelligence, then, is the symbol which we employ to designate a certain aspect or evaluation of behavior, regardless of the particular acts in connection with which it occurs. Tests which reliably discriminate degrees of this aspect of behavior are called intelligence tests and what they test is called intelligence. For a fuller statement of the position see my *Foundations of Sociology*, New York, 1939, 446-457.

socioeconomic status. The scale makes us aware of this fact. If we feel that our personal definition, including our feeling tones associated therewith, is the only proper or true definition of the phenomenon under consideration, then the scale is, of course, invalidated by any disagreement on its part, at least to the degree that it differs from our common sense discrimination. But we have already pointed out that this agreement of a measuring device with either an individual or a consensus of commonsense judgments is not the only possible or even a primary object in scale construction. Scales may aim instead merely at the reliable discrimination of any conditions whatever which enable us to make successful adjustments. Sometimes these conditions as discriminated by instruments are at wide variance with the findings of commonsense. In many such cases, we find it extremely wise to ignore the findings of commonsense and to follow those of the instrument. This is likely to be increasingly true as we have to adjust to remote and complex environments.

Our preference for the "qualitative" or prescalar use of the phrase socioeconomic status is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that no one is compelled to break it up into components or to consider the relative weights he gives to each factor. The whole procedure is a deliciously private and subjective reaction for which we are not consciously accountable to anyone. Consequently, we feel strongly that the meaning which we attach to such words, with which we designate certain stimuli, has some intrinsic validity or fitness, as, for example, when children (and others) are impressed with the peculiar fitness of the word "cold" to designate a certain degree of temperature. For people reared in the same culture and hence receiving their language-values from a fairly uniform source, there will be a certain uniformity in the use of such terms, usually sufficient to serve most primary group purposes. When we come in contact with people of different culture backgrounds and therefore with different word-meanings, we marvel at their gross misjudgment of such matters as socioeconomic status, living wage, decency, and so forth, and bring to bear against them emotions reserved for the stupid and the vulgar.

As science advances, we find less and less interest in such questions, for example, as "what" electricity *is*. Except for certain types of philosophers, children, and other more or less semantically deranged persons (from the scientific point of view), most people find it sufficient to define what electricity *is* in terms of what it *does*. It is *that which* under certain circumstances kills people, makes trains go, flashes in the clouds, illuminates lamps, makes the hand of the voltmeter move to a certain point, etc., etc. As social science advances, we shall doubtless also find this type of answer adequate for the question as to what socioeconomic status *is*. We shall be content to say that it is *that which* under certain circumstances makes people beg on streets, cringe before the local banker, and behave arrogantly to the

janitor. We shall say it is *that* status which is associated with certain kinds of houses, food, clothing, education, occupation; more specifically, we shall probably say that a person will be accorded status, i.e., people will behave toward him *according to their estimate of the probability that he will achieve* the maximum goals of socioeconomic striving. That is what we have meant by the term in prequantitative days; it is likely to continue to be what we mean by it under a quantitative terminology, except that we shall state it in terms of a number of units on a scale. That is in either case the only possible answer to the question of *what* socioeconomic status *is* or *what* a socioeconomic scale *measures*.

In short, it is only when we have a quantitative scale for measuring socioeconomic status that we can give an explicit account of what we are measuring. We can enumerate or point to the items which enter into the construction of the scale and the proportional weight which each item is allowed in the total score. This is not possible when the general dictionary definition or folk usage is allowed to determine its meaning. We can never know whether another person means quite the same by the phrase as we do. When we try to determine this, we find ourself constructing, formally or informally, a quantitative scale.

#### NOTE

Since this paper was completed, I have been allowed to examine briefly the manuscript of the valuable paper by Robert K. Merton, which appears in this issue of *The Review*. On the request of the editor, I append the following remarks on a point which, although it does not effect the reasoning of the present paper, refers to a related aspect which I have treated elsewhere.

In the first place, I call attention to the following reservation which I made in the paper to which Merton refers: "I am not here expressing any opinion as to the sociological value of attitude measurement, the validity or relative value of different types of scales, or other methods now employed or any of the other technical points involved. I have confined myself in this paper solely to the logical validity of such measurement as a means of describing social behavior and its logical comparability with other recognized measurement techniques." (Pp. 720-721, note 32.) My statements on the subject, therefore, have not involved questions of fact with respect to any particular scale but have been strictly theoretical of the type, "If . . . then." On the basis of the brief examination of Merton's references to my position, therefore, I would say that I do not feel any need of modifying that position. I may say further that I had the privilege of examining the manuscript of the paper by H. M. Johnson to which Merton refers in his footnote 6 before preparing my own paper of 1936, and that these points were carefully considered. Critical examination of particular scales, such as Merton's paper contains, has, of course, my enthusiastic support and I should be glad to accept any valid results of such analysis, whatever effect such acceptance may have on my previously expressed purely theoretical position. A more detailed consideration of the specific points raised by Merton is, of course, not here possible and should perhaps be left to L. L. Thurstone or other specialists fully conversant with the techniques actually employed in the construction of the particular scale in question. Obviously, a defect in the calibration of a particular scale does not necessarily destroy the logic upon which all scale construction depends.

Reverting briefly to my theoretical position, however, I would point out one crucial consideration regarding all measuring scales which is frequently overlooked both by physical and social scientists. This is the consideration that *all interchangeability of units in "physical" as well as social scales is a purely mathematical one*. It is only in terms of the calibrated scale that the difference between 1 and 2 pounds is "the same" as between 19 and 20 pounds. As far as the reaction of unstandardized human senses are concerned, it is well known that the addition of a pound of weight to an already present weight of one pound does not "feel" the same as the addition of a pound to an already present weight of 19 pounds. In the same way, it is not necessary to assert that the increase of 25 points in socioeconomic status on the Chapin scale for a family scoring 200 is "the same" (in our "feeling" about it) as an increase of 25 points in the score of a family previously scoring 50. (The same reasoning would apply to a Thurstone scale.) Whether a scale which is at wide variance with these "commonsense" impressions may still be valuable, is the subject of the present paper. My conclusion is that it depends entirely on whether the results achieved by the scale serve a purpose in which we are interested. Suppose that the ratings by the banker and by the Chapin scale in the concrete example given in the present paper were at wide and irregular variance. Suppose it is found, however, that the Chapin scale is a much safer guide to the lending policy of the bank. All that can then be said is that the two methods "measure different things," which should be designated by different words. I think the whole misunderstanding on this matter is attributable to a semantic confusion regarding *units* (purely symbolic entities) and the referents of these symbols (observable behavior). See my reference to B. Russell and J. Dewey in this connection in my *Foundations of Sociology*, New York, 1939, p. 86, note 54. This clearly seems to be the case in Merton's statement that "Thurstone assumes an interchangeability of judgments with identical scale values *which does not in fact exist*." (Italics mine) His assertion of what "does not in fact exist" is based on his preference for commonsense (or other instrumental or inferential) indicators of fact. As for interchangeability of *units*, this is, as I have already pointed out, governed purely by the accepted conventions of mathematics. (Note that this is not equivalent to saying that *all* conventions of mathematics have equal *utility* in practical affairs). From this point of view, also, Merton's statement that "there is no introduction of cardinal numbers at any point" is erroneous, for numbers of the Thurstone scale are as cardinal as the numbers on any other scale.

## CONSTRUCTIVE TYPOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

HOWARD BECKER

*University of Wisconsin*

THE CALL of the *Esoteric*. The preliterate often uses word and number magic; so do we, even when we think ourselves ultra-modern. Some social scientists, for example, intone a ritual composed largely of sacred sounds such as "natural," "quantitative," "operational," "objective," and "correlation," and rise in wrath when some hardened skeptic asks, "What does it mean?" Of genuine science, instrumental in origin and goal, these ritualists have no comprehension. They flock to highly esoteric discussions of conceptual integration or of factor analysis, for example, in order to acquire the feeling of exaltation, of salvation, that comes through participation in a lofty, half-understood ceremony.

But let it be clearly understood that *to the genuine scientist who wields his tools with full awareness of their uses and limitations none of these strictures apply*. He is no high priest, to be sure, and he has no key to the cosmos, but in spite—or perhaps because—of this, he merits the most profound respect. Criticism of the Word and Formula worshippers is a preamble necessary to the task of setting forth, clearly and plainly, what is meant by "constructive typology." (I shall strive to be understandable even to the point of using analogies and of dispensing with the usual footnote ritual passing for scholarship. Those interested in more intensive study are referred to the appended bibliography and to my presentations, under such headings as "construct," "type," and "ideal-typical," in Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*.<sup>1</sup>)

*The Particular and the General*. This problem has long plagued social scientists of every description. Even the inveterate "other-things-being-equal" generalizer can scarcely fail to be aware that the society he is examining at the moment is unique in spite of all resemblances to other societies. Yet we are seldom content with a mere collection of unrelated data, for not only do we wish to apprehend the unique, but as social scientists we also want to make generalizations. If sociology, in particular, means anything at all, it means the ability to say wherein the society in question is like other societies and wherein it differs from them.

More is involved here than is apparent at first glance. Instance the orthodox monographic historian sworn to Ranke's dictum that his task is to

<sup>1</sup> Space prohibited the publication of this article in its original form. The author and editor cut it nearly by half. This eliminated much of the illustrative material. However, I believe the author's essential thesis remains intact and merits the attention of sociologists whatever their methodological predilections may be.—R. B.

depict the past *wie es eigentlich gewesen*—"as it actually and peculiarly was." Such a historian correctly maintains that he is a specialist in idiography, in the description of the unique. The vitally necessary function of the idiographic historian should be plain to every unprejudiced social scientist; the "thisness" of events *must* be made clear. But the historian's legitimate rejection of generalization for *his own* definitely assigned task may lead him to assert that no generalizations with regard to human conduct should ever be attempted—in short, that there can be no social *science*. He says, in effect, "I know Jock Elliot—intimately. In all the wide world there is no one like him, and consequently you cannot say anything about types of Scottish Lowlander. The history of the stretch 'south of Tay and north of Tweed' is nothing but a collection of individual biographies, and must remain so." This is certainly forthright enough, but even the most orthodox monographic historian is usually compelled to deal with units larger than the individual. He may single out a few "great men" or "climactic events" as most representative of the given culture and period, and deal with them more or less exhaustively, but he is also forced to use such highly general terms as medieval Papacy, Calvinism, Whigs, Jacobites, Highland clan organization, the national state system, or what not. Nevertheless, as contrasted with his polar opposite, the sociologist, this historian remains highly particularistic.

The sociologist, on the other hand, sometimes goes to the other extreme. For example, knowledge of the distribution of population in rural Scotland, in terms of relative sparseness alone, provides very little aid when the immediate task is the prediction of success or failure, not only from the cash-crop standpoint, but also from that of subsistence farming, long-term familial adaptability, and survival. Neglect of typical differences between Scottish Borderers, Lowlanders, Highlanders, and Islanders deprives the observer of almost every vestige of predictive power. In other words, the sociologist's general knowledge is sometimes so excessively general that it is of virtually no value in saying what may occur in certain type situations within the foreseeable future.

*The Unique, Constructive Typology, and Prediction.* Both directly and by implication the word "predict" has been used. This gives a clue to a definition of science, or of scientific activity, that may perhaps make it possible to bring together these considerations relating to the particular and the general in a somewhat more meaningful way. For the ends now in view, let us define science as *the systematic statement of the probability of the potential or actual<sup>2</sup> recurrence of phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical*. Without attempting to define sociology, this,

<sup>2</sup> If it were not for the fact that the contrast between "potential" and "actual" is useful when the question of experimentation is discussed in succeeding sections, the word "conditional" alone might be used instead of "potential or actual."

definition can be applied to any generalizing social science simply by inserting the word "social" immediately before "phenomena." When a high degree of precision seems possible, it is perhaps advisable to insert the word "statistical" just before "probability." The phrase would then run "the statistical probability of the potential or actual recurrence of social phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical."

Let us now go on to analyze the various parts of this definition as they bear on the problem of the general and the particular. It has been said, in effect, that the scientist is not interested in the unique *as such*. Fully to know Jock Elliot, I must respond to him as a total personality whom I shall never meet again. He must be responded to emotionally and normatively as well as intellectually. For the scientist *qua* scientist, however, Jock Elliot in his "ultimate essence" need not be known at all, still less judged on moral grounds. It may be enough to be able to place him at a certain point in a statistical distribution of height or weight. Or again, Jock Elliot may have teeth that make a dental mold an object of enthralling study. There are many things about him in which the scientist is professionally interested—but not because these things are identified with Jock Elliot as *this* person and no other. His "thisness" is not a matter of scientific concern.

Here a warning notice must be posted. *Interest in the unique is in and of itself worth while*. No derogation of such interest is intended by refusing to apply the scientific label. Life as it is *lived* probably assumes final meaning only as a set of altogether ineffable, incommunicably meaningful relations with other persons now alive or dwelling in a past that may be more "real" than the present. Yet, however keenly we may be aware of such ultimates, absorption in them is not justification for a specialized *scientific* activity. The scientist necessarily deals with the general, not the unique.

Take any object turned out in thousands by mass production methods—a Grand Rapids chair, let us say. In pursuit of the ideal of full description of the unique, it would be quite legitimate to include a treatise on the structure of the cosmos. This is too obvious to warrant further discussion. Quite as obviously, however, certain aspects of such a chair can be isolated and dealt with from a specifically scientific standpoint. To refer to the definition of scientific activity presented above: *For the purposes in hand*, there are certain things about this chair, in spite of undeniable uniqueness, that can be regarded as identical with other aspects of other chairs.

Many persons will grant these points where inanimate objects are concerned, but they have mental reservations when "subjectively intended meaning" is neglected in the pursuit of fanciful analogies that liken societies to solar systems, organisms, or conglomerations of atoms. An increasing number of sociologists, however, never ignore the meaningful aspects of social conduct. They would agree that certain aspects of the meaningful

conduct of Jock Elliot can be isolated for study; that, *for the purposes in hand*, it is possible to assert that Jock Elliott is doing the same thing as Abie Rosenblum. The modern sociologist can say, with the idiographic historian, that each human being is unique; that the social situations in which he has developed are unique; and that history never repeats itself in any ultimate or final sense; but he is also correct in saying that *for certain purposes*, which are not those of the idiographic historian, it may be entirely legitimate to say that certain phenomena can be treated as identical with certain other phenomena.

The dilemma of the particular and the general, then, boils down to a question of purpose. What are the purposes in hand? If you wish to appreciate to the full the characteristic essence of the culture of the Scottish Border, you steep yourself in the folksong, the literature, the poetry, the arts—and how much more!—of that culture. In so doing, you acquire kinds of sensitivity and of learning that may enable you to communicate to others less sensitive or less erudite, some notion of what it meant, and still means, to grow up an heir to The Debateable Land north of the Cheviots—to be born within sight of “three crests against a saffron sky, beyond the purple plain.” To be sure, you come to *know*, in a final and irreducible sense, some things about the Border that you can’t communicate to anybody directly; only in the nuances of style, the overtones of the written word, can the reader sense the fact that in learning to know the Scottish Border you have yourself become akin to the hard-bitten “raiders and reivers” who once made eternal vigilance a necessity for Northumbrian cattle owners. There is no need to justify such immersion in the particular and absorption of it; the only thing to which legitimate objection may be taken is the sometimes-encountered assumption of the idiographic historian, of biographical persuasion especially, that we can never deal with anything but the unique. To such a forthright challenge, the reply should be equally direct: “We as sociologists can deal with the general because, if you will, *we are going to construct the general*. You as an idiographic historian wish to saturate yourself in the lore of the Scottish Border and to communicate to others the insights you thereby gain; we want to be able to predict within the framework provided by constructive typology.”

The possibility of prediction is in many respects limited, but the ultimate goal of scientific generalization in sociology is the prediction of the recurrence of social phenomena. There are many other valid purposes, and there is no need unduly to exalt the role of the scientist. It is but one of many, and that man is poor indeed, where the essential resources of his total personality are concerned, who is and can be only a scientist. It is not a question of either—or. Must we choose between Weber and Ranke? Between Adam Smith and Walter Scott? Between Darwin and Shakespeare?

*Experimentation and Recurrence.* So much for purpose. We shall now turn

to the problem of recurrence. It will be recalled that "the prediction of the potential or actual recurrence of social phenomena" was the phrase used. Why is it necessary to speak of "potential or actual?" Because much of the recurrence with which the sociologist deals is potential only; certain types of social conduct recur *if and when* certain conditions are given, and those conditions may be impossible to reproduce at will. The potentialities of the conduct are there, as it were, but they may never become actual. Could we make them actual whenever we wished, we could carry on sociological experiments, and only then.

In spite of high-sounding phrases in graduate school bulletins about Harlem or rural Iowa or gangland Chicago as "a sociological laboratory," most sociologists know full well that they cannot experiment, that they are not laboratory scientists, and that in the opinion of many competent judges they never will be. There is no real freedom to experiment with human beings, even in the totalitarian states. When we turn to treatises such as Murphy's *Experimental Social Psychology*, we encounter many patterns of analysis called "experimental" that lack anything remotely approaching experimental control. Power to manipulate persons and social situations at will, for as long a time as may be necessary, is *perhaps* a desideratum, but it certainly is not in the possession of any sociologist. Almost any practitioner of a genuine experimental science would turn up his nose at the loose and haphazard way in which our psycho-sociological and sociological "experimenters" go about their work. They are not to blame for the conditions that make actual control impossible; they are to blame for the direct invitation to criticism which they offer when they talk about "experiment."

If we must liken sociology to other sciences (and the "must" is doubtful), an analogy much to be preferred to that provided by any of the experimental sciences is afforded by geology. The geologist is indubitably a scientist. He attempts to predict where deposits of lead-bearing ore will be found, where oil supplies can be tapped, where earthquakes are likely to occur as results of subsidence or upheaval. The purpose is prediction, but there is no experiment in any real sense of the term. The geologist is confronted by a series of strata that were laid down, we may safely infer, with no thought that geologists would some day make use of them. Analogously, the sociologist may be faced by a cultural structure in which Negroes, Italians, and a host of other peoples are piled together indiscriminately with no foreordained plan of interrelation. We are confronted with cultural deposits, in other words, very much like the deposits with which the geologist has to deal.

Some of the vogue of sociological "experiment" is explicable in terms of vogue. The natural science most popular at the moment provides the model: in one generation it is sidereal mechanics; in another, biology; in

another, relativity physics. The misguided sociologists who want to construct their science along lines presumably preordained by some other science are very much like the modern Thomists who assume that all phenomena are necessarily amenable to interpretation *à la* the dictates of "right reason." "Orthodoxy is my doxy, and heterodoxy is your doxy."

The sociologist wishes to predict potential or actual recurrence. The test of his work is its predictive power, not its conformity to an "orthodox" pattern. Judged in this light, a great deal of current sociological effort is misplaced because prediction is not held steadfastly in view. For example: What genuinely scientific purpose is served by lifting a collection of definitions of concepts from a secondary writer, and restating them in algebraic terms? Confusion becomes worse confounded, and in addition, any predictive utility that may have existed is almost eliminated. Simply to restate, in more elaborate ways, what informed observers already know and on the basis of which they can successfully predict, is not necessarily scientific activity. Not only the form of research, but also its purpose, its focus on the prediction of potential or actual recurrence, determines its scientific character.

*Varieties of Constructed Types.* Faced as the sociologist is by data not susceptible of experimental manipulation, by time deposits analogous to those dealt with by the geologist or the comparative grammarian, his only recourse is to construct types of social conduct, of social organization, of personality—to construct them. This is a very far-reaching statement, but it will simply have to stand as an essential part of the abbreviated record.

Even the idiographic historian, dealing as he does with the unique, and sometimes setting for himself the impossible goal of full description, is forced to make use of constructed types which do not conform exactly to any specific historical instance. Unfortunately, however, most of the historian's construction of types is inarticulate. Scorning "schematism" and "rigid definition" as he does, he often takes over the general notions that happen to be present, and, but one step removed from journalism, gathers "all the facts" within the fields thus bounded for him, and sorts them into the baskets already provided. In the process, the terms of common parlance with which he started slowly acquire altered meanings; new types have been constructed, but not with full awareness. There lies the rub.

The historian's types should perhaps be called "dated and localized types" by way of contrast with those used by the sociologist, which are "undated and nonlocalized." No cultural types are wholly "timeless" or "nonspatial"; like those with which the geologist operates, some chronological and spatial determination is always present. Nevertheless, it is possible to speak of undated and nonlocalized types; here the element of time is not in the foreground, as in the case of dated and localized types. Using the latter, seldom consciously formulated, the historian describes the unique,

but *complete* description is an impossibility. It remains evident, however, that the historian's goal is the polar opposite of the sociologist's: here, the particular—there, the general; and therefore, here, the dated and localized type—there, the undated and nonlocalized.

Frequently I have stated that the sociologist's goal is prediction. To put it more exactly, the sociologist wishes to be able to say, "Given such and such circumstances, these consequences will follow." He may not be able to produce the circumstances—that is oftentimes a matter of accident. He nevertheless wants sufficient knowledge to be able to assert, for example, that when given configurations of revolutionary phenomena which closely approximate certain constructed types, certain consequences are likely to ensue. Revolutions manifestly differ. Therefore, after a preliminary, highly provisional hypothesis has been formed, the sociologist examines as many revolutions as he can, in the effort to construct a typical set of typical revolutionary personalities, processes, and structures. These constructed types are his tools. No one of them ever will be found concretely exemplified. The reason such a type cannot be found in external "nature" is because it has been made in the investigator's mind. It is a *construct* and hence does not correspond *exactly* to any aspect of the French revolution; if it did, it would be of no comparative value when the English revolution is examined. It is built on lines sufficiently general so that it can be set down on this or that portion of the given terrain without tipping over, so to speak, and it then becomes possible to survey that territory. The constructed type is merely a tool. Hence, when the methodologically sophisticated sociologist talks about a type of revolution, his hearers can be very sure that it will never correspond exactly to any empirical instance, to any "real" revolution.<sup>3</sup> It is perhaps permissible to liken this constructed type to the sort of image of the "pure type" Airedale or Percheron that a judge of dogs or of horses carries around in his head as the basis of his "objective" system of scoring for points. He has never seen a "pure type" Percheron or Airedale, but he has seen numerous close empirical approximations of his constructed types. In fact, he has built up these constructed types on the basis of numerous observations.

Constructed types such as these are the tools with which we must work. Laboratory experimentation in sociology, as we have seen, is, to say the least, sharply limited in its possibilities. In most if not all instances, the "experimentation" must be *mental*. The process begins with a vaguely defined problem, the framing of a hypothesis, selective observation (and *all* observation is selective in some sense) with reference to it, and eventual

<sup>3</sup> Insofar as the antithesis "real—ideal" has any instrumental value, it may be said that the constructed type is an ideal type. I now prefer to avoid the use of "ideal" whenever possible, because with some sociologists it immediately evokes notions of Berkeleyan idealism, or of perfection in some final sense. In the present context, it is possible to say that the constructed type is an "ideal" type in the sense that it does not fit any single empirical instance.

construction of a type, or a battery of them, that aids in further research. (Note the implicit distinction between *hypothesis* and *type*; they are all too frequently confused.) The construct may be a type of social organization, a type of personality, or the like. By implication, if not directly, this statement is made: "Under such and such circumstances, this type would probably behave thus and so." The researcher then looks for cases that provide some kind of comparative checkup on his tentative generalization. ↵

Instance: The existence of contemporary anti-Semitism may set a vaguely defined problem: "What is the source of these 'Jewish' traits to which objection is taken?" The preliminary hypothesis may then be that a number of traits ordinarily regarded as specifically Jewish in the "racial" sense are not the result of biological transmission, but of a peculiar cultural heritage. If the researcher turns first to the past, he may focus on the early contacts with the Phoenicians and other traders, as well as on the "caravaneering" facilitated by the surviving nomadic pattern. Next, he may concentrate on the "middleman" locations characteristic of the Jews before as well as after the Diaspora; the ghettos were splendidly placed for the development of extensive trade with many lands. Once more, he may direct his lens toward the dual ethic separating the members of the ingroup from those of the outgroup—on the one hand, "the chosen people"; on the other, the unclean Gentile. (Many other traits might be listed, but enough has been said to indicate the procedure.) Looking for like phenomena in nearby areas, our investigator may then discover that the Armenians are strikingly similar to the Jews. They too are a trading people with a long history of widespread culture contacts with other traders. Further, they occupied "middleman" positions for a long period, dwelling the while in ghetto-like seclusion from Arab and Turk. Again, they drew the line between ingroup and outgroup—you treat the brother Armenian as you would be treated, and you skin the Turk alive, commercially speaking, and nail his hide on the family strongbox.

With two cases parallel, it then seems worth while to go about the construction of a type of "marginal trading people." Using the Jews as a focus-setting point, certain traits regarded as providing adequate causation<sup>4</sup> for the characteristic conduct have come into view. The selected traits seem to be at least partially relevant to Armenian conduct and they are therefore worked into a guiding pattern that gives some promise of other empirical approximations. Equipped with this device, the researcher finds that the Parsees on the west coast of India draw into focus. They too are traders with a "middleman" position. Also present is the ideology that cleaves the social world in twain: within the fold is the fireworshipper who gives the corpse of his beloved to the fowls of the air, who has an elaborate Magian ritual, and

<sup>4</sup> The problem of adequate causation is of highest importance, but space forbids any attempt to grapple with it here. So also with objective possibility.

who is a follower of Zoroaster; in outer darkness is the unclean Hindu on whom the Parsee looks down with great contempt, and whom he remorselessly exploits whenever possible. Our researcher looks still farther afield and finds that the Chinese trader in the Dutch East Indies represents a fairly close approximation of the construct. Rambling into the interior of Egypt, always on the *qui vive*, he there discovers another trading people with many of the traits usually held to be peculiarly Jewish. These turn out to be the Greeks who migrated into Egypt, beginning in force with establishment of the trading center of Naucratis about the seventh century B.C., filtering slowly southward, ceaselessly trading, maintaining the exclusiveness of the Greek culture in spite of surface assimilation, and feeling themselves infinitely superior to the natives. These Greek traders frequently "played both ends against the middle," and in general approximated the characteristics of a marginal trading people. In earlier times, they scorned the zoölatry of the Egyptians and held to the Greek pantheon; in later times, their faith was Greek Orthodox. In both periods, religious exclusiveness was maintained, for even when the wily Christian Greek operated among Christian Egyptians, these Egyptians belonged to the Coptic sect which defined the relation of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in a way quite different from his own.

These approximations are interesting, but even more arresting is the light thrown on certain Scottish traits. Many Lowland and Border Scots were active in trade from an early period. They even traded sporadically with the Romans along Hadrian's Wall which, it will be remembered, was "one roaring, rioting, cock-fighting, wolf-baiting, horse-taming town, from Ituna in the west to Segedunum on the cold eastern beach." Later, the favorably situated Lowlanders dealt with the Lords of the Isles, with Red Hugh of Ulster, with "the King of Norraway," with the hated Southron on his fat acres, with the "uncanny" Hielandman, that "daft body o' the North," with the Dutch, the French, and other queer folk. Comes the Reformation, and Jock Elliot listens to Calvinist Knox, "dingin' the pulpit to blads." Elect, by God's irresistible grace, the Covenanters undergo persecutions that seal their conviction of being dear to Him "who scourgeth every son whom He receiveth." Set apart from the Catholics to the north and the "King-Papist" Anglicans to the south, the Scottish Presbyterians recognize themselves as a chosen people. Trade with the worldly reprobate? Of course. Treat him as you would treat one of the elect, a fellow-Calvinist with the outward signs of inward grace? Doctrinally, "Aye"; actually, "Pairhops."<sup>5</sup> Shrewd, competitive, rationalistic, an ascetic *within* the world, "principled," industrious, acquisitive, calling many lands his habitation but only Scotland his home, the man from "south of Tay and north of

<sup>5</sup> No Calvinist "sure" of election would *consciously* hold a dual ethic.

Tweed" still retains, in the midst of the Empire, what Stevenson called "a strong Scots accent of the mind."

The "marginal trading people" type has enabled us to range over a considerable body of data looking for certain specific things. The traits with which we started seemed to be linked with others: high degree of rationality, objectivity-fostering detachment where the outgroup is concerned, and considerable measure of economic internationalism—not *ubi bene ibi patria*, but "Wherever my economic good is found, there is my country." All these traits are in some degree, *within the limits of the construct*, Jewish, Armenian, Parsee, Chinese, Greek, Scottish. The configurations from which they are extracted cannot be produced in the laboratory, for these configurations are cultural structures built up by the slow accumulation of folkways and mores; by rapid, catastrophic changes in the form of wars, migrations, and rise of charismatic leadership; by rational systematization of essentially irrational values, and so on. Willy-nilly, the social scientist must work with such facts. Instead of planning research in terms of a virtually unattainable ideal, the laboratory experiment, he must accept the data as they are and adapt his method to them. In many instances, he will eventually find that he can forecast what is likely to happen when certain typical traits turn up in typical relation with each other. He has made one indispensable stride toward realizing his purpose, which is the prediction of the potential or actual recurrence of phenomena that for the purposes in hand are regarded as identical. He does not say that a Scotsman is a Jew; he does say that the existence of certain Scottish characteristics can be predicted ("retrospectively," at least)<sup>6</sup> by means of a construct that takes the Jew as one of its points of departure, and that for the purposes in hand these Scottish traits can be regarded as identical with these Jewish traits. Jock Elliot and Abie Rosenblum, with "a great gulf between them fixed" in many, many respects, nevertheless draw close together in certain phases of their conduct when these are framed within the outlines of a constructed type, the "marginal trading people."<sup>7</sup>

The initial hypothesis that certain characteristics often regarded as "biologically Jewish" are in reality of cultural derivation has in some measure been substantiated, and in addition, the constructed type has revealed the possible relevance of traits other than those originally listed. As a

<sup>6</sup> Prediction in our sense may be "retrospective" rather than "prospective." In other words, we may verify or refute our hypotheses and constructs by searching the record of the past for setups in which the "if and when" proviso is fulfilled. Verification or refutation of predictions may come from events that have *already* occurred. We are not prophesying the future; we are predicting "if and when" recurrence. Hence, the term "retrospective prediction," and also the importance of historical data for the sociologist. The "geological strata" of history take the place of the laboratory.

<sup>7</sup> It should go without saying that this brief illustrative sketch of the "marginal trading people" is not intended to stand the fire of criticism. A buttressing monograph along the lines of Sombart's *The Quintessence of Capitalism* would be needed.

means of more definitive checkup, it may next prove desirable to refine the hypothesis by constructing subtypes discriminating more sharply between various kinds of marginal trading and related conduct, and then to seek statistical demonstration of the high empirical frequency of the conduct isolated as significant. Whatever method of testing the hypothesis is chosen, it should be clear that the constructed type is not itself a hypothesis and that it is not self-validating. Facts are stubborn things. Constructed types must be drawn from them and continually thrown back upon them if empty speculation is not to replace sound generalization. Constructive typology offers neither aid nor comfort to wishful thinking.

The constructed type, in conjunction with an appropriate hypothesis, may have predictive power, but certainly not in the sense of enabling us to say positively that on June 28, 1940, this or that will occur. Being neither market forecasters nor prophets, we can never cast predictions in such unconditional terms. We can say, however, that "If and when these typical factors are given in this typical relation, these will probably be the typical consequences." That is oftentimes as far as we can or should go. The geologist, to analogize once more, will seldom if ever hazard an assertion such as this: "If you bore here, at exactly 3182 feet below the surface you will find a deposit of oil totalling 4,182,692 barrels in amount, flowing at the rate of 76 cubic feet per second." After much investigation, he may say, "The indications are pretty good, considering what is happening in comparable fields, that by boring somewhere within a half-mile radius of this point you may strike oil in paying quantities at about a three-quarter mile depth." The man who has been paying for the geologist's advice then goes ahead and verifies or refutes the generalization.

The verification or refutation is always pragmatic. Often, in sociology, preoccupation with orthodoxy of method prevents the search for crucial checks. Many of us, for example, continue to follow the alliterative lilt of "cultural lag" as an all-sufficient explanation of changes in American divorce rates, blithely ignoring the fact that such changes have been proceeding in reverse direction in Japan under conditions of even greater "discrepancy" between non-material and material culture. Careful constructive typologists say, "Given such and such circumstances, these consequences are likely to ensue," and we then inspect the "historical" record and/or the record of "contemporary" events to find out whether our generalizations, necessarily cast in terms about as vague as those of the geologist, are pragmatically verified or refuted.

The constructed type is an indispensable tool for analysis in the social sciences generally. In no social science is it more useful than in sociology. It is indispensable when one deals with longitudinal sections or time-series—that is, with the "same" set of processes and structures followed over a dated period of years. It is also indispensable from the cross-sectional stand-

point, i.e., the study of the interrelations of a number of processes and structures in a given cross-section of the "existing" and/or "realizable" record. Finally, it is indispensable when the phenomena concerned are relatively undated.

*Dangers in Use of Constructive Typology.* If the potentialities of constructive typology are to be realized, we must guard against misunderstanding and against misuse of the method by the well-intentioned but ill-informed. Case in point: Someone is always saying, "Your constructed type is no good because several exceptions to it can be found." The obvious reply is, "You can never expect anything other than exceptions. If construct and 'reality' exactly correspond, you are in the morass of the 'particular. You are talking about *this* thing at *this* time in such a way that explicit comparison with anything else becomes virtually impossible." The belief that the constructed type is rendered useless because exceptions to it can be found is childishy naïve. Exceptions must be found; in the realm of the particular, nothing other than "exceptions" can be expected.

Present-day cultural anthropologists of Lowie's sect, now fortunately waning in prestige, are the most frequent perpetrators of the methodological naïveté just mentioned, in part because some of them, deceived by the limited spatial extent and numerical scope of the societies they investigate, attempt "full description" of the unique. This tendency is also furthered by the fact that preliterate have no written records that enable adequate investigation of long-term changes, and hence it seems possible to "gather *all* the facts." The resulting failure to focus on definite problems that conform to the criterion of attempted scientific prediction causes these anthropologists to bog down in the particularistic swamp and, unaware of their plight, to deride all efforts at generalization by croaking "Exception."

Another vulgar misunderstanding which predictions based on constructed types frequently encounter is that the conditional character of the generalizations is disregarded. All that the constructive typologist ever says is that "if and when" certain factors, which have been isolated as significant, recur in configurations which can be regarded as identical for the purposes in hand, then this in turn probably will ensue. He does not say in advance, nor can he *ever* say in advance, whether the factors which are essential for the results *actually* will recur in the required configuration. Cultural structures cannot be concocted in the laboratory; Calvinistic Scottish society or Frankfort Jewry cannot be made to order. The constructive typologist, like the geologist, must depend on the accidents of past "deposit" or of future "stratification." If it is only clearly held in mind that these generalizations are cast in "if and when" terms, a considerable amount of misunderstanding can be avoided.

Still another kind of misunderstanding arises from the belief that constructed types are all of equal generality. Nothing could be further from,

the truth, as we tried to show in the discussion of dated and localized as over against undated and nonlocalized types. It is worth stressing again, however, that constructed types in the social sciences are of many forms. The purposes in hand determine what they are going to be like.

It may be necessary, for example, to construct a type that is highly relative, quasi-"historical," for the purposes of short-term prediction. For some purposes, of course, the construction of a type that is not so relative would be in order; to be tied down to a construct dated and localized in highly specific terms would stultify the projected research. The goal in view is more general; hence a more general type is constructed. On the basis of such a type, a number of far-reaching "if and when" generalizations can be made. This construct, however, is less relative, and the more general it becomes, the less detailed can be the predictions based upon it. In a certain sense, generalization is omission. The more ground a type covers, the less adequately it covers it so far as minor humps and hollows are concerned. Yet for some purposes the construct should cover a great deal of ground.

Analogy: Suppose that the face of some hero is being carved on the side of a mountain. The engineer-sculptor did not determine the form and composition of that mountain, but he must nevertheless go to work. He begins by building a scaffold in order to reach the surface of the mountain with hammer, drill, and dynamite. For preliminary purposes, the scaffold can be of very open construction, without a great many stages, because the first step is to remove irregularities and prepare suitable working areas; such a purpose is sufficient justification for a scaffold of highly general character. Later on, it will be necessary to rough out the features, and later still, to chisel the delicate folds and lines surrounding the eye. When these phases of the work are reached, the scaffold must be built in such a way that it gives access to the precise points of importance. Eventually, every facility of position must be provided for the workman who puts on the finishing touches. The scaffold, manifestly, becomes more intricate and detailed as the purpose it serves changes.

*The purpose in hand* determines how the type is to be constructed. That is the all-important criterion. There is no way of saying before the problem has been defined and the hypothesis framed exactly how a type should be constructed. You must know the purposes of the study, the empirical data, and what kind of pragmatic verification or refutation is to be sought. Statistics may be called upon for this checkup function, or data drawn from history may be used to shape crucial culture case studies of societies and cultural blocs à la Toynbee; or psycho-sociology, with its resources of personality study, may carry out the tester's task. In short, the data from which the type is distilled and on which it and its initiating hypothesis depend for validation may be drawn from many different sources. Only when the researcher knows clearly what his purpose is, and only when he has

tested the possible utility of his constructs in the light of that purpose, does he know whether his generalizations are likely to be worth the effort of pragmatic validation. If he decides "to put them to the touch," the final question is, "Does the construct work, within the limits set by the purpose, on the whole and in the long run?"

*Conclusion.* Generalizations in constructive typology are not True, if by this is meant the controlling, ultimate, ineffable Capital T. All that the social scientist can mean by truth is some amount, however slight, of predictive power. Truth as insight into the essence of things, as apprehension of first or final reasons, cannot be delivered by the scientist. The scientist does not seek for "Truth." His task is not to enquire into the "Why?" of things, but into the "How?" "*Why* should there be a cosmos?" is not a scientifically answerable question. "*How* has the cosmos changed throughout determinable time?" is certainly a large order, but the attempt to answer it does not carry us beyond the confines of science. These considerations, however, range too far afield; let us return to the nearby task.

"Common sense" to the contrary, it seems to me that the scientist in a very real sense operates with fictions—or, if that term is unpalatable, with planned modifications or simplifications of the "empirically given," i.e., of the configurations he first perceives.<sup>8</sup> The working fiction of the scientist—any scientist—is a construct of the type I have already characterized. As one physicist has put it: "On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday we use a wave theory of light, and on Tuesday and Thursday we use a particle theory." Both of these theories work for the specific purposes for which they were intended; they procure prediction. What light *is*, in any final sense, is never revealed by a scientific theory; it merely tells how something called "light" acts under given conditions. Most of us tend to think in spatial terms, and the result is the construction of models envisaging either wave motion or the bombardment of minute particles, depending on which model works out best under the terms of the problem and the data confronted.

Now it is entirely possible that in the future someone will construct a theory of light that will reconcile the wave and the particle assumptions.<sup>9</sup> This reconciliation of present contradictions would be no warrant, however, for believing that the reconciling theory is finally and absolutely "True."

<sup>8</sup> Manifestly, the "empirically given" is not "raw fact." Strictly speaking, there are no facts as such; the very act of perceiving, if our perceptions are to be communicable, depends on unarticulated constructs. Nevertheless, we here provisionally draw a line between (1) facts "known as such" to all normal human beings who have undergone like general cultural training, and (2) constructs planfully developed by specialists for their particular purposes. This distinction is merely a substitute, however, for an involved analysis which is a task for a first-rate epistemologist, not a sociologist.

<sup>9</sup> I am informed by my physicist friends that a fairly satisfactory reconciliation has already been effected.

Attainment of such "Truth" would not be the purpose of the reconciliatory achievement; instead, the general principle of economy of effort would probably enter into consideration. It is much easier to use one theory in which apparent contradictions are reconciled than it is to keep one's mind in separate compartments, as it were, using one theory in one situation and the other in another. The scientist *qua* scientist has no yearning for "Truth" in this or any similar case; he is simply trying to get a tool that works better, more economically, with less effort and more precision, than the two somewhat awkward implements that he is now forced to manipulate. The reconciling theory is just as much a working fiction as were the two he was struggling with before—unless we wish to assume that at the day and hour when the discrepant theories are reconciled, the scientist knows all that he ever can know, in the predictive sense, about the phenomena in question.

In the late nineteenth century, of course, some physicists did think that they had "the feel of the fur on the tail of the world"; one of them even said, "From this time on, all that will ever be done will be to introduce refinements into the already existing body of physical theory." And yet within twenty-five years that whole body of theory was revolutionized through the new "extra-dimensional" geometries and the work of mathematical astronomers. It is unlikely that the physicists will again think that they have a tailhold on the cosmos; it remains to be seen how the "common sensors" in the social sciences will conduct themselves.

In the search for "Truth as the Last Word," the working scientist is a blood brother of Pilate. It should not be assumed, however, that the working fictions of which we make use are "just any" fictions. They should not involve the social scientist in conflict with established principles in other sciences; e.g., no sociologist in his senses would follow Freud and Jung in postulating a phylogenetic memory, a "racial unconscious," based on the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The long battle of the biologists has apparently entered a quiescent stage, with victory at least provisionally resting on the banners of the anti-Lamarckians. True, the palaeontologists, among others, raise timid pro-Lamarckian objections now and then, only to see them crushed under the weight of countervailing evidence. Unless the biologists eventually make discoveries that overturn what they hold to be one of their most firmly established generalizations, no construct that assumes the inheritance of acquired characteristics can be regarded as objectively possible. Certainly the foolhardy alone would attempt to build their scientific houses on rejected theories, more especially when they derive from fields where the word of the qualified specialist is the only trustworthy guide. Most of us will feel that the conclusions of these specialists stake off the plots within which our constructs must be built. Even when these limits seem relatively narrow, there is usually

space enough to tax the constructive endurance of the most assiduous typologist.

Finally, note that the constructed type *as such* is not necessarily a statistical mean or mode, or even a homogeneous universe. True, it can be constructed in such a way that it corresponds to any of these, but usually its utility will be sharply limited by such practices. The instrumentally valuable construct is like a Frans Hals portrait rather than like a composite photograph printed from a large number of superimposed negatives. We might even say that a construct may be as selective as a sketch. The ordinary stereotype affords an instructive contrast: it is an unconscious, unplanned exaggeration of the "empirically given," mixed with much that has not been observed at all, and includes a large emotional freight of praise or blame; the constructed type is a conscious, planned selection and combination of the "empirically given," relatively free from value-judgment. Most important of all, the constructed type serves scientific activity, which is "the systematic statement of the probability of the potential or actual recurrence of phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical."

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## DEMOCRACY UNDER THREE DIFFERENT CULTURES

NEWELL L. SIMS

*Oberlin College*

FROM Herodotus to the present, travelers have been writing about the characteristics and customs of the peoples among whom they have sojourned. In the sixteenth century, with the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of nationalism, officials of the newly formed states began to take interest in the differences between the peoples of the various political unities. Ambassadors began reporting on the habits and temperaments of the nations to whom they were accredited.<sup>1</sup> One such report was that of the Venetian Ambassadors on the English under Henry VIII. A more comprehensive one was that by a traveler named Andrew Borde, called the *Fyrst Boke of the Introduction of Knowledge*, which described almost every people of Europe.<sup>2</sup> Since then, writings of this sort have multiplied until the world's literature is overloaded with them.

Generally speaking, most of them commit a common error in their characterizations. This consists in assigning most of the virtues to such nationalities as the writers fancy, including, of course, their own, and attributing the vices to the people they dislike or fear.<sup>3</sup> Thus, humankind has been classified into superior and inferior, clever and stupid, noble and ignoble, or good and bad folks. On the whole, the observations have been superficial and the generalizations of a subjective nature with results that are more often ludicrous than illuminating. Only a few out of the many efforts can be accepted as of real scientific value. In spite of the bad light in which so much of this literature has put the subject, there are undoubtedly authentic differences in folk behavior which merit careful study and description. Therefore, it behooves the sociologist making such a study to apply to the task whatever scientific methods he can command in order to bring an objective viewpoint to the problem. This paper does not claim to have fulfilled this ideal but it does venture to propose its possibilities.

An approach may be made by recalling certain fairly well substantiated facts of general significance relative to national conduct. In the first place, "collective temperament" or behavior can no more be considered a constant or invariable factor than can individual conduct. It varies from time to time, even radically in the space of a few years. Witness, for instance, what has transpired within two decades in Russia, where a pacific and mystic folk have developed new habits and a different tempo. Obviously, however,

<sup>1</sup> Julian S. Huxley and A. C. Haddon, *We Europeans*, 44, New York, 1936.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

the possibility of rapid change does not preclude a nation's demeanor from remaining essentially unaltered for generations and even centuries. Since change may occur in a brief space, its cause and hence the explanation of the differences between peoples is thereby pretty definitely indicated.

Thus we come to a second fact, namely, that differences in national behavior and the change to which it is subject are due mainly to socio-cultural factors. If it be attributed to any other, the relatively rapid alteration of which we have evidence could hardly occur. Biological variation and selection would require much more time than is otherwise involved. If the biological process may not be wholly ruled out, neither can it be accorded any particular importance as compared with cultural variation and selection in determining the behavior of a people.

Assuming the correctness of this causal hypothesis, we may view the behavior differences obtaining between national groups as essentially the products of diverse cultures which are in turn from time to time subject to change. The implication of this is that the distinguishing traits of a people are more quantitative than qualitative. However, since quality may often be resolved to quantity it would be possible to establish national character by the method of statistical averages, but in the absence of any exact measurements of the frequency with which the various traits appear, one must rely upon general impressions in describing their differences.

It is to be noted in the third place that the behavior pattern which we call national may not be exactly uniform throughout all ranges, sections, and classes of its population. Although there may be a common denominator of conduct in any given instance, as, say, among the English gentry, bourgeoisie, and proletariat which distinguishes them from the French, Germans, or Americans taken as a whole, there are also certain more or less recognizable differences between the various strata, geographical sections, and occupational groups of each nation. The more heterogeneous the stock, the regional conditions, and the modes of getting a living, the more true this is; and the greater the homogeneity, the less apparent it is. Hence, national behavior will have to be taken to mean the modal conduct of a people.

Finally, let it be observed that, since national traits are not constant factors, any listing of them must have reference to what is predominant at a particular time and not to absolute qualities which are timeless in their significance. Thus, in the colonial days of the United States, the southern aristocracy was in many respects clearly and consciously imitative of the English gentry and the French Bourbons, but that is no longer the case. There has been a change of habit. In like manner, the English of the pre-industrial era were described as "merry," but merry would hardly apply at any subsequent time. Nor would the fact that they were known as a musical and music loving folk in the Elizabethan age justify calling them such at any time during the Victorian period.

Holding constantly in mind these general facts and the caution that one ventures upon difficult, uncertain, and even dangerous ground in trying to characterize any nation's conduct, we shall, nevertheless, attempt it in a few cases. Taking those traits which the consensus of judgment among competent scholars and observers who have seriously undertaken to appraise folk behavior on the basis of fairly objective data has considered to be the salient ones, we shall endeavor to analyze the behavior patterns of England, France, and the United States, and to suggest in each case something of the bearing they may have on political affairs. The nations chosen being those where political democracy prevails, our specific object shall be to direct attention to the peculiar traits of each people in relation to that type of political institution. Thus, we may discover or at least throw some light on why democracy is not the same in these three countries.

Whatever the conclusions arrived at may be, they can hardly be very exact, for we shall encounter the dilemma of reciprocal influences—of folk habits determining government and government in turn conditioning folk habits. The two factors cannot be completely separated and evaluated; they cling together in a social complex that defies final analysis. Still, certain folk habits are definitely prior to the establishment of the democratic political systems and relatively uninfluenced by them in England, France, and America. It is upon these habits that we shall focus attention.

When the behavior of the English nation is analysed, two or three traits are recognized as outstanding. One is orderliness and respect for law. This prevails to a degree altogether exceptional among nations. Decorum is excellent everywhere. There is little friction and quarreling. A dignified but cordial give and take, or a kind of social elasticity, makes the English masses the most civil people in Europe. They live together amicably because of a tacit agreement not to interfere with one another.<sup>4</sup> Conflicts are more likely to be verbal than pugilistic. Englishmen seem to be motivated by a certain sense of self-government which tends to reduce the need for law and governmental regulation of personal conduct to a minimum, but whatever the law is, there is little disposition to disregard it. Obedience is habitual. Even the police, as agents of law and order, are popular and as cordially liked by the masses and classes of the realm as our American police are hated and distrusted. The public is squarely behind its officers. These facts, together with the added one that neither police nor criminals in Britain are armed,<sup>5</sup> speak eloquently of the nation's conduct. It is further attested by the standards of police efficiency, which rates highest those who make the fewest arrests, whereas in France and America, it is the other way about.<sup>6</sup>

A second conspicuous trait of the Englishman is his self-reliant and stub-

<sup>4</sup> Price Collier, *England and the English*, 28, New York, 1911.

<sup>5</sup> R. H. Hutchinson, *Harpers Magazine*, August 1936, 319.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

born disposition to exercise his own ability and pursue his career in his own way. This implies what is much in evidence, namely, a strong preference for privacy. In consequence of this, a philosophy and practice of "social convenience"<sup>7</sup> has arisen which dictates that you refrain from meddling with the other fellow's affairs in order that he may not meddle with yours. In operation, this does not so much mean social isolation and individualism as a ready cooperation for the maintenance of the rights of each person in his social status and in pursuing his own peculiar career.

A third trait that might be regarded as the keystone of English character structure is their habit of compromise. This is why they are known as good sportsmen. Compromise, as exemplified in English life, is a species of stupidity or mental haziness which "permits them to hold two contradictory propositions at one and the same time."<sup>8</sup> In consequence, no people are so illogical, inconsistent, and contradictory in thought and action as the English. This fact has been recognized by some of their best minds. Their conduct and institutions represent a congeries of irreconcilabilities.

It is this constant search for the feasible, for the convenient, for the conciliatory, for the instantly practicable and the total ignoring of the logical, and sometimes even the true and the right, which has given the name *Perfide Albion* to England and made her so vulnerable to the accusation of hypocrisy.<sup>9</sup>

Such are the salient traits of English character structure. Our next inquiry is concerning the nature of English democracy. In brief, this institution consists of popular sovereignty, the election of governments by the people, and the relative freedom of the individual in life's pursuits. In other words, it means liberty, but, except in a restricted political and legal sense, it does not imply equality. For, with all her proud boast of freedom, England remains, in her national structure, her traditions, and her social relations, highly stratified, aristocratic, and committed to the practices of inequality. Even her liberty is exercised within the framework of a feudal system that by its very nature denies equality. Although in many respects this system is today little more than a form, an "archeological survival,"<sup>10</sup> much of the ancient sentiment and influence remains connected with it. Upper class privilege has neither been destroyed nor passed down to the masses to any considerable degree. It has been somewhat redistributed, to be sure, for the nobility have shared it with the rich bourgeoisie, but that is essentially all. The masses are subservient to the class distinctions and the customs that accompany them. There is an attitude of obsequiousness before the rich and powerful that is at times almost servile and an acquiescence in a semicaste society that is strangely at variance with the exercise of personal liberty.

<sup>7</sup> Price Collier, *op. cit.*, 77.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 70-71.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 73

<sup>10</sup> Robert Briffault, *Breakdown*, 68, New York, 1932.

It is the Englishman's character traits, I submit, that are largely accountable for this particular type of democracy. Liberty has always originated in resistance to oppression. In England, that resistance came from the self-assertive habits and the desire of the individual to be left alone. The main objects sought have been releases from feudal tyrannies, servitudes, restrictions, burdensome duties, excessive punishments, too heavy obligations, and too rigid controls. Gaining them in a piecemeal fashion in the course of many generations, the Englishman has been satisfied and pleased with what he has prized as a great achievement, for they have permitted him in greater numbers and to a progressively greater degree to assert himself in his own way. But this liberty, be it observed, is largely if not wholly negative. It represents little more than emancipation from upper-class domination and relief from exploitation. Not much acquisition of new privileges, except certain formal political prerogatives, has been involved. The positive side of democracy, which means equality, has neither been much sought nor won in any large measure.

The method by which liberty has been gained reveals the determinative influence of habits of orderliness and respect for law in English life. In fact, one ought scarcely to speak of method at all, for it has been more of a growth than a matter of design. As it has been said, the privileges of the few have broadened down from precedent to precedent to the many so gradually as to appear a natural development. The organic continuity has not been broken. There have been, to be sure, a few dramatic and ructious scenes in the rise of English democracy, but no upheavals, no disruptions of the system—only gradual adjustments within it. Apparently, habit traits could not brook anything else and have persistently inhibited revolutionary movements which would completely sweep away a social structure that has effectively prevented the people from obtaining and enjoying the full fruits of democracy in the form of equality.

Moreover, to such masses as the English, so respectful of order, so obedient to law, so subservient to institutions, the ruling class could safely relinquish bit by bit its political power and legal prerogative until formal government became vested in the voting public without much fear that that public would ruthlessly destroy the traditional system. Experience has indeed demonstrated that such trust as the aristocracy has placed in the populace has not been misplaced, for it has exercised its liberties without seriously seeking to abolish inequalities, which would mean to violate the habitual order and destroy the law of the land.

So English democracy is a halfway measure, contradictory throughout, with self-government and social caste, liberty and aristocracy, functioning side by side. But could it be anything else among a people whose cardinal habit is to compromise? A people devoid of this trait would not be satisfied with such a system, but it suits the English with their opportunistic ways,

their lack of clear vision and logical procedure. It is what one would look for among those whose whole conduct has been so inconclusive, muddled, inconsistent, and at variance with fixed principles. When, therefore, Burke called upon his fellow countrymen to understand the British Constitution according to their measure and to venerate when they were not able to comprehend,<sup>11</sup> he evidently knew his Englishman, few of whom he had counted on to understand but most of whom he expected to accept with equanimity, to venerate, since to such mixed ways habit had inclined them.

In their most conspicuous character traits, the French are very different from the English. In no respect is this more marked than in the high degree of mutuality, interdependence, and social solidarity which prevails among them. The habit of dependence upon, and identification with, the community is their most distinctive characteristic.<sup>12</sup> Life is essentially organic. There is respect and consideration for others to an extent rarely found in England. Success in France is, therefore, more often achieved through winning social approval, the support of public opinion, and community sympathy than by means of forceful action and dominating methods. Because of such attitudes, there is less feeling of personal responsibility and more reliance upon what the group requires or offers than one finds in England or America.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, life is more freely expansive, expressive, and less aloof, restricted, and inhibited.

A second element of French behavior no less pronounced than the one just described is its rationality. Intelligence rules. Not only is there quickness and keenness of perception among all classes, even to the most ignorant and illiterate, but a notable application of reason in all affairs.<sup>14</sup> The idea is the thing that counts. It is put first and sought and followed to its logical conclusion with greater certainty than generally among any other people. One has said of the French nation, "Nowhere does action follow thought so swiftly and nowhere is there so much thinking done."<sup>15</sup> The Frenchman apparently enjoys his fellows for their opinions more than for their personalities.<sup>16</sup> By the same token, conversation is for the sake of communicating thought or for the pleasure of apprehending it<sup>17</sup> rather than merely argument for argument's sake or for the stimulating of the sensibilities. Thus, it is intelligence that is honored in men even to the extent of elevating capacity above character.<sup>18</sup> Such rational appraisal leads to little of hero-worship after the English manner.<sup>19</sup> In its stead is a critical appreciation of those who achieve, more because they are distinguished equals than because they are looked upon as supermen.<sup>20</sup> For this reason,

<sup>11</sup> Edmund Burk, *Works*, v. III, 114.

<sup>12</sup> W. C. Brownell, *French Traits*, 32, New York, 1897.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8.

<sup>14</sup> C. T. Muret, *Harpers Magazine*, July 1934, 223.

<sup>15</sup> W. C. Brownell, *op. cit.*, 85.

<sup>16</sup> C. T. Muret, *op. cit.*, 227.

<sup>17</sup> W. C. Brownell, *op. cit.*, 146.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

it is said, no Frenchman surrenders himself with awe and abjectness to any personal influence.<sup>21</sup>

Hardly anything in French life fails to be stamped with the rational method. This is true even of art, where there is more striving after the true than the essentially beautiful, more after form than content. It is quite evident that the French in the exercise of their rational disposition are discontented with the merely natural. Everything about them must be refashioned and subjected to the impress of thought. It has been said, "They can leave nothing alone; they charge you more for potatoes *au naturel* than for potatoes served in any other way."<sup>22</sup>

Their rationality, of course, makes them realists. That type of romantic idealism so often found elsewhere, particularly in England and America, does not befuddle them. They are not afraid of facts,<sup>23</sup> not easily deluded, but given to skepticism. When they do become fanatical, it is in the pursuit of a great idea or principle.

French democracy is essentially like the English in respect to form and popular sovereignty, but it is very different in content. A highly centralized government tends to eliminate local independence, and gives government "for," not by the people.<sup>24</sup> There is far less of individual and civil liberty than in England although a deep respect for the idea of liberty dwells in the heart of every Frenchman. But *laissez faire* is not allowed.<sup>25</sup> The state regulates conduct to an excessive degree as it seems to us. While the English prefer to be self-regulating, the French, as Napoleon III remarked, always look to the government for everything instead of depending on themselves.<sup>26</sup>

The English have liberty without much concern for either the idea or the substance of equality, but the French have exalted the latter above every other social value. They have exerted, then restricted, their political liberties to achieve and establish equality. That is why they have an excess of government and center so much thought upon its functioning.<sup>27</sup> Only by the action of the state can equality be secured and preserved. Privilege has to be abolished by law. France once did that, or thought she did, and appointed law and its agencies to be the guardians of the many against the few. This was done under the assumption that equality, or anything approaching it, can exist only as society protects itself against the individual.<sup>28</sup> Since England acts upon the very opposite assumption and protects the individual against society, she fails in equality. For,

The relations between the absence of state action and privilege are closer and more direct than we imagine. In England . . . where the privileges of the privileged classes form a part of the constitution . . . , minute state regulations, codes, etc.,

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 257.

<sup>23</sup> C. T. Muret, *op. cit.*, 223.

<sup>24</sup> W. C. Brownell, *op. cit.*, 340.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 339.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 336.

<sup>27</sup> W. C. Brownell, *op. cit.*, 339.

<sup>28</sup> F. H. Giddings, *Democracy and Empire*, 339, New York, 1901.

are easily dispensed with because the strong can readily get along without them and because only the strong are accounted worthy.<sup>29</sup>

Equality in France is at once a creed, a cult, and, within limits, an objective reality. As André Sieffried states it, "The French Revolution created a metaphysical equality of all citizens—a jealous and uncompromising affirmation of the theoretic dignity of everyman."<sup>30</sup> It did, of course, much besides this to establish equality in objective conditions, but its success was only partial; and, meantime, the forces of the industrial age have created new inequalities. Natural inequalities among men were not and could not be destroyed, but fixed social strata, feudal orders, and the caste system were thrown down. As in all countries that have developed a capitalistic industrial economy, social and economic classes have risen to nullify in part the work of the revolution, and to restore feudalism under a new form if not to quench the equalitarian spirit which has its source in the mores of the masses.

One has but to remind himself of these dominant traits of French character to comprehend why French democracy took the form and resorted to the methods it did. For, given habits of solidarity to begin with, the political institutions which the nation set up could hardly fail to exalt the community above the individual with the resulting emphasis on equality instead of liberty. Anything else would have been an anomaly and at variance with the mores.

That the origin of the democratic movement in France was due largely to the rational attitude is generally acknowledged. In contrast to the slow-growing process of the English system, the French method was revolutionary. That meant the employment of a logical device to end a feudal regime. Philosophy nurtured the revolution and in the succession of experimental efforts by which its fruits were garnered into a constitution, abstract principles played a major role. Throughout subsequent history, law, as the instrument of the democratic idea, has been applied less untrammelled by custom, precedent, sentiment, or any other agency tending to nullify it or thwart its logical procedure than in England or America.<sup>31</sup> Thus, French democracy has been a work of reason, not a natural growth. When it was seen that liberty, equality, and fraternity were not naturally existent in the social order, the nation reasoned that they should be put there, and so asserted itself politically, as it was accustomed to do otherwise, to carry its idea into action.

In turning from France and England to America, we find, in spite of our great diversity of conduct, a behavior pattern with traits no less distinctive

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 337.

<sup>30</sup> Quoted by André Maurois in an article entitled "The French Revolution Lives On," *The New York Times Magazine*, August 16, 1936.

<sup>31</sup> J. Macy and J. W. Gannaway, *Comparative Free Government*, 560, New York, 1915.

than in other nations. What is foremost is the energetic character of the American people. Action<sup>32</sup> is the mainspring of our conduct. Call it strenuous, aggressive, restless, spontaneous, impulsive, adventurous, creative, action for action's sake, or what you will, it remains the dominant quality giving a peculiar flavor and tempo to the nation. We have always been a dynamic folk, an aggregation of pioneers, migrants, doers, inventors, builders, enterprisers, speculators, producers, and reformers. The action quality is what we praise in our heroes and admire in our women. It is that which has made production our god and the massing of wealth too often the measure of a man's worth. From it likewise have sprung the violence, crime and exhibitionism for which we are notorious. It is this habit that has always so quickly interrupted thought, meditation and every sort of deliberation among us by prompting the forceful man to rise and shout, "For God's sake let's do something about it!"

A second trait, no less conspicuous than the first and generally attributed to the American people is unsocialized individualism. Most of our history is a chronicle of conduct singularly atomic, anarchic, competitive, unfettered, and independent. It has been of a type to prevent the growth of social solidarity and to disintegrate tendencies toward it. No doubt personal freedom has been more fully exercised, the will-to-power more readily realized, and rugged individualism more generally idealized here than elsewhere in the world. One result has been to produce a most effective, capable, and self-reliant type of person who has been disposed to regard the man himself, quite apart from his belief or station, as the chief value. Another result has been to create a nation of discrete units each going his own way in a *laissez faire* society.

A third characteristic of the American people has to do with their emotional habits. They may be described as, on the whole, highly suggestible, sentimental, optimistic and given to extremes. They "enthuse" easily and subside quickly over a great variety of things. In proof, witness their ready response to almost countless -isms and fanaticisms, Utopian and reform movements, mob furies, heroic causes, Pollyanna hopes, childish fears, sordid dreams, and bitter hates. Such armies of followers can hardly be gathered so quickly anywhere else in the western world as are commanded here by demagogues, social messiahs, crusaders for panaceas, promoters of get-rich-quick and share-the-wealth schemes, founders of quack religions, and movements led by charlatans of every sort. It is because of such susceptibility to feeling stimulation that the American people have been called a nation of idealists and reformers. Perhaps, Waldo Frank's term, a "cap-turable" people<sup>33</sup> comes nearer describing them than any other single word.

<sup>32</sup> Waldo Frank, *The Rediscovery of America*, chap. V, New York, 1929.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 233-234.

In any event, their emotional reactions are quite as distinct as their activism and individualism.

American democracy tends to hold liberty and equality in somewhat better balance both in theory and practice than is the case in England or France.<sup>34</sup> It differs from the English form by putting less stress on liberty and from the French in giving less practical emphasis to equality.<sup>35</sup> In its adherence to the notion that one man is as good as another regardless of external circumstances, our equality turns out to be more of a subjective value than a social condition or reality. At the same time, our fraternity has generally been more widespread and genuine. Perhaps that which is most distinctive in our democracy traces to the different circumstances of its origin and background. In both England and France, democracy rose out of feudalism; by growth, adjustment, and compromise in the one case; by design and summary action in the other; whereas in America, it was the product of natural conditions, devoid of feudalism. In the social and political life of our country, liberty and equality were from the beginning conditions of existence. They did not have to be achieved; they obtained. Hence, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution represented only the formulation in doctrine and law of the general mode of living and thinking which had been challenged by alien authority.

Our character traits were produced by the same conditions that gave democracy. Nevertheless, these traits have exerted a profound influence on its development. Individualism, formed by the frontier that lacked organized society, was bound to sponsor a type of political liberty which countenanced few restraints and to hold that government best which governed least, and that has been the sort of government we have had throughout most of our history. Unfettered opportunity to do as one pleased, guaranteed by law or regardless of law, has been the prevailing idea.

However, this individualism has inevitably and always overreached itself. It therefore has created situations inimical to the rights and well-being of the majority who produced it. So many social problems have arisen because of it that the actionism and capturability of the masses have been excited against it. Hence, our character traits have worked at cross purposes with one another and in the last analysis against the individualistic political system. By forcing every problem into politics, by demanding solution through law for every social ill, and so constantly overloading and elaborating that government which was supposed to be kept to the lowest terms, we, the acting, capturable, individualistic people, have tended to make this one of the most governed nations. Naturally, unsocialized individualism in high places always, and in low places often, cries out against legal villenage when the waves of every sort of movement raised among the easily stimulated masses dash against legislatures and congresses to force

<sup>34</sup> F. H. Giddings, *op. cit.*, 338.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 339.

them into action. For governmental action is all that will satisfy the nations' action habits. Hence, a riot of laws hasty, ill-advised, ill-considered, shortsighted, impractical, irrational, and often at variance with available facts, come from lawmaking bodies scarcely less irrational and emotionally susceptible, actionistic, and capturable than the nation they represent.

But after all, this actionism, linked with capturability, which brings so much reformism to politics and believes that to get a law is tantamount to solving social problems, the end-all and cure-all of every ill, is not so contradictory of the individualistic mode as at first appears. For, while operating to destroy the sort of government that individualism originally preferred, it is itself one expression of that same individualism. It is moved by the same self-confidence and belief in man's ability to shape his own destiny that once wanted no governmental interference. Only it sometimes chooses to get by law what at other times it sought without law. Thus, it is a double-edged sword in a relatively chaotic, irrational, socially ignorant nation.

This paper has briefly directed attention to the salient character traits of three nations in relation to democracy. To the peculiar habits of each have been attributed the differences in their democracies, but it would hardly do to rest the case there. For there is every evidence that significant character changes are taking place and beginning to manifest themselves in all three nations. These changes, moreover, appear to be very similar and so bid fair to make all more alike politically. Under the capitalistic industrial system, the common man is being regimented, organized, robbed of responsibility, denied opportunity for initiative, and made a part of a great social machine. Thus he is being forced into habits of irresponsibility, dependence, obedience, and servitude. He is being standardized to much the same pattern everywhere. In America, for example, uniformity of behavior is rapidly approaching among the mass of urban dwellers. There is little pride in individuality of thought or act, but an ambition on the part of everyone to be like his neighbor. This conformity apparently has its main root in conditions of work and living which deny opportunities of free choice and the exercise of individual judgment. Wherever such conditions prevail, there tends to develop a dependent type of man who, having little experience of it, will have little interest in political liberty as such.

Already in America, this type seems to be in the majority. The idea of liberty has long since lost currency, and hence credit among them.<sup>36</sup> The faith of our fathers is dead and the institution of our fathers has died or will die with it. If we mistake not, the same thing to a greater or less degree is happening in France and England, and if that be the case, liberty is going to disappear, largely, from the scene. An authoritarian form of state, devoted either to the interests of a larger equality or to the perpetuation of privilege will probably supplant the democratic form.

<sup>36</sup> W. C. Brownell, *op. cit.*, 317.

# Official Reports and Proceedings

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 Ill., b f G H k l  
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 of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.  
 Bettman, Alfred, 1514 First Natl. Bank  
 Bldg., Cincinnati, Ohio  
 Beynon, E. D., 1212 E. University Ave.,  
 Ann Arbor, Mich., h  
 Bickham, Martin Hayes, 429 9th St., Wil-  
 mette, Ill.  
 Bierstedt, Robert, Bennington College, Ben-  
 nington, Vt.  
 Binder, Rudolph M., 157 W. 57th St., New  
 York, N.Y.  
 Bisset, Charles, York College, York, Neb.  
 Bittner, W. S., 822 Hunter St., Bloom-  
 ington, Ind., a b H i  
 Blackburn, Cleo W., 802 814 N. West St.,  
 Indianapolis, Ind., a b c f h i k n  
 Blackwell, Gordon, 113 Crescent Ave.,  
 Greenville, S.C., c g  
 Biaha, In. Arnost, Dr., Masaryk University,  
 Brno, Neumanova, 32, Czechoslovakia  
 Blaine, Emmons, Mrs., 101 E. Erie St.,  
 Chicago, Ill.  
 Bloch, Herbert A., St. Lawrence University,  
 Canton, N.Y., g h i j k  
 Blocker, D. J., Griffin Ave., Williamsburg,  
 Va., a e J k l m n  
 Bloom, Leonard, Dept. of Sociology, Kent  
 University, Kent, Ohio, a b c h i  
 Blumenthal, Albert B., 520 W. 1st St.,  
 Maryville, Mo., A b C h  
 Blumer, Herbert, Social Science Bldg., Uni-  
 versity of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.  
 Blunt, Carlene L., 1133 Michigan Ave.,  
 Evanston, Ill., g h I m  
 Bodenhafer, Walter B., Washington Univer-  
 sity, St. Louis, Mo.  
 Boettiger, Louis A., 20 Bellaire Ct., Apple-  
 ton, Wis., A b c d f i n o  
 Bogardus, Emory S., University of Southern  
 California, Los Angeles, Calif., B c i  
 Bolden, Alexander R., 400 W. 153rd St.,  
 Apt. 5E, New York, N.Y., A C e I J k  
 Bonner, Hubert, 6151 S. Kimbark Ave.,  
 Chicago, Ill., A B c m  
 Bonser, Howard, University of Tennessee,  
 Knoxville, Tenn., b c G h

- Bossard, James H. S., Logan Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.  
 Bostwick, Arthur E., St. Louis Pub. Lib., Olive and 15th Sts., St. Louis, Mo.  
 Boucher, Pierre, 10 St. James St., West, Montreal, Canada  
 †Bouglé, C., Univ. of Paris, Paris, France  
 Bowden, Gordon T., Hunt 11, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass., b c d e f h k l m  
 Bowers, Raymond V., Univ. of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y., a c f h j m  
 Bowman, Claude C., Dept. of Sociology, Temple Univ., Philadelphia, Pa., A b e k  
 Bowman, Leroy E., 41 Washington Sq., S., New York, N.Y.  
 Boyd, Neva L., 1919 W. Cullerton St., Chicago, Ill., b c d h i  
 Boyer, Edward S., James Millikin University, Decatur, Ill.  
 Boyer, Phillips B., Stillwater, Okla., c f G  
 Brandenburg, S. J., Clark University, Worcester, Mass.  
 Brearley, Harrington C., Peabody College, Nashville, Tenn., b E j k n  
 Brewster, James, State Lib., Hartford, Conn.  
 Bridgman, Ralph P., 131 Westminster Rd., Brooklyn, N. Y., b e h i j K  
 Britt, Steuart Henderson, George Washington Univ., Washington, D.C., B k m n o  
 Brooks, L. M., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., H j k n  
 Brophy, Arthur, Rev., St. Bonaventure's College, Allegany, N.Y., a i  
 Brown, B. Warren, 5641 Dorchester Ave., Chicago, Ill.  
 Brown, Francis James, New York Univ., Washington Sq., N.Y., N.Y., a b c E h k  
 Brown, L. Guy, 240 E. College St., Oberlin, Ohio, b c i k m n  
 Brown, Julia S., Mrs., 16 Park St., New Haven, Connecticut, A b c f h  
 Brown, Walter James, 1006 Wellington St., London, Ont. Canada, a c e g h k l  
 Brown, W. O., Dept. of Sociology, Howard University, Washington, D.C.  
 Brownlow, Louis, 1313 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill.  
 Brunner, Edmund DeS., Teachers College, Columbia Univ., N.Y., N.Y., c e G h  
 Bruno, Frank J., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.  
 Brush, Ruth Seaman, 11 Brummer St., Boston, Mass., C h j k  
 Byrce, John, 19976 Salem Ave., Detroit, Mich., d I m n  
 Bryson, Gladys, Dept. of Sociology, Smith College, Northampton, Mass., a c K  
 Bucklin, Harold Stephen, 124 Woodbine St., Providence, R.I., A b c h k n  
 Bunzel, J. H., Dr., 381 Kenmore Ave., Buffalo, N.Y., a b i l o  
 Burdell, Edwin S., Office of the Director, The Cooper Union, N.Y.C., j  
 \*Burgess, E. W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., h K n  
 Burgess, J. S., 140 Halcock Lane, Wyncote, Pa.  
 Burke, W. W., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.  
 Burnham, Ernest, 320 Burrows Rd., Kalamazoo, Mich., a e g k  
 Burns, Sister Anne, College of St. Benedict, St. Joseph, Minn.  
 Burrow, Trigrant, 27 E. 37th St., New York, N.Y., b D m  
 Busch, Henry Miller, Cleveland College, Cleveland, Ohio, a b i j k o  
 Bushee, Frederick A., University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.  
 Bushnell, C. J., University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio, a h i j k l o  
 Calcott, Mary S., 29 Claremont Ave., New York, N.Y.  
 Caldwell, Morris G., Wis. Dept. of Public Welfare, Madison, Wis., a b c f g k m n  
 Campbell, W. J., Mrs., Care J. T. Thomason, Box 642, Lenox, Mass.  
 Canisius, Sister M., Dunbarton College of Holly Cross, Washington, D.C.  
 Cantor, Nathaniel F., Ed Hayes Hall, 3425 Main St., Buffalo, New York, c i j n  
 Cape, T. W., University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, N.D.  
 Capen, Edward Warren, 80 Sherman St., Hartford, Conn., A g k  
 Carlson, Glen E., University of Redlands, Redlands, Calif.  
 Carlson, Gustav G., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, a b c f m o  
 Carr, Lowell J., Hampstead Lane, R.F.D. No. 1 Ann Arbor, Mich., b c i m  
 Carter, Hugh, Bennett Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.  
 Case, Clarence M., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif., A b e l  
 Catherwood, B. F., Ithaca College, Ithaca, N.Y.  
 Cattell, J. McKeen, Garrison, N.Y.  
 Cavan, Jordon, Rockford College, Rockford, Ill.  
 Cavan, Ruth Shonle, Rockford College, Rockford, Ill.

- Cavanaugh, Frank, Rev., Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, Ind., k
- Celestine, Sister M., College of St. Scholastica, Duluth, Minn.
- Cell, Clark W., 1112 Austin St., Evanston, Ill., a b E h
- Cell, Erma J., 1112 Austin St., Evanston, Ill., a B c E f
- Chaddock, Robert E., Columbia University, New York, N.Y., a c f h j k
- Chakerian, Charles G., Dr., 405 Moheyan Ave., New London, Conn., g h i o
- Chamberlain, Joseph P., Columbia Univ., 510 Kent Hall, New York, N.Y., j l o
- Chamberlain, Lucy J., 40 E. 10th St., Apt. 4 E, New York, N.Y.
- Chambers, M. M., 744 Jackson Pl., Washington, D.C., a c e g h J k o
- Chapin, F. Stuart, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., b c f
- Chatterjee, Manmatha Nath, 913 Xenia Ave., Yellow Springs, Ohio
- Child Welfare League of America, 130 E. 22nd St. New York, N.Y.
- Choukas, Michael, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.
- Christina, Sister M., Marygrove College, Detroit, Mich.
- Chugerman, Samuel, 165 Broadway, New York, N.Y., a b c e i j o
- Churchill, Charles W., 352 Pine St., Jersey City, N.J., a b c k
- Clare, Tom, 138 South York St., Elmhurst, Ill., b k
- Clark, Carroll D., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan., a b g j
- Clark, Egbert B., Jr., Santa Rosa Junior College, Santa Rosa, Calif.
- Clark, Lawrence, 169 Sylvan Ave., Leonia, N.J.
- Clark, S. Delbert, University of Toronto, Toronto 5, Canada, a b c l o
- Clarke, Edwin L., Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla., j k
- Cleland, Wendell, American University at Cairo, Cairo, Egypt
- Clemmer, Donald, 2 Woodruff Rd., Joliet, Ill., b c h n o
- Clinard, Marshall B., Univ. of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, a b c j k N
- Cobb, William C., Houghton Mifflin Co., 2 Park St., Boston, Mass.
- Cobbledick, M. Robert, Connecticut College, New London, Conn., a d f k
- Coen, B. F., Colorado Agric. College, Fort Collins, Colo.
- Cohen, Joseph, Dept. of Sociology, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
- †Colcord, Joanna Carver, Russell Sage Fndn., 130 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Cole, Stewart G., 6 Fairwood Road, Madison, N.J.
- Cole, William E., University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn.
- Conard, Laetitia Moon, 1310 Elm St., Grinnell, Iowa
- Conrad, F. A., University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz.
- Conway, Margaret, Whitman College, Walla Walla, Wash.
- Coogan, John E., Library, University of Detroit, McNichols Rd. at Livernois Ave., Detroit, Mich.
- Cook, Lloyd Allen, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, b c d e g h i j
- Cooper, Charles I., 404 S. 8th St., Minneapolis, Minn.
- Cooper, John M., Caldwell Hall, Catholic Univ. of America, Washington, D.C.
- Cornell, William A., Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn., b k n
- Cottam, Howard R., 315 Agricultural Hall, College of Agriculture, Madison, Wis.
- Cottrell, Leonard S., Jr., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., B C f k
- Counts, George S., Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- Coutu, Walter, University of Georgia, Athens, Ga., B c d f g k, m n
- Cowgill, Donald O., Drury College, Springfield, Mo., f h k
- Cox, Oliver Cromwell, Wiley College, Marshall, Texas, b c f h k
- Coyle, Grace L., Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
- Crawford, W. Rex, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Cressey, Paul F., Wheaton College, Norton, Mass., a H j k
- Cressey, Paul G., 132 McCosh Rd., Upper Montclair, N.J., b e h i
- Croft, A. E., The Municipal University of Wichita, Wichita, Kan.
- Cromwell, Mary E., 1815 13th St., N.W. Washington, D.C., b e f i m n
- Cronbach, Abraham, 842 Lexington Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio, b l
- Crook, Evelyn B., 3820 Osceola Ave., Kingston, Pa.
- Crook, Wilfrid, 3820 Osceola Ave., Kingston, Pa.
- Crooks, Ezra, Newark, Del., a i J k n

- Croxton, Frederick E., Hamilton Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.  
 Cuber, John F., Dept. of Sociology, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio  
 Cummings, Milton C., 212 Halley St., Brockport, N.Y., a c h j k  
 Cunningham S. B., Care Prentice Hall, 70 5th Ave., New York, N.Y.  
 Cutler, J. E., Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
- Dai, Bingham, Dr., Dept. of Social Science, Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn., M  
 Daniel, V. E., Wiley College, Marshall, Tex., a b c e L  
 D'Argonne, Michael C., 7728 Plum St., New Orleans, La., A b C e G i J n  
 Davie, Maurice R., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.  
 Davies, Stanley P., Rm. 302, 105 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y.  
 Davis, Edward H., 61 Oakland Ave., Waterbury, Conn.  
 Davis, J. Merle, Internat'l Missionary Council, 156 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y.  
 \*Davis, Jerome, 489 Ocean Ave., W. Haven, Conn.  
 Davis, Kingsley, 720 W. Foster Ave., State College, Pa.  
 Davis, Michael M., 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y.  
 Davis, Ralph N., Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee Institute, Ala., b C e g i j k m  
 Dawson, C. A., Arts Building, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada  
 Daykin, Sam, 1011 E. Elm St., Taylorville, Ill., c f g N  
 Dedrick, Calvert L., Rm. 5810 Commerce Bldg., Washington, D.C., c f h k  
 Deets, Lee E., 153 East 27th St., New York, N.Y., a c h i  
 DeGraff, Harmon O., University of Akron, Akron, Ohio, b c h i k n  
 DeGrange, McQuilkin, 1 Barrymore Rd., Hanover, N.H., a  
 Denood, Neal B., Main St., Haydenville, Mass., a i k M  
 Denune, Perry P., 1845 Tremont Road, Columbus, Ohio  
 De Sylvester, Corrado, 5240 Congress St., Chicago, Ill., b c h k n o  
 Deutsch, Albert, 115 East 169th St., New York, N.Y., a c I m  
 DeVinney, Leland C., 111 Social Science Bldg., Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.  
 Dexter, Lewis A., Dept. of Sociology, Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla.
- Ditmars, August, 89 47 115th St., Richmond Hill, L.I., N.Y., a  
 Dittmer, C. G., New York University, Washington Sq. E., New York, N.Y.  
 Dodd, Stuart C., American University of Beirut, Beirut, Syria, a c f  
 Dodson, Dan W., Rm. 41 Press Bldg., New York University, New York, N.Y., a b c e k l  
 Doering, William F., 1230 Villa Pl., Nashville, Tenn., a c H j l  
 Dollard, John, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., b m  
 Dorn, Harold F., 7403 Montgomery Lane, Bethesda, Md., c D f g  
 Dove, F. D., Bridgewater College, Bridgewater, Virginia, a e m  
 Dowd, Jerome, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.  
 Droba, Daniel D., University of Mississippi, University, Miss., B c e f g i k l o  
 Dummer, W. F., Mrs., 679 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill., i k m  
 Duncan, Hugh D., 6020 Kimbark Ave., Jackson Park Sta., Chicago, Ill., a b c  
 Duncan, Otis Durant, Oklahoma A and M College, Stillwater, Okla.  
 Dunham, H. Warren, Jr., 5614 Ingleside Ave., Chicago, Ill., b c h i k m n  
 Dunlap, Amy, The Packer Collegiate Institution, 170 Joralemon St., Brooklyn, N.Y., a b E j l m  
 Dunlap, Sheldon, 230 Euclid Ave., Syracuse, N.Y.  
 †Duprat, G. L., University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland  
 Duthie, Mary Eva, 314 Agri. Eco. Bldg., Cornell University Ithaca, N.Y., b e g i  
 Duvall, Everett W., Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa., b c e I m  
 Dybwad, S. Gunner, N.Y. State Training School for Boys, Warwick, N.Y., c I M N  
 Dybwad, Rosemary, Mrs., N.Y. State Training School for Boys, Warwick, N.Y., c I M N
- Earp, James P., Western Maryland College, Westminster, Md., a b c h J K n  
 East, Wendell L., 5615 Kenwood St., Chicago, Ill., a b i m  
 Eaves, Lucille, 41 Clark Rd., Brookline, Mass.  
 Ebaugh, Laura Smith, 311 Pettigru St., Greenville, S.C., H I j k  
 Eddy, G. Norman, 744 State St., Springfield, Mass.

- Eddy, Henrie May, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
- Edwards, Allen D., Virginia Polytechnic Inst., Blacksburg, Va.
- Edwards, Lyford P., Bard College, Annandale on Hudson, N.Y., a l o
- Egan, Thomas A., Loyola University, 28 N. Franklin St., Chicago, Ill.
- Ehrmann, W. W., 1416 W. McCormick St., Gainesville, Fla., a d g K
- Eldredge, H. Wentworth, 6 Valley Rd., Hanover, N.H., A h
- Eldridge, Seba, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan., a C h O
- \*Eliot, Thomas D., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
- Ellickson, John C., 6311 Ridgewood Ave., Washington, D.C.
- Ellickson, John C., Mrs., 6311 Ridgewood Ave., Washington, D.C.
- Elliott, Lois, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
- Elliott, Mabel A., Department of Sociology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.
- Ellwood, Charles A., Duke University, Durham, N.C., a b c e j l
- Elmer, M. C., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., a c i k
- Elrod, Julius M., Berry College, Mount Berry, Ga., G h j
- Embree, Edwin R., 4901 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill., e G m
- Emig, Arthur Samuel, 207 Edgewood Ave., Columbia, Mo.
- Ennis, J. H., Dept. of Sociology, Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Iowa, a g h J k O
- Epstein, Lenore, 143 E. 19th St., New York, N.Y., C f o
- \*Eubank, Earle E., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, A c e i k l
- Fairchild, H. P., New York University, Washington Sq., E, New York, N.Y.
- Fairchild, Mildred, 219 Roberts Rd., Bryn Mawr, Pa
- Falley, Eleanor W., Goucher College Library, Baltimore, Md.
- \*Faris, Ellsworth, 1126 E. 59th St., Chicago, Ill.
- Faris, Robert E. Lee, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, A b c m
- Faris, Clair Guignard, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, A b c m
- Feder, Leah, Dept. of Social Work, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
- Federal Council of Churches, Library, 297 Fourth Ave., New York, N.Y., c e i l
- Fehlandt, August F., 1917 Watson St., Ripon, Wis.
- Feuerlicht, Morris M., 3034 Washington Blvd., Indianapolis, Ind
- Field, Frederick V., 129 E. 52nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Field, Thea G., 2908 Beanna St., Austin, Tex.
- Fiero, Maude L., 4887 S. Martindale, Detroit, Mich.
- Fink, Arthur E., University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia
- \*Fisher, Galen M., Orinda, Calif.
- Fisher, Mary S., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., b d e j K M
- Fitzgibbon, George F., 35 Paisley Park, Dorchester, Mass.
- Fletcher, Ralph C., 519 Smithfield St., Pittsburgh, Pa., c f h i
- Fligelman, Frieda, 2509 Parker St., Berkeley, Calif., B c o
- Folsom, Joseph K., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., b e h K m
- \*Ford, Richard T., Mrs., 1 Douglas Rd., Rochester, N.Y.
- Ford, Robert N., 1006 Spring St., N. Brad-dock, Pa., a B c f
- Foreman, Paul B., University of Mississippi, University, Miss., a b f N
- Fox, Byron L., Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio, a c h
- Frank, Lawrence K., Josiah Macy Founda-tion, 565 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
- Frankel, Edward T., 491 State St., Albany, N.Y., a c f i
- Frazier, E. Franklin, Howard University, Washington, D.C., b c i k o
- Frazier, Olen T., State Normal School, New Paltz, N.Y.
- Freeman, Eva Allen, 5324 Willis Ave., Dallas, Texas, a b m N
- Frey, Fred C., Louisiana State University, University, La., d G k
- Friedel, Francis J., Rev., University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, k L m
- Friedli, Alfred, 5861 Plymouth Ave., St. Louis, Mo.
- Friedman, Elisha M., 15 Broad St., R. 1308, New York, N.Y.
- Fulcomer, David, Drew University, Madi-son, N.J., a b E K l m
- Fuller, Hugh N., 1063 Clifton Rd., N.E. Atlanta, Ga.
- Fuller, Richard C., Haven Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

- Furfey, Paul Hanly, Catholic University, Brookland, D.C., a b c f
- Galitz, Christine, 18 Str. Ecaterina Teodoroiu, Bucharest, Roumania, c g i j n
- Gallagher, Ralph A., Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Rd., Chicago, Ill.
- Galpin, Charles J., Bur. of Agri. Eco., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
- Galt, William, Lifwynn Foundation, 27 E. 37th St., New York, N.Y., b c d M n
- Gamble, Sidney D., 4730 Fieldston Rd., New York, N.Y.
- Gardiner, Gertrude R., Apt. 201, 5493 Cornell Ave., Chicago, Ill., a e j o
- Gardner, M. L., University Hospital, Omaha, Neb., e g h
- Garlington, S. Wycliffe, Livingstone College, Salisbury, N.C., A b g k n
- Garrison, Richard C., Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, Ind., a B k N o
- Garvey, Helen G., Stevens College, Columbia, Mo., K m
- Garwood, L. F., Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa
- Gee, Wilson, University of Virginia, University, Va.
- Gehlke, C. E., Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
- Geisert, H. L., 1405 University Ave., Tuscaloosa, Ala., a c d
- †George, Julia, 609 Sutter St., San Francisco, Calif.
- Gertrude, Sister Mary, Immaculata College, Immaculata, Pa., a e g h i j k m n
- Gettys, W. E., University of Texas, Austin, Tex., a b h k
- Gibbard, Harold A., Dept. of Sociology, Brown University, Providence, R.I., c h
- Gilfillan, S. C., 5623 Blackstone Ave., Chicago, Ill., a j k
- Gill, John D., 260 S. Broad St., Philadelphia, Pa.
- Gillette, John M., University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, N.D.
- Gillin, J. L., Sterling Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
- Gillin, John P., Dept. of Sociology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
- Ginsberg, Sarah, 3000-39th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., a c f
- Gist, Noel P., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., b c D H o
- Glaser, Lydia N., Box 305, Rochester, Minn., e g j
- \*Glenn, John M., 130 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y., b c h i j K l m n
- Glick, Clarence E., Brown University, Providence, R.I., b c H m
- Goethe, C. M., 7th and J Sts., Sacramento, Calif.
- Goldenweiser, Alexander, 2644 S.W. Ravensview Dr., Portland, Ore.
- Good, Alvin, State Normal School, Natchitoches, La., E g K l
- Goodsell, Willystine, 509 W. 121st St., New York, N.Y., b d f k m o
- Goodwin, Frank, Washington College, Chestertown, Md.
- Grafton, Thomas Hancock, Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, Va., A l n
- Gray, Wayne T., 404 N. Main St., Barboursville, Ky., c G k
- Green, Howard W., 1001 Huron Rd., Cleveland, Ohio c f h
- Greenfield, Mary R., Friends University, Wichita, Kan.
- Greenhoe, Florence, Apt. 3, 1579 N.W. Blvd., Columbus, Ohio, e h
- Gregory, Edward Wadsworth, Box 725, University, Ala., A c h k n
- Greth, Morris S., Albright College, Reading, Pa., a g i k n
- Grove, Elsa Butler, 531 W. 122nd St., New York, N.Y., e g i j k m
- Groves, Ernest R., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
- Gruener, Jennette R., 65 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass., c f l k
- Guckert, E. S., Dort Bldg., Flint, Mich., c h i
- Guthrie, Elton F., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., a j
- Guthrie, Paul N., Randolph-Macon Women's College, Lynchburg, Va., A i j n o
- Gwin, J. Blaine, 1610 N. Harrison St., Arlington, Va., h i k
- Hadley, Ernest Elvin, 1835 Eye St. N.W., Suite 621, Washington, D.C.
- Hagood, Margaret Jarman, Box 974, Chapel Hill, N.C., c f
- †Halbwachs, Maurice, The Sorbonne, Paris, France
- Hall, Jerome, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Ind., a b n o
- Hallenbeck, Wilbur C., 520 W. 122nd St., New York, N.Y., c e h l
- Hamilton, C. Horace, Texas Agri. Exp. Sta., College Station, Tex., c d f G h k l
- Handman, Max Sylvius, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Hankins, Frank H., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.

- Hansen, Asael T., Dept. of Sociology, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, b h k
- Haring, Douglas G., 117 Euclid Ter. Syracuse, New York, c f
- Harmon, Gladys C., Jennie Edmundson Memorial Hospital, Council Bluffs, Iowa, d i k
- Harper, E. B., Box 93, E. Lansing, Mich., b c h i j k m n
- \*Harper, J. C., Prospect & Torrey, La Jolla, Calif.
- Harris, Frank, Elmira College, Elmira, N.Y.
- Harris, Thomas L., West Virginia University, Morgantown, W.Va.
- †Harrison, Shelby M., Russell Sage Foundation, 130 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Hart, Clyde W., State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, a b c m o
- Hart, Hornell, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
- Hartshorne, Edward Y., 3 Phillips Pl., Cambridge, Mass., a e h k o
- Hatch, D. Spencer, Keston, Trivandrum, Travancore, S. India
- Hatcher, J. Wesley, Berea College, Berea, Kentucky, A B g h j n o
- Hauser, Philip M., Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.
- Havice, Charles W., Head Dept. of Sociology, Northeastern University, Boston, Mass., a i k l n
- Hay, Donald G., State College Station, N.D., b c G
- Hayes, C. Walker, 173 Hillsdale St., Hillsdale, Mich., B k n o
- Hayner, Norman S., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., K N
- Healy, Sister Mary Edward, College of St. Catherine, St. Paul, Minn.
- Heberle, Rudolf, Dr., Louisiana State University, University, La.
- Heinmiller, W. H., 154 N. Columbia St., Naperville, Ill., g h j k
- Helleberg, Victor Emanuel, 1725 Mississippi Ave., Lawrence, Kan.
- Henderson, Benton M., 3333 M St., S.E., Washington, D.C.
- Henderson, Donald E. V., Box 416, University, Alabama, a b c F j
- Henry, Edward A., Library, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio
- Henry, Sister Mary, Rosary College, River Forest, Ill.
- Henssler, Friedrich W., 1257 Lunt Ave., Chicago, Ill., a b c f O
- Herman, Abbott P., Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, Mich.
- Hertzler, Joyce O., Social Science Hall, Univ. of Nebr., Lincoln, Neb., a c h o
- Hibbs, Henry H., Jr., College of William and Mary, 827 W. Franklin St., Richmond, Va.
- Hicks, William Norwood, State College Station, Raleigh, N.C., a j k L
- Higgins, H. Ralph, Rev., St. Mark's Church, Grand Rapids, Mich., b K l m n
- Hightower, Raymond L., 107 Monroe St., Kalamazoo, Mich.
- Hilger, Sister M. Inez, St. Cloud Hospital, St. Cloud, Minn., g j m
- Hill, George W., College of Agri., Univ. of Wis., Madison, Wis., a c f g h
- Hill, Randall C., State Agricultural College, Manhattan, Kan., A C G h i k
- Hill, Reuben L., 601 S. Orchard St., Madison, Wis., B c f i k n
- Hiller, E. T., 328 Lincoln Hall, Urbana, Ill.
- Hillman, Arthur, 6115 Kimbark Ave., Jackson Park Sta., Chicago, Ill., a b h i
- Himes, Norman Edwin, Colgate University, Hamilton, N.Y.
- Hirsh, Joseph, U.S. Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., A d F
- Hochhauser, Edward, 67 W. 47th St., New York, N.Y.
- Hoffer, C. R., Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich., g h k o
- Hoffer, Frank W., University of Virginia, University, Va., c h i k
- Hoffman, Charles W., 25 Oliver Rd., Wyoming, Ohio
- Holben, Ralph P., Dept. of Sociology, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H., i N
- Holbrook, David H., Rm. 919, 50 W. 50th St., New York, N.Y.
- Hollingshead, George G., 47 Afterglow Way, Montclair, N.J.
- Holmes, Roy H., 706 Monroe St., Ann Arbor, Mich., a G h
- Holt, John B., Room 306, 249 Peachtree St., Atlanta, Ga., a g h l
- Hopkins, Louis J., 1385 Hillcrest Ave., Pasadena, Calif., o
- Hopton, Frederick, Jr., 4734 Butler St., Pittsburgh, Pa., l n
- Horak, Jacob, 58 Ohio Ave., Tiffin, Ohio
- Horkheimer, Max, Internat'l Inst. of Soc. Res., 429 W. 117th St., New York, N.Y., A k o
- Hornik, Edgar C., 226 Colorado Ave., Highland Park, Mich., c f H
- Horton, James A., Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio
- House, Floyd N., Rugby Apts., University

- Branch P.O., Charlottesville, Va., A b c j l o
- Howard, Claxton, 1868 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Ill., b e K l o
- Howard, J. A., Upland, Ind.
- Hughes, Everett C., 1126 E. 59th St., Chicago, Ill., a b m o
- Hughes, Helen Gregory MacGill, 1126 E. 59th St., Chicago, Ill., a b m o
- Hugo, John J., Rev., Seton Hill College, Greensburg, Pa., a k l
- Hukill, Ralph L., SS 109A, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., k m n
- Hulett, J. E., Jr., 200 N. Trenton St., Arlington, Va., a B k
- Hulseman, Bertha F., 130 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Humphries, Jessie H., P.O. Box 745 T.S. C.W. Sta., Denton, Tex., a c i j
- Huntington, Albert H., 702 Washington Bldg. 15th & N.Y. Ave., Washington, D.C., c e f k
- Hurlin, Ralph G., Russell Sage Foundation, 130 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Hussey, Helen, 311 B The Olbiston, Utica, N.Y., c g I
- Hutchinson, Edward P., Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass., c d F
- Hutt, Robert B. W., Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.
- Hyde, Roy E., 605 N. Magnolia St., Hammond, La., a b d G j k
- Hypes, J. L., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn., b c e j k
- Inglis, Ruth A., 312 Professional Bldg., Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood, Calif.
- Ingram, Louis W., 1511 Burbank Rd., Wooster, Ohio, a b h O
- Innes, John Warwick, Columbia University, New York, N.Y., a c d f n
- \*Irving, Bertha A., 102 Henderson Ave., New Brighton, S.I., N.Y.
- Jacobi, John E., College Park, Md., c f h k N
- Jacobs, Herman, Jewish Community Center, Woodward At Holbrook, Detroit, Mich., e h i k
- Jameson, Samuel Haig, University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore., b c j m
- Janousek, Bohumil, Librarian, Ministry of Social Welfare, Palackeno, Nam 4N, Prague, Czechoslovakia
- Jeddeloh, Henry J., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, a c E f n
- Jenkins, F. Raymond, Hampoton Institute, Hampton, Va.
- Jenkins, Herbert Crawford 2244 E. 82nd St., Cleveland, Ohio
- Jenks, Leland H., 18 Weston Rd., Wellesley, Mass., A h o
- Jensen, Howard E., Duke Station, Durham, N.C.
- Jeremiah, J. A., Edgartown, Mass.
- Jessup, Mary F., 411 West 114th St., New York, N.Y.
- Jewish People's Institute, 3500 Douglas Blvd., Chicago, Ill.
- Jocher, Katharine, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
- Johansen, Sigurd, New Mexico State College, State College, N.M.
- Johnson, Charles S., 1611 Harding St., Nashville, Tenn.
- Johnson, Guy B., Box 652, Chapel Hill, N.C., b c h
- Johnson, Joseph K., Division of Social Science, East Texas State Teachers College, Commerce, Tex
- Johnson, Mary A., Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, N.Y., b e i K m
- Johnson, Rex M., Lake Erie College, Painesville, Ohio, a b d e k m n o
- Johnston, A. A., 419 Pearl St., Wooster, Ohio, i k n
- Jones, Alfred W., 124 E. 84th St., New York, N.Y., b c f H j o
- Jones, Arthur H., 23 W. Walnut La., Germantown, Pa., a H j m
- Jones, Harold E., 2683 Shasta Rd., Berkeley, Calif.
- Jones, Robert C., 5460 Kimbark Ave., Hyde Park Sta., Chicago, Ill., c h i
- Joseph, Samuel, 88 Morningside Dr., New York, N.Y.
- Joslyn, Carl S., 102 Shepherd St., Hyattsville, Md., a i
- Julian, Anna Johnson, 152 S. 14th Ave., Maywood, Ill., c e h i k m n
- Justiss, Valarie, 5650 Indiana Ave., Jackson Park Sta., Chicago, Ill., g I l
- Kahn, Edward M., 318 Capitol Ave., S.E., Atlanta, Ga., b H I k o
- Kamsler, Harold M., 88-23 179th St., Jamaica, New York City, a h i j k L
- Karpf, Fay B., 467 Central Park West, New York, N.Y., a B C h I j m
- Karpf, M. J., 71 W. 47th St., New York, N.Y.
- Kast, Ludwig, 565 Park Ave., New York N.Y.
- Kastler, Norman M., 207 Union Ext. Bldg., Madison, Wis., a g h l

- Kaufman, Edmund C., Bethel College, North Newton, Kan., k l
- Kaufman, Henry, Yorkville Community Association, 1639 York Ave., New York, N.Y., c h i
- Kaufman, Henry, Mrs., Yorkville Community Association, 1639 York Ave., New York, N.Y., c h i
- Keller, Philip Edward, 312 Professional Bldg., Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood, Calif., a c n
- Kelsey, Carl, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Kennedy, Raymond, Graduate School, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., a
- Kepler, Charles D., Jr., 5059 Broadway Ave., Cleveland, Ohio, A b i k l n
- Kercher, Leonard Clayton, Western State Teachers College, Kalamazoo, Mich., a b h j
- Ketcham, Dorothy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., i
- Ketchum, John Davidson, 181 Rosedale Heights Dr., Toronto, Ont., Canada, a B c h k m
- Keyes, Fenton, Wilton, Conn.
- Kimball, P. H., 1 O'Brien Ave., Machias, Me., e g
- Kimmel, Wm. G., Walnut Park Plaza, 63rd and Walnut Sts., Philadelphia, Pa., b j
- Kincheloe, Samuel C., 5757 University Ave., Chicago, Ill., b c h k l
- Kingsbury, Susan M., 219 Roberts Rd., Bryn Mawr, Pa.
- Kinneman, John A., Illinois State Normal University, Normal, Ill., e i j k
- Kirk, Dudley, 48 A Conant Hall, Cambridge, Mass., a d f g j o
- Kirk, William, Pomona College, Claremont, Calif., a B D n
- Kirkpatrick, Clifford, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., b c f K l m
- Kirkpatrick, E. L., American Youth Commission, 744 Jackson Pl., Washington, D.C., c f G k
- Kiser, Clyde V., Milbank Memorial Fund, 40 Wall St., New York, N.Y., c f
- Klassen, Peter P., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa., a b c f j k n
- Kleihege, George W., 318 N. College, Linsborg, Kan., a B e
- Klein, Philip, N.Y. School of Social Work, 122 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Kluckhohn, Florence, 48 A Buckingham St., Cambridge, Mass.
- Knoebber, Sister Mildred, Mount St. Scholastica College, Atchison, Kan.
- Koch, Theodore W., Northwestern University Library, Evanston, Ill.
- Koempel, Leslie Alice, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, N.Y., a C h i
- Koenig, Samuel, 236 Dwight St., New Haven, Conn., A b h l
- Kolb, J. H., College of Agriculture, Madison, Wis., g h k
- Koshuk, Ruth P., 5524 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill., b c f i k
- Kouzian, Ardemis, 294 Worcester Place, Detroit, Mich., H i
- Kraenzel, Carl F., 719 S. Sixth St., Bozeman, Mont., a g h
- Krall, Dorothy, Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio, A c f H i k m n
- Krassovsky, Collerohe, Care of Dr. S. Veselowsky, 680 Merrich Ave., Apt. 205, Detroit, Mich., c h j
- Kress, Andrew J., 4427 5th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., A b g i k m
- Kratz, Althea H., Bennett Hall, Univ. of Penn., Philadelphia, Pa., i k n o
- Krueger, E. T., Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn., b k m
- Kujawski, Carl, 5 Hart St., Rochester, N.Y.
- Kurtz, Russel H., Russell Sage Foundation, 130 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y.
- \*Kusama, Shiko, Deleg. Japonaise à la Société des Nations, 54 Blvd., Exelmans, Paris 16, France
- Kutak, Robert, I., Dept. of Sociology, University of Louisville, Louisville, Ky.
- Labaree, Robert M., Lincoln University, Pa., b k n
- Laing, James T., Dept. of Sociology, Kent University, Kent, Ohio, b d h n
- Lake, James H., Research Dept. Kiwanis International, 520 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill., c g h i k o
- Lam, Margaret Mildred, 1439 Keeaumoku St., Honolulu, T.H., B c k m
- Lamson, Herbert D., 77 Bennoch St., Orono, Me., d h i k n
- Landesco, John, 812 E. 58th St., Chicago, Ill.
- Landis, Paul H., Dept. of Rural Sociology, Washington State College, Pullman, Wash.
- Landman, Sol, 8315 Lefferts Blvd., Kew Gardens, L.I., N.Y., b e k l
- Lane, Harold E., 13 Goodyear Ave., Melrose, Mass., b c e f i j k m n o
- Lang, Richard O., 7701 Georgia Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., c D F k
- Lantis, L. O., State Teachers College, Minot, N.D.

- Lanzer, Irving A., 83 Park Terrace West, New York, N.Y., b c i j k M n o
- LaPiere, Richard T., Dept. of Economics, Stanford University, Calif., a B j m
- Larson, A. F., William Woods College, Fulton, Mo., a m n
- Larson, Olaf F., Bureau of Agric. Econ., Amarillo, Texas, c d G k
- Lasker, Bruno, 64 Shelley Ave., Yonkers, N.Y.
- Lattimore, Eleanor L., Pultneyville Wayne Co., New York
- Laune, Ferris E., 6611 Kinzua Ave., Chicago, Ill., C f h i n
- LaViolette, Forrest E., 5402 20th Ave. N.E., Seattle, Wash., b k
- Layer, Frederick P., 121 S. Pine St., Nakomis, Ill., a b g i k l
- Lazarsfeld, Paul Felix, Rm. 414, 41 Union Sq., New York, N.Y.
- Leap, W. L., Birmingham Southern College, Birmingham, Ala., A c h i j k n
- Lee, Alfred M., 329 Commerce Bldg., New York Univ., New York, N.Y., B c e f h j o
- Lee, Elizabeth B., Mrs., Raymond St., R.F.D. 1, S. Norwalk, Conn., B c e f h j o
- Leen, William J., 45 Prospect Place, Tudor City, N.Y.
- Lehmann, W. C., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y., a c g h j
- Leiffer, Murray H., Garrett Biblical Inst., Evanston, Ill., B h k l
- Lejins, Peter, Elizabetes iela 87, dz. 5 Riga, Latvia, Europe, a b c n
- Leland, Waldo Gifford, 907 15th St., Washington, D.C.
- Lerner, Eugene, 626 E. Lincoln Ave., Apt. 1 M, Mt. Vernon, N.Y.
- Lewis, W. P., State College Library, State College, Pa.
- Leyburn, James G., 1406 Yale Sta., New Haven, Conn., a
- Lichtenberger, J. P., Logan Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., a k
- Lies, Eugene T., 821 Olive St., Shreveport, La., b e h i
- Liguori, Sister Mary, B. V. M., 1033 Newton St., N.E., Washington, D.C.
- Lind, Andrew W., University of Hawaii, Honolulu, T.H.
- Lindsmith, Alfred R., 417 S. Henderson, Bloomington, Ind., b
- \*Lindsay, Samuel M., Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- Lindsey, Edward, National Bank Bldg., Warren, Pa., a b
- Lindstrom, David E., University of Illinois, New Agri. Bldg., Urbana, Ill., c G
- Lingel, Robert, c/o N.Y. Public Library, 5th Ave. and 42nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Lister, Joseph J., Matawan, N.J., a c e f G j k o
- Little, Maude Clay, Meredith College, Raleigh, N.C., a b K l n
- Lively, Charles E., Rural Sociology, Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., c f g k
- Lively, E. L., State Normal School, Fairmont, W.Va., a c d g i j k l n
- Llewellyn, Karl, Mrs., 410 Riverside Dr., New York, N.Y., c f h j
- Lobb, John, Box 24, South Hadley, Mass., A k n
- \*Loeber, Maud, New Medical Bldg., New Orleans, La.
- Loescher, Frank S., Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchburg, Va., A e j o
- \*Lofsteadt, Christine, 1021 Concha St., Altadena, Calif.
- London, Jack, 3258 W. Hirsch, Chicago, Ill., B n o
- Londow, Ezekiel Jacob, 220 5th Ave., New York, N.Y., e h i o
- Loomis, Charles P., Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., G h k
- Loram, Charles T., 1030 Whitney Ave., Hamden, Conn., e g h k l o
- Lorimer, Frank, American University, 1901 F. St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
- Loring, William C., Jr., 9 Crescent Ave., Newton Center, Mass.
- Lottier, Stuart, Municipal Court Building, Rm. 330, Detroit, Mich., b i k m N
- Lowrie, S. H., 154 Manville Ave., Bowling Green, Ohio, a c f g i k n
- Ludlow, Wm. L., 30 E. Main St., New Concord, Ohio
- Lumley, F. E., Commerce Bldg., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
- Lumpkin, Katherine D., 47 Belmont Ave., Northampton, Mass., c h
- \*Lundberg, George A., Bennington College, Bennington, Vt., b c f
- Lunden, W. A., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., e j l n
- Lurie, Harry L., Rm. 1301, 71 W. 47th St., New York, N.Y.
- Lynd, Robert S., Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- MacIver, Robert Morrison, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

- Macrory, Boyd E., Asbury College, Wilmore, Ky., h k n
- Magnusson, Leifur, 3223 Northampton St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
- Malone, Tennessee, Miss, West Texas State Teachers College, Canyon, Tex.
- Mamchur, Stephen Wm., College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minn., a b c d f g h i j k l m n o
- Mangus, A. R., 2718 Kent Rd., Columbus, Ohio
- Manheim, Ernest, Univ. of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo., a c h k o
- Mann, Albert Z., Internat'l Y.M.C.A. College, Springfield, Mass., a b e g h i k l
- Mann, Fritz K., 15 W. Kirk St., Chevy Chase, Md., A c o
- Mark, Mary Louise, School of Social Admn., Ohio State Univ., Columbus, Ohio, C f h i j
- Marks, Mary E., Librarian, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyo.
- Marsh, Donald, 665 W. Hancock, Detroit, Mich., a B m
- Marsh, Margaret, 11 Hillcrest Pl., Amherst, Mass., o
- Marsh, May R., Mrs., 103 Overlook Ter., Leonia, N.J.
- Marshall, L. C., 7007 Rolling Rd., Chevy Chase, D.C.
- Mather, William G. Jr., 574 E. Monroe St., Franklin, Ind., g k
- Mauldin, W. Parker, University of Tenn., Knoxville, Tenn., b F g m
- †Mauss, Marcel, The Sorbonne, Paris, France
- MaWhinney, William T., General Motors Institute, Flint, Mich., a B e
- Mayer, Carl, 66 W. 12th St., New York, N.Y., a l
- Mayer, Joseph, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., A c f
- McAfee, Mildred H., Presidents House, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
- McAleer, James Alfred, 3311 North Ave., Richmond, Va., g k o
- McBride, Anna Christine, Dept. of Social Work, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pa., a c f g h i j k n
- McCamman, Dorothy F., 1426 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C., b c f I k
- McCanliss, Lee, 31 Nassau St., New York, N.Y.
- McCormick, Thomas C., Dept. of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
- McDougle, Ivan E., 1219 Roundhill Rd., Baltimore, Md., b K n
- McGee, Mildred K. Mrs., Box 36, Hudson, Ill., b i M n
- McGee, N. W., 417 N. Elm St., Greenville, Ill., b e j o
- McKay, Evelyn C., Amer. Fdn. for the Blind, 15 W. 16th St., New York, N.Y.
- McKenzie, F. A., Juniata College, Huntingdon, Pa., a g i k n
- McKenzie, R. D., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
- McMillan, Robert T., 630 St. Joseph St., Baton Rouge, La., C G k
- McMinn, Gerald W., Rev., St. Bonaventure College, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., i K
- McQuade, Vincent A. Rev. O.S.A., Villanova College, Monastery, Villanova, Pa., a f H k o
- McWilliams, R. H., 2025 S. Fillmore St., Denver, Colo., a b c f K N
- Mekeel, H. Scudder, P.O. Box 1727, Santa Fe, N.M., b g h k M
- Melvin, Bruce L., East Falls Church, Va.
- Menefee, Selden C., WPA Division of Research, 1734 New York Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.
- Merrill, Francis E., Box 145, Hanover, N.H., b H i k n
- Merson, Frankie G. Mrs., Keuka College, Keuka Park, N.Y.
- Merton, Robert K., Tulane Univ., New Orleans, La., a b c l m o
- Metzger, Charles Robert, 5504 Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood, Calif.
- Metzler, Wm. H., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark., A b g m
- Meyer, Henry J., Jr., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Miles, Arthur P., 6032 Ingleside Ave., Chicago, Ill., c h I
- Miller, H. A., Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
- Miller, Harlan H., 23 E. Welling Ave., Pennington, N.J., b e H k
- Miller, Henry, 436 E. 58th St., New York, N.Y., A b i m o
- Mitrany, David, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.
- Molyneaux, Lambert, A & M College, College Sta., Texas, a f O
- Monachesi, Elio D., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
- Monsees, Carl H., 2801 Adams Mill Road, Washington, D.C., b g m o
- Montgomery, Edward W., Route 1, Box 3, Gibsonia, Pa.
- Mooney, George S., Montreal Industrial &

- Economic Bureau, 806 Dominion Square Bldg., Montreal, Canada  
 Moore, Coyle E., State College for Women, Tallahassee, Fla., a c g K  
 Moore, E. H., 205 Oregon Bldg., Eugene, Ore., b d n  
 Moore, Elizabeth Proehl Mrs., 5 Lothian Court, Brighton, Mass., a b c d f i k m  
 Moore, Felix E. Jr., Hitchcock Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., c d f  
 Moore, Harry E., Dept. of Sociology, University of Texas, Austin, Tex.  
 Moore, Underhill, 127 Wall St., New Haven, Conn., c f o  
 Moreno, J. L., Beacon Hill Sanitarium, Beacon, N.Y.  
 Morris, Albert, 176 Hillcrest Rd., Needham, Mass., a c k n  
 Morrow, Curtis H., 3 W. Court, Waterville, Me., a d i k  
 Mounts, Lewis H., Ballard Normal School, Macon, Georgia, e h J k  
 Mowrer, Ernest, 2505 Prairie Ave., Evanston, Ill.  
 Mowrer, Harriet, 2505 Prairie Ave., Evanston, Ill.  
 Mudd, Emily, Mrs., 2453 S. 15th St., Philadelphia, Pa., b d i j K M  
 Mudge, G. O., 520 N. West St., Raleigh, N.C., a b e g j k  
 Mueller, John H., Dept. of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind., a c f  
 Mueller, Theophil W., Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, Ill.  
 Mumford, Eben, 710 Maple St., East Lansing, Mich., a b c e g h j  
 Munce, R. J., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.  
 Mundie, Paul J., Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis., a b m  
 Muntz, Earl E., Gap View Rd., Short Hills, N.J., a H n o  
 Munzer, Willard, 2322 Kenmore Ave., Chicago, Ill., A b i K l m n o  
 Murdock, George P., 960 Ridge Rd., Hamden, Conn., A. b  
 Myhrman, Anders M., Bates College, Lewiston, Me., a h i j  
 Navin, Robert B., Rev., Sisters College, 1027 Superior Ave., Cleveland, Ohio  
 Nearing, Scott, P.O. Box 516, Ridgewood, N.J., a  
 Neely, Wayne C., Hood College, Frederick, Md., a b g k  
 Nelson, Lowry, Minnesota Agricultural Experiment St., St. Paul, Minn., g  
 Neprash, Jerry Alvin, 914 Virginia Ave., Lancaster, Pa., a b C f n o  
 Neumann, Sigmund, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn., a h o  
 Neumeyer, M. H., Univ. of So. Calif. 3551 University Ave., Los Angeles, Calif., A g h i k  
 Newcomb, Charles Shelton, 4630 23rd St., N., Arlington, Va., b c F h  
 New Jersey College for Women, Librarian, New Brunswick, N.J.  
 \*Newell, Jane L., 139 W. Highland Ave., Philadelphia, Pa.  
 Newman, S. Clayton, University of Louisville, Louisville, Ky., a e J o  
 Nimkoff, M. F., Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa., a b c d h i j K m  
 Nissen, Carl A., 81 Beech St., Berea, Ohio  
 North, Cecil C., Page Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio  
 Noss, Theodore K., Purdue Univ., LaFayette, Ind., a b c e f g h i j k l m n o  
 Notestein, Frank, 47 Hawthorne Ave., Princeton, N.J., d f  
 Nottingham, Elizabeth K., Wheaton College, Norton, Mass., A f i l n  
 Nuquist, Joseph E., Sioux Falls College, Sioux Falls, S.D., a c g j  
 Nystrom, Paul H., School of Business, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.  
 Oberdorfer, Douglas W., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, a B c d f k m  
 O'Connell, John C., Rev., Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass.  
 Odell, Wanda, 5845 Drexel Ave., Chicago, Ill.  
 Odum, Howard, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.  
 Ogburn, William F., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.  
 Ogle, J. J., 20th and South Sts., Lincoln, Neb., a l  
 O'Grady, John, Secy. National Conference of Catholic Charities, 1317 F St., N.W., Washington, D.C.  
 University of Oklahoma, Librarian, Norman, Okla.  
 Oman, William M., Oxford University Press, 114 5th Ave., New York, N.Y.  
 †Oppenheimer, Franz, Nassauische Strasse 9-10, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Germany  
 Orr, Edward B., Principia College, Elsau, Ill., a i k L  
 Ovenburg, Dorothy C., 4462 St. Paul Blvd., Rochester, N.Y., b I m

- Owen, Floyd, Broadway Hill, Ann Arbor, Mich., a B h m o
- Oyler, Merton D., 923 E. 56th St., Apt. 3, Chicago, Ill., c f G h k
- Page, Charles Hunt, 242 W. 109th St., New York, N.Y., a c j o
- Page, J. F., Oklahoma A. and M. College, Stillwater, Okla.
- Panunzio, Constantine, Univ. of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
- Parenton, Vernon J., 50 Perkins Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., A b C f G h k
- Park, Robert E., Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn.
- Parker, Frederick B., Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa., a o
- Parmelee, Maurice, 1024 Transportation Bldg., Washington, D.C.
- Parsons, Talcott, 62 Fairmont St., Belmont, Mass., a c j k l m
- Parten, Mildred, 1214 St. Mathews Ct., N.W., Washington, D.C.
- Passamaneck, Herman, Care Y. M. and Y. W. H. A., 315 S. Bellefield Ave., Pittsburgh, Pa.
- Paton, Bernice E., Box 126, Birmingham, Mich., e o
- Paula, Sister Mary, College of St. Elizabeth, Convent, N.J., A e f k
- \*Payne, E. George, School of Education, New York University, Washington Sq., E., New York, N.Y.
- Pedersen, Laura M., 133 Pearl St., Little Rock, Ark., e i k n
- Peeling, James H., Butler University, Indianapolis, Ind., a c g i j o
- Person, Philip H., 623 W. State St., Milwaukee, Wis., a i j k n
- Peskind, A., 12629 Euclid Ave., East Cleveland, Ohio
- Peters, Charles C., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa., b c E f
- Pettit, Walter W., 122 East 22nd St., New York, N.Y., h i
- \*Phelps, Harold A., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., a b c f j k n o
- Pierson, Donald, Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn.
- Pigors, Paul, 92 Washington Ave., Cambridge, Mass.
- Pinkham, Louisa, 27 Ripley Ter., Newton Centre, Mass., a b c j m n o
- Piotrowski, Sylvester A. Rev., Mount Mary College, Milwaukee, Wis., a e i j l
- Plumley, Margaret L., 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y.
- Polson, Robert A., Dept. of Rural Social Organization, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., c f G h j
- Pope, William, 655 Elm St., Winnetka, Ill.
- Potter, Allen R., R.F.D. #4 Ward's Lake, Olympia, Wash.
- Potter, Ellen C., 301 W. State St., Trenton, N.J., I k m n
- Powdermaker, Hortense, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.
- Powers, Dorothy E., 1120 East 24th Pl., Tulsa, Okla.
- Powers, Edwin, Box 101, Cambridge, Mass., b c i N
- Prentzel, Harold Thompson, c/o Friends Hospital, Frankford, Philadelphia, Pa., a c d h M o
- Prescott, Daniel A., School of Educ., Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., b c e m
- Price, Maurice T., Sociology Dept., Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill., a b c f g o
- Pritchett, Henry L., Southern Methodist University, Box 503, Dallas, Texas
- Puckett, Newbell N., Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, a b c f g j k l
- Queen, Stuart A., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., c i k
- \*Quijano, J. Rivero, Box 1542, Mexico City, Mexico
- Rademaker, John Adrian, 427 Main St., Lewistown, Me., A b c d f g h J k o
- Radomski, Alexander, 134 Seymour Rd., Rochester, N.Y., H k n
- Ramsperger, H. G., 400 Allaire Ave., Leonia, N.J.
- Ranck, Samuel H., Public Library, Grand Rapids, Mich.
- Randolph, E. F., 993 Memorial Dr., Cambridge, Mass.
- Ratcliffe, S. C., Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Ill.
- Rau, Albert G., 38 W. Market St., Bethlehem, Pa.
- Reed, Ellery F., The Community Chest, 312 W. 9th St., Cincinnati, Ohio
- Reed, J. Paul, 210 Calabria Ave., Coral Gables, Fla., a b C f H k
- Reeves, Ruby Jo., Box 3814, T. S. C. U. Station, Denton, Texas
- Reid, Ira De. A., Atlanta University, Atlanta, Ga.
- Reinhardt, James M., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., a b m n

- Reuss, Marguerite, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wis., a b c f h i k m n
- Reuter, E. B., Dept. of Sociology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
- Reynolds, Charles N., 611 Alvarado Row, Stanford University, Calif., d h i
- Reynolds, Joseph Weston, White Salmon, Wash., c G h I k l m N o
- Rice, Stuart A., Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.
- Riley, John W. Jr., George St., Near Landing Lane, New Brunswick, N.J.
- Robert, Percy A. Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., k o
- Roberts, Harry W., Virginia State College, Ettrick, Va.
- Robinson, Ormsbee, 5 W. 65th St., New York, N.Y., a k l o
- Robinson, William S., 514 Bancroft Hall, Columbia Univ., New York, N.Y., b C F g
- Rockwood, Lemo Dennis, Home Economics, Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N.Y., b c k
- Rodnick, David, 342 Crown St., New Haven, Conn.
- Roethlisberger, F. J., Harvard Graduate School of Business Admin., Soldiers Field, Boston, Mass.
- Rogers, D. B., Dept. of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- Root, Paul A., Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, a l
- Roper, M. Wesley, Kansas State Teachers College, Emporia, Kan., b c e H
- Rosario, Jose C., University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, e h K
- Rosenquist, Carl L., Dept. of Sociology, Austin, Tex., B c f n
- Rosenthal, William H., Mrs., 3149 Harvey Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio
- Roskelley, R. W., Colorado State College, Ft. Collins, Colo., b C f G k
- Ross, Edward A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., a
- \*Rossouw, G. S. H., P.O. Box 2160, Durban, Natal, Union of South Africa
- Roucek, Joseph S., Hofstra College, Hempstead, N.Y., a b e h j n o
- Roy, Katharine, Kansas State College, Manhattan, Kan., b c k
- †Rubin, Arthur L. H., Div. of the Social Sciences, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
- Rumney, Jay, 69 Alexander St., Princeton, N.J., a b d k O
- Rural Economics Dept., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
- Rush, Charles E., Cleveland Public Library, Order Dept., 325 Superior Ave., N.E., Cleveland, Ohio
- Russell, Seth, Lemont, Pa.
- Ryskamp, Henry J., 1201 Sherman St., S.E., Grand Rapids, Mich., a k l
- Salomon, Albert, 3212 Cambridge Ave., New York, N.Y., a l o
- Salter, Alice B., 1712 Grand, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, a B i
- Sanders, Irwin T., Dept. of Sociology, Alabama College, Montevallo, Ala.
- Sanderson, Dwight, 212 Overlook Rd., Ithaca, N.Y., a c g k
- Sanford, Gilbert A., 332 Maynard St., Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Saposnekow, Jacob, West Va. Univ., Morgantown, W.Va., a b c d f h i j m n o
- Sarvis, G. W., 146 Lincoln, Delaware, Ohio
- Satchwell, Wayne, 1816 N.E. 12th Ave., Portland, Ore., i j O
- Saul, Herbert W., 18 Talbot Rd., S. Braintree, Mass., b k M
- Sayler, Edward, Talladega College, Talladega, Ala., a b c g H i J k l
- Scates, Douglas E., College Sta., Durham, N.C.
- Schacht, Lucie H., Mrs., Chicago Teachers Col., 6800 Stewart Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- Schafer, Marvin R., College of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Wash., a i h j k l m
- Schaper, Florence W., Lindenwood College, St. Charles, Mo., A b c E f j
- Schauffler, Mary, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
- Scherer, M. Elizabeth, Russell Sage College, Troy, N.Y., a b i k
- Schettler, Clarence H., Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, Ohio, a B c f k m
- Schersten, Albert Ferdinand, 1000 38th St., Rock Island, Ill., a g h i k l n o
- Schmid, Calvin F., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., C d h o
- Schneider, David M., 44 Van Schoick Ave., Albany, N.Y., a c f h I
- Schneider, Joseph, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
- Schorsch, A. P., Office of Dean, Graduate School, De Paul University, Rm. 302, 64 E. Lake St., Chicago, Ill., c k l
- Schuessler, Karl, 301 Central Ave., Highland Park, Ill., c f n
- Schuler, Edgar A., Louisiana State University, University, La., b
- Schumacher, Henry C., 2525 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, Ohio

- Schwitalla, Alphonse M., 1402 S. Grand Blvd., St. Louis, Mo.
- Sears, Charles H., 35 Edgecliff Ter., Yonkers, N.Y.
- Seelig, Harold D., Mrs., 36 Cobane Ter., West Orange, N.J., c f i K N o
- Selekman, Ben M., 24 Province St., Boston, Mass.
- Sell, Harry B., 5711 Blackstone Ave., Jackson Park Sta., Chicago, Ill., a b c e n O
- Selle, Erwin S., 323 W. Broadway, Winona, Minn., E j o
- Sellin, Thorsten, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., a b c f N
- Selling, Lowell S., 16196 Cherrylawn Ave., Detroit, Mich.
- Setterlund, Elmer L., 501 Emery St., Longmont, Colo., b c H j K L m
- Severson, Alfred L., Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa, a b c h j k l
- Sevina, Sister M. O. S. F., Alverno Teachers College, 1413 S. Layton Blvd., Milwaukee, Wis.
- Sewell, William H., Okla. A. and M. College, Stillwater, Okla., a b C f G n
- Sewny, U. D., 390 Riverside Dr., New York, N.Y., a B m o
- Shankweiler, Paul W., Dept. of Sociology, Florida State College for Women, Tallahassee, Fla., a h I K m n
- Shaw, G. Howland, Department of State, Washington, D.C., c i m N o
- Sheffield, Ada E., Mrs., 31 Madison St., Cambridge, Mass.
- Sheldon, Henry D. Jr., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
- Shideler, Ernest H., 425 Perrin Ave., LaFayette, Ind., b c e g k n o
- Shyrock, Henry S., 3804 18th St., N., Arlington, Va., c d f
- Sibley, Elbridge, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me., a c f o
- Sidlo, Thomas L., 1956 Union Trust Bldg., Cleveland, Ohio
- Simms, B. F., 228 La Fayette St., Roanoke, Ala.
- Simpson, George E., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa., a c l
- Sims, Newell L., Oberlin, Ohio, a g h j o
- Slawson, John, 228 E., 19th St., New York, N.Y.
- Sletto, Raymond F., Hotel Empire, Broadway at 63rd St., New York, N.Y.
- Smith, Chris, 129 Farmington Ave., Waterbury, Conn., a b c h
- Smith, Eleanor, Alderson, W.Va., a B i n
- Smith, Luke M., 10583 Blythe Ave., Los Angeles, Calif., a d h O
- Smith, Mapheus, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan., B C d f g n
- Smith, Raymond C., 502 Kentucky Ave., Alexandria, Va., G
- Smith, Richard R., 120 E. 39th St., New York, N.Y.
- Smith, T. Lynn, Louisiana State University, University, La., a c d G k
- Smith, William C., Linfield College, McMinnville, Ore., a b c g k l
- Snyder, Harry R., 330 W. 42nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Sorokin, P. A., 8 Cliff St., Winchester, Mass.
- Speier, Hans, 66 W. 12th St., New York N.Y., a o
- Sperka, Joshua S., Rabbi, 1938 Tuxedo, Detroit, Mich.
- Spirer, Jess, Western State Penitentiary, Pittsburgh, Pa., b c f m n
- Stacy, W. H., Ames, Iowa
- Stafford, Alfred B., 2 Roseridge St., Bellevue, Pa., A c f j
- Stafford, Thomas Albert, 731 Simpson St., Evanston, Ill., f l o
- Standing, Theodore G., Okla. A. and M. College, Stillwater, Okla., A c g k
- Steele, Mary R., Main St., Wilbraham, Mass., c g h
- Steiner, Jesse F., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., d g H i
- Steinmetz, Richard C., Mutual Fire Prevention Bureau, 400 W. Madison St., Chicago, Ill.
- †Steinmetz, S. R., University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Holland
- Stephan, Frederick F., 1626 K. St., N.W., Washington, D.C., b c d f h i k
- Stern, Bernhard J., Dept. of Social Science, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- Stetler, Henry G., 412 W. 115 St., Apt. 2W, New York, N.Y., c f j O
- Steward, Florence Marie, Alma College, Alma, Mich., b I k m
- Stone, Olive M., 901 W. Franklin St., Richmond, Va.
- Stone, W. B., Commerce, Tex., a b e
- Stonequist, Everett Verner, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, N.Y., a B c d j k m o
- Stouffer, George A. W. Jr., 610 Philadelphia Ave., Chambersburg, Pa., B e i n
- Straley, J. C., Kansas State Teachers College, Pittsburg, Kan.
- Streightoff, Frances D., 733 E. 33rd St., Indianapolis, Ind.

- Strode, Josephine, 106 Morningside Dr., New York, N.Y., b e g i m
- Strong, George W., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- Stubbs, Florence H., State Teachers College, Farmville, Va., a b g h j k
- Sullenger, T. Earl, Municipal University of Omaha, Omaha, Neb.
- Sutherland, E. H., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind., n
- Sutherland, Robert L., Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa.
- Swanson, C. G., 150 Meeker St., Bowling Green, Ohio, b E g h l m
- Sweeney, L. J., 1010 Webster Ave., Chicago, Ill., h i k l
- Sweetser, Frank L. Jr., 810 N. Washington St., Bloomington, Indiana, a c h n
- †Swift, Harold H., Union Stock Yards, Chicago, Ill.
- Symon, Stow E., 6533 Kimbark Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- Symons, Joseph N., Utah State Agricultural College, Logan, Utah, a b g i k N
- Syz, Hans C., 27 E. 37th St., New York, N.Y.
- Taeuber, Conrad, 201 Jackson Ave., Hyattsville, Md., c f g
- Taft, Donald R., 1001 Douglas Ave., Urbana, Ill.
- Talbert, Ernest L., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, b l o
- Talbot, Nell Snow, 1125 Farwell Ave., Chicago, Ill., b c d e f o
- Tang, Kuang Wu, 701 E. Washington St., Phoenix, Ariz., a b m
- Tate, Leland B., Box 51, Blacksburg, Va., a c G h j
- Tate, Leland B., Mrs., Box 51, Blacksburg, Va., a c h j K
- Taylor, Burton W., Southport, Conn., H k
- Taylor, Carl B., Division of Social Sciences, Hobart College, Geneva, N.Y., e g i k N
- Taylor, Carl C., 5166 Tildon St., N.W., Washington, D. C., b g
- Taylor, E. A., 19 N. Shannon Ave., Athens, Ohio, A g h
- Taylor, Eleanor K., Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh, Pa., b H k
- Taylor, John Edward, 168 Prospect Pl., Brooklyn, N.Y.
- Teggart, Frederick J., Wheeler Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
- Terpenning, Walter A., 704 E. Porter St., Albion College, Albion, Mich., A g h
- Tetreau, E. D., Experiment Station Staff, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz.
- Thaden, John F., Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich., a e g h
- Therault, George F., 12 Valley Rd., Hanover, N.H., A b C g h k
- Thomas, Dorothy S., 333 E. 41st St., New York, N.Y., b c f g
- Thomas, William I., 333 E. 41st St., New York, N.Y.
- Thompson, Warren S., Miami University, Oxford, Ohio
- Thomson, Henry E., 6533 17 Ave., N.E., Seattle, Wash., a b O
- Thomson, Mehran K., 11 S. Summit St., Ypsilanti, Mich., a b c k n
- Thrasher, Frederic M., 5 Woodland Place, Great Neck, L.I.
- Tibbitts, Clark Institute for Human Adj., Rm. 1514 Rackham Bldg., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., c f
- Tilley, Margaret C., 511 W. 113th St., New York, N.Y., c e h j n
- Timasheff, N. S., 5 Phillips Pl., Cambridge, Mass., a b N
- Timmons, Benjamin Finley, 314 Lincoln Hall, Univ. of Ill., Urbana, Ill., a c h I K o
- \*Toda, Teizo, Dept. of Sociology, Imperial University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
- \*Todd, A. J., Harris Hall, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
- Tollen, William B., 4109 Pine St., Philadelphia, Pa., a i O
- Tomars, Adolph S., 200 Riverside Dr., New York, N.Y., a c h j o
- Topping, C. W., University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
- Tozier, R. B., State Teachers College, Winona, Minn.
- Treudley, Mary Bosworth, Horton House, Wellesley, Mass., d i m
- Truxal, Andrew, G., Lebanon St., Hanover, N.H.
- Tufts, Edith M., 3114 Iowa St., Pittsburgh, Pa., c i j m
- Tweito, Andrew, Chandler, Minn., a b d e
- Twomey, David W., 300 Newbury St., Boston, Mass., a k
- \*Tylor, W. Russell, 407 S. New St., Champaign, Ill., a c f g H j
- Ulman, Joseph N., Judge, Court House, Baltimore, Md.
- Upson, Lent D., Dept. of Sociology, Wayne University, Detroit, Mich.
- Vaile, Gertrude, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., b G h I k l m

- Vance, Rupert B., Box 495, Chapel Hill, N.C., a D f g o
- Van Der Slice, Austin, 205 Commerce Bldg., Univ. of Ark., Fayetteville, Ark., A c i o
- †Van Kleeck, Mary, 130 E. 22nd St., New York, N.Y.
- Van Vechten, Courtlandt C., Wayne University, Detroit, Mich., f N
- Van Vleck, Joseph, Jr., 34 Mohawk Dr., Hartford, Conn.
- Vincent, George E., Greenwich, Conn.
- Vold, George B., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., b f N
- Von Schmid, Johan J., 109 Zoeterwoudsche Singel, Leiden, Holland, A b C O
- Von Tungeln, George H., I. S. C. Ag. Annex, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, a c g h i k
- †Von Wiese, Leopold, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
- Vreeland, Francis M., 606 E. Anderson St., Greencastle, Ind., a b h i
- Vrooman, Clarence E., 1422 F. St., N.W., Washington, D. C., b c e f h i
- Walker, Gladys R., Bellefield Dwellings, Apt. 1 F., 4400 Center Ave., Pittsburgh, Pa., a b C f h i k l m n o
- Walker, Marquerite, 357 S. Kenmore Ave., Los Angeles, Calif., a c i j M
- Waller, Willard, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- Wallin, Paul, 1156 E. 56th St., Chicago, Ill., a b c K M
- Walsh, Mary Elizabeth, Catholic Univ. of America, Washington, D.C., i k l m n
- \*Wang, Tsi Chang, Rm. 615, 516 Canton Rd., Shanghai, China
- Ward, Annette P., 421 Prospect Ave., Alma, Mich.
- Waris, Heikki, Dr., Brahenkatu 4, Helsinki, Finland, a c i k
- Warner, Wellman J., Dr., Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa., A c l o
- Warner, W. Lloyd, Dept. of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
- Waterman, Willoughby C., Brooklyn College, Bedford Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.
- Watson, Amey E., 773 College Ave., Haverford, Pa., c e f i j k m n
- Watson, Frank D., 773 College Ave., Haverford, Pa., c e f i j k m n
- Watson, Goodwin, R.D. 1, Warwick, N.Y., B e k m O
- Watson, Maud E., Apt. 402, 2240 W. Grand Blvd., Detroit, Mich.
- Watson, Walter Thompson, Southern Methodist Univ., Dallas, Tex., B c h i o
- Watts, Fred G., 217 W. Midland, Shawnee, Okla., b f g h i J K l m N
- Weatherly, U. G., 4 Church St., Cortland, N.Y., a
- Weaver, W. Wallace, Logan Hall, Univ. of Penn., Philadelphia, Pa., c f l j m
- Weaver, W. W., Mrs., Logan Hall, Univ. of Penn., Philadelphia, Pa., c f l j m
- \*Weber, Harry F., State Teachers College, Lock Haven, Pa.
- Webster, Donald E., Beloit College, Beloit, Wis., a b o
- Webster, Edward J., 1124 11th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., a C f i m o
- \*Webster, Hutton, R.F.D. 2, Box 326-A, Menlo Park, Calif.
- Weinfeld, William, 716 S.E. 13th Ave., Minneapolis, Minn., c F O
- Wiessman, Irving, 613 Locust St., St. Louis, Mo., c f h i
- Weitzman, L. G., John Carroll University, University Heights, Cleveland, Ohio
- Weller, Forrest L., Elizabethtown, Pa.
- Wells, Carl D., 4923 15th St., N., Arlington, Va.
- Werlin, Joseph S., 903 Sul Ross, Houston, Tex., a i k n o
- Wesley, Oscar, Drexel Institute, Philadelphia, Pa., a b e i k
- Wessell, Bessie Bloom, Mrs., Connecticut College, New London, Conn.
- Wheeler, Joseph L., Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore, Md.
- \*Whelchel, James O., 1382 S. Denver St., Tulsa, Okla., a
- Whetten, Nathan L., Storrs Agricultural Exp. Station, Storrs, Conn., c d G k
- White, Eva Whiting, Mrs., 264 Boylston St., Boston, Mass.
- White, R. Clyde, 1112 E. 62nd St., Hyde Park Station, Chicago, Ill., c f i
- Whitehouse, Herbert, 3800 A Humphrey St., St. Louis, Mo., a j m
- Whitelaw, Doris S., Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, N.Y., a b c h i k
- Wiley, Malcolm M., 202 Admn. Bldg., Univ. of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
- Williams, B. O., Clemson, S.C., a b c f G j k m
- Williams, Byard, 140 E. 54th St., New York, N.Y., i j
- Williams, Hermon P., Etna, N.Y., l
- Williams, Richard Hays, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y., A g l m o
- Wills, Elbert Vaughan, Treasury Dept.

- Procurement Div., Federal Warehouse,  
Rm. 376, Washington, D.C., a b E j  
Wilson, Logan, Dept. of Sociology, Univer-  
sity of Maryland, College Park, Md.  
Windsor, P. L., Library, University of Il-  
linois, Urbana, Ill.  
Winston, Ellen, 120 Forest Rd., Raleigh,  
N.C., a c D f k m  
Winston, Sanford, 120 Forest Rd., Raleigh,  
N.C., a c D f k m  
Wirth, Louis, Social Science Bldg., Univer-  
sity of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., a c h i j m  
Wolters, Gilbert Rev., O. S. B., Abbey Li-  
brary, St. Benedicts College, Atchison,  
Kans.  
Wood, Arthur Evans, University of Michi-  
gan, Haven Hall, Ann Arbor, Mich.  
Wood, L. Foster, Rm. 41, 297 4th Ave.,  
New York, N.Y., i k l  
Woodard, James W., Temple University,  
Philadelphia, Pa., a B c m  
Woodbury, Robert M., Care International  
Labor Office, Geneva, Switzerland  
Woodhouse, Chase Going, Mrs., 751 Wil-  
liams St., New London, Conn., C f k o  
Woods, Erville B., Hanover, N.H., a h j  
Woodward, Comer M., Emory University,  
Ga., a g h i k l  
Woodward, Julian Laurence, 249 Goldwin  
Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca,  
N.Y., D j k n  
Woodworth, A. H., 6220 Greenwood Ave.,  
Chicago, Ill., a b o  
Woofter, T. J. Jr., 2001 16th St., N.W.,  
Washington, D.C., c f g i  
Woolston, Howard B., University of Wash-  
ington, Seattle, Wash., B c f  
Wooten, Mattie L., Mrs., Box 3685, T.S.  
C.U. Station, Denton, Tex., a f g h i k  
Wormer, Grace, State University of Iowa,  
Iowa City, Iowa  
Wright, Verne, University of Pittsburgh,  
Pittsburgh, Pa., A b e o  
Yacos, Julia Elaine, 935 Caldwell Ave.,  
Portage, Pa., a c e H i j m  
Yentis, David, 700 University Ave., Syra-  
cuse, N.Y., a b F h  
Yoder, Fred R., State College of Washing-  
ton, Pullman, Wash., a b G O  
Young, Benjamin F., 62 Belvidere Pl.,  
Yonkers, N.Y.  
Young, Donald R., Logan Hall, University  
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.  
Young, Hobart N., Food Research Inst.,  
Stanford, Calif., a b c  
Young, Kimball, 4035 Connecticut Ave.,  
N.W., Washington, D.C., B k m  
Younge, Eva R., Soc. Res. Offices 3466, Mc-  
Gill University, Montreal, Canada  
Yourman, Julius, 110-31 73rd Rd., Forest  
Hill, L.I., N.Y., E g k  
Zeleny, Leslie D., State Teachers College,  
St. Cloud, Minn., a E h k n  
Zimmerman, Carle C., Harvard Univ.,  
Cambridge, Mass., a b c g H k  
Znaniecki, Florian, Columbia Univ., New  
York City, N.Y.

## NEW MEMBERS AND FORMER MEMBERS REJOINING

- Aginsky, Bernard W., 8 W. 13th St., New  
York, N.Y., a b c h j k m  
Argow, Walter Webster, 695 Sunset Road,  
Teaneck, N.J., c e i m n  
Barnes, Mary Edna, 99 Joralemon St.,  
Brooklyn, N.Y.  
Baur, Edward J., Dillard University, New  
Orleans, La.  
Beal, Owen F., University of Utah, Salt  
Lake City, Utah, A c k  
Bishop, Dorothy G., Mrs., Social Service  
Dept., Massachusetts Memorial Hospi-  
tal, 750 Harrison Ave., Boston, Mass.,  
a b d e g h i j k m  
Brenner, W. Nisson, 1501 Walnut St., Phila-  
delphia, Pa., k N  
Brown, Martin W., 5 E. 57th St., New York,  
N.Y., a d f H  
Cahn, Zvi, 22 W. 91st St., New York, N.Y.  
Callaghan, Hubert C. Rev., Georgetown,  
University, Washington, D.C., a d e i j k n  
Callaghan, Margaret, St. Joseph College,  
West Hartford, Conn., i j n o P  
Carmichael, F. L., 2230 Colorado Blvd.,  
Denver, Colo., c f h  
Carpenter, Thomas P., 1086 N. Cherry St.,  
Galesburg, Ill., b e h i J l  
Chapman, Stanley H., 27 Harrison St., New  
Haven, Conn.  
Chiver, Walter R., Post Office Box 4412, At-  
lanta, Georgia, B k m  
Davis, Horace B., 309 Lake Ave., Newton  
Highlands, Mass., K  
Davis, Jean S., Wells College, Aurora, New  
York, a b c h i j k l m n

- Demerath, Nicholas J., 15 Elm St., Winchester, Mass., a k M n
- Detweiler, Frederick G., Denison University, Granville, Ohio, d k
- Dietrich, Doris C., care Dr. C. Dietrich, 642 Medical Arts Bldg., Tacoma, Wash.
- Dunn, Halbert L., 1734 Eye St., N.W., Washington, D.C., b f i
- Edward, Sister Mary, Library, College of St. Catherine, St. Paul, Minn.
- Emens, John A., 555 Shelbourne Ave., Wilkinsburg, Pa., E h i j
- Eskell, Bertram C., 147 E. 72 St., New York, N.Y.
- Eskell, Milia Alihan, 147 E. 72 St., New York, N.Y.
- Estorick, Eric E., New York University, New York, N.Y., a b e j m o
- Fernandes, Grace, Sociology Department Stillwater, Oklahoma, b k
- Fisher, J. Elliott, 130 Morningside Dr., New York, N.Y., b c E i j
- Fosberg, Morton F., 12 Arden St., New York, N.Y., b C f m
- Fowler, Charles B., 24 Vermont Ave., White Plains, N.Y.
- Frank, George, 610 Thompson St., Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Franzen, Erich, 514 W. Grand Ave., Carbon-dale, Ill., a B c L M N o
- Glick, Paul C., 5050 First St., N.W. Wash- ington, D.C., a b c d f i k
- Goldberg, Ruth Jean, 1115 W. Nevada St., Urbana, Ill., b c h i k m n
- Gomillion, Charles G., Box 31, Tuskegee In- stitute, Ala.
- Haak, Leo A., University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Okla.
- Hall, Oswald, Brown University, Providence, R.I., b f k
- Hardin, Clara A., Wilson College, Chambers- burg, Pa., a c g H i k
- Hart, C. W. M., Dept. of Sociology, Univer- sity of Toronto, 273 Bloor St., West, Toronto 5, Canada, a K l M
- Henderson, David, 5148 Blair St., Pitts- burgh, Pa.
- Hendricks, Carolina M., Mrs., 180 West 1st N. Street, Logan, Utah
- Hoffsommer, Harold, Dept. Rural Sociology, Louisiana State University, University, La.
- Homans, George C., Kirkland House, Har- vard University, Cambridge, Mass., A l m
- Honigsheim, Paul, Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich., A c L
- Hunt, Thomas C., 46 Park Pl., Princeton, N.J., b c f k l m
- Johns, R. Elizabeth, Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio, i j k m n
- Kaplan, Oscar, 2006 Kelton Ave., Los Angeles, Calif., B c d f k m o
- Karcher, E. Kenneth, Jr., 14 Fairlawn Ave., Albany, N.Y., a b c d f h i m n
- Knox, John B., 184 Stiles St., Elizabeth, N.J., a b c k P
- Komarovsky, Mirra, 601 West 113 St., New York, N.Y., a b c k
- Kovacs, Sandor B., Baylor University, Waco, Texas, a i K n
- Kraus, Hertha, 233 Roberts Road, Bryn Mawr, Pa., c h i j
- Landecker, Werner S., 315 Haven Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., a b c l n O
- Landheer, Bartholomew, 4707 Connecticut Ave., Washington, D.C., A b c j l o
- Landman, J. H., 110 Seaman Ave., New York, N.Y., a b c d m n o
- Lohman, Joseph D., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., a b c f j n
- Long, Virgil E., University of Chatanooga, Chattanooga, Tenn.
- Lyons, James A. Dr., P. O. Box 10, Ottawa, Kansas, a g k
- Maneval, Raymond K., Pennsylvania Un- dergraduate Center, Webster Bldg., Altoona, Pa., a b f j k
- Mansfield, A. Elizabeth, Sergeant Hall, 34th and Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa., a b e h i l m o
- Marx, Walter J., Catholic University, Wash- ington, D.C., a g O
- May, Geoffrey, 1243 30th St., N.W., Wash- ington, D.C.
- Mayo, George Elton, 48 Brattle St., Cam- bridge, Mass., b c d i m
- McConnell, John W., University Heights, New York University, New York, N.Y., a h O
- McCrae, Helen, 1460 Baldwin Ave., Detroit, Mich., b c f l m n
- Metcalf, Wayne D., P.O. Box 117, Racine, Wisconsin, c g h i k n

- Metour, Gildas E., Butler University, Indianapolis, Ind.
- Morris, True, 650 12th Ave., E., Eugene Ore.
- Muller, Henry M., Haines Ave., Berlin, N.J., d j K
- Muriel, Sister M., Briar Cliff College, Sioux City, Iowa
- Neal, Ernest E., Texas College, Tyler, Texas, b C e i j k
- Noonan, Carroll J. Rev., St. Mary's Seminary, Paca St., Baltimore, Md.
- Rapport, Victor A., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.
- Rasmussen, Donald E., 330 Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill., n
- Record, Mason T. Dr., Box #24, Sweet Briar, Va., a g j k
- Reed, Stephen W., 312 Linsly Hall, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., a
- Rennekar, Lucille M., 8702 Elmhurst Ave., Elmhurst, N.Y., a H j
- Riecken, Henry W., Jr., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn., b c h
- Rowland, Howard, Room 14, Page Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
- Schroeder, Clarence W., Bradley Hall, Peoria, Ill., a b c j K n
- Schwieb, Vernon R., 2030 North 32nd St., Lincoln, Neb.
- Sellow, Gladys, 2119 10th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., i
- Senior, Clarence, Paseo de la Reforma, 27, Mexico, D.F., a b c g h n O
- Shalloo, J. P., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Shannon, May G., care W.P.A., Federal Bldg., Fort Worth, Texas, a g h
- Sholes, Russell C., Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vt., a b g i k n
- Stephan, A. Stephen, Stout Institute, Menomonie, Wis., e h i k
- Stevens, Raymond B., 320 Irvine Pl., Elmire, N.Y., b f j k n
- Stouffer, Samuel, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
- Torok, John, 211 S. Dithridge Ave., Pittsburgh, Pa., a b c l m o
- Trueblood, E. J., Limestone College, Gaffney, S.C., g h i k l m n
- Van de Wall, Clara Liepman, Wittenburg College, Springfield, Ohio.
- Van de Wall, Willem, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky., g
- Van Diest, Alice E., 1730 N. Cascade St., Colorado Springs, Colo., i k l m.
- Voss, J. Ellis, 6225 Morton St., Philadelphia, Pa.
- Wakeley, Ray E., 702 Ash Ave., Ames, Iowa
- Warner, Florence M., Connecticut College, New London, Conn., g i j
- Whyte, William F., 477 Hanover St., Boston, Mass.
- Wildes, Harry Emerson, Valley Forge, Pa.
- Witchell, Samuel E., State Teachers College, Glassboro, N.J., a E h
- Woll, Milton, 420 E. 86th St., New York, N.Y., e g h o P
- Wyatt, Donald W., 25 N. 40th St., Philadelphia, Pa.
- Yarbrough, Dean S., Wilberforce University, Wilberforce, Ohio, C g H i n

## AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY—MINUTES AND ANNUAL REPORTS

FIRST BUSINESS MEETING, DECEMBER 27, 1939

The first business meeting of the Society was called to order at 9:12 A.M. in the Crystal Ballroom of the Benjamin Franklin Hotel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, President Sutherland presiding.

Minutes of the last business and Executive Committee meetings were approved as printed in *The Review*, Vol. IV, pp. 103-104.

The report of the Social Science Research Council was presented for the representatives of the Council by M. C. Elmer.

A summary of the activities of the American Council of Learned Societies was given by J. H. S. Bossard.

The report of the Society's delegate to the American Association for the Advancement of Science was read by W. A. Anderson.

The report for the Research Planning Committee was read by Harold A. Phelps.

The report of the Committee on Social Research was presented by S. Clayton Newman.

Alfred M. Lee reported for the Committee on Public Relations.

Richard Fuller announced a special meeting to be held in connection with the Section on Sociology and Social Work to consider the desirability of instituting a special section on social problems.

Maurice Parmelee presented the following resolutions:

1. RESOLVED: That the Society rescind every decision of the Executive Committee and of the Society concerning affiliation with the International Federation of Sociological Societies and Institutes.
2. RESOLVED: That in future negotiations with the International Institute of Sociology and the International Federation, the Executive Committee shall be guided by the following objectives:
  - a. The Federation shall be independent of the Institute in its officers and governing body;
  - b. In the governing body of the Federation, each constituent society shall be entitled to one vote for every 100 members, or fraction of 100, up to 500 members; one vote for every 200 members, or fraction of 200, from 500 to 1500 members; and one vote for every 500 members, or fraction of 500, over 1500 members;
  - c. The by-laws of the Federation shall provide that, whenever possible, the Federation and the Institute shall hold their congresses at the same time and place.

Maurice Parmelee moved the adoption of the first resolution. A substitute motion was made and seconded that both parts of this resolution should be referred to the Executive Committee for its report. This motion was approved by the Society.

President Sutherland appointed the following Resolutions Committee: Carl Kelsey, Chairman, and H. P. Fairchild, J. P. Lichtenberger, I. E. McDougale, and O. Wesley.

The meeting adjourned at 9:45 A.M.

Respectfully submitted,  
HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Secretary*

FIRST MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 27, 1939

The first meeting of the Executive Committee, Room 210, Benjamin Franklin Hotel, was called to order at 5:00 P.M. by President Sutherland. Members of the

Committee present were: E. H. Sutherland, E. W. Burgess, E. Faris, G. A. Lundberg, Donald Young, W. E. Gettys, Lowry Nelson, and Dorothy Thomas.

Minutes of the previous meeting were approved as printed in Volume IV of *The Review*, page 104.

The Secretary read his annual report which was approved.

The report of the Managing Editor was read and approved.

The report of the Treasurer for the past fiscal year was read and approved.

A summary of the financial operations of the Society was read by Dwight Sanderson who also presented the budget for the next year. Both the report and the budget were approved.

Ellsworth Faris moved that the Society continue the policy of having a certified audit. This motion was seconded by Warner Gettys and approved by the Committee.

Ernest Burgess moved that the incoming President and Secretary should constitute a committee to investigate the question of incorporation and to report to the Committee with recommendations. This motion was seconded by George Lundberg and approved.

The chairman of the Committee on Honorary Members, Ellsworth Faris, reported that no candidates were being nominated this year. This report was accepted by the Executive Committee.

The selection of Chicago for the next annual meetings was approved, with the further recommendation that the dates of these meetings should be decided by the president and secretary.

An invitation from the American Association for the Advancement of Science to this Society to participate in the summer meetings of the Association to be held in Seattle June 17-22, 1940, was accepted.

J. H. S. Bossard presented the report of the Committee on Organization and recommended that the report be presented to the Society for discussion, that it should be printed in *The Review*, that space be allowed in the next three issues of *The Review* for discussion of this report, and that in the fall a vote of the membership shall be taken by mail. E. W. Burgess made the motion, seconded by Donald Young, that each of these recommendations be approved. E. Faris moved that the preceding motion should be tabled. Motion passed. Lowry Nelson moved that the report should be submitted to the membership at the next business meeting and discussed at the following business meeting. Motion was approved.

The resolution relative to the International Federation was presented and was referred by the Executive Committee to the membership.

Meeting adjourned at 6:56 P.M.

Respectfully submitted,  
HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Secretary*

#### SECOND BUSINESS MEETING, DECEMBER 28, 1939

The second business meeting of the Society was called to order in the Crystal Ballroom by President Sutherland at 9:10 A.M.

The minutes of the Executive Committee were read and approved.

The report of the Nominating Committee was read by the Secretary. This report was approved by the Society, nominating the following candidates:

For President  
Robert M. MacIver  
Dwight Sanderson

For First Vice-President  
Stuart Queen  
Jesse F. Steiner

## For Second Vice-President

J. H. S. Bossard

J. O. Hertzler

## For Executive Committee

R. C. Angell

J. K. Folsom

R. S. Lynd

Malcolm Willey

## For Editorial Board

George Lundberg

Talcott Parsons

Donald Young

Pauline V. Young

J. H. S. Bossard presented the report of the Committee on Organization. Copies of the report were distributed to all members present. This report will be discussed at the next business meeting.

C. E. Lively reported on the activities of the Council on Human Relations of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The report was approved.

The report of the delegate to the American Documentation Institute was read by Ruby Jo Reeves and approved by the Society.

The resolution presented by Maurice Parmelee at the previous meeting was reconsidered, and a motion to approve this resolution was made by George Lundberg. E. Faris offered a substitute motion that the preceding motion be delayed indefinitely. This motion was seconded and passed.

Dwight Sanderson presented a review of the Society's financial operations and the budget for the next fiscal year. The report was approved.

The meeting adjourned at 10:00 A.M.

Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Secretary*

## SECOND MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 28, 1939

The second meeting of the Executive Committee was called to order at 5:00 P.M. in Room 210, President Sutherland presiding. The following members were present: E. H. Sutherland, E. W. Burgess, H. P. Fairchild, E. Faris, Kimball Young, W. E. Gettys, and Wilson Gee.

Upon the request of the Allied Social Science Association for an early selection of the meetings for 1941, E. W. Burgess moved that the Society indicate its preference for a meeting in Washington for that year. Motion passed.

E. W. Burgess moved the election of George Lundberg to the Research Planning Committee for a term of three years. Motion was seconded by E. Faris and passed.

As the Society's representative to the Social Science Research Council, Warren S. Thompson was elected for a term of three years upon the motion of Warner Gettys, seconded by H. P. Fairchild.

George Lundberg was nominated as the Society's representative to the American Association for the Advancement of Science on the motion of H. P. Fairchild, seconded by Donald Young.

P. A. Sorokin was renominated as our delegate to the International Institute on the motion of E. Faris, seconded by E. W. Burgess. Motion was passed.

The nomination of Mildred Parten as delegate to the American Documentation Institute for a term of three years was approved on the motion of E. Faris, seconded by Wilson Gee.

It was moved and seconded to leave the appointment of the Society's delegate to the American Library Association to the incoming president.

On the motion of E. W. Burgess, seconded by H. P. Fairchild, the nomination of J. L. Hypes and O. T. Duncan as delegate and alternate respectively to the Council of Human Relations of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, was approved

Harold A. Phelps was elected Secretary-Treasurer on the motion of E. W. Burgess seconded by H. P. Fairchild

Read Bain was elected Editor of *The Review* on the motion of H. P. Fairchild, seconded by Donald Young.

Harold A. Phelps was elected managing editor of *The Review* on the motion of E. W. Burgess, seconded by Wilson Gee.

Action by the Committee upon a resolution of the Section on Educational Sociology relative to a textbook in sociology was postponed, on the motion of H. P. Fairchild, seconded by Donald Young.

Kimball Young moved the approval of the resolution to establish a participating section for one session on Sociology of Social Problems with the recommendation that the name be rephrased. Seconded by Donald Young. Motion passed.

Meeting adjourned at 6:05 P.M.

Respectfully submitted,  
HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Secretary*

### THIRD BUSINESS MEETING, DECEMBER 29, 1939

The third business meeting of the Society was called to order in the Crystal Ballroom by President Sutherland at 11:00 A.M.

The minutes of the second business meeting were read and approved.

The minutes of the Executive Committee were read and approved.

Warren S. Thompson was appointed for a term of three years to the Social Science Research Council.

The nomination of George Lundberg for a term of three years to the Research Planning Committee was approved.

George Lundberg was reappointed as the Society's delegate to the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

The decision to defer the appointment of the Society's delegate to the American Library Association for action by the incoming president, was approved.

P. A. Sorokin was reelected as the Society's representative to the International Institute.

The appointment of Mildred Parten as the Society's delegate to the American Documentation Institute for a term of three years was approved.

The selection of J. L. Hypes and O. T. Duncan as the Society's delegate and alternate respectively to the Council of Human Relations was approved.

The Society approved the election of Harold A. Phelps as Secretary-Treasurer.

The Society approved the election of Read Bain as Editor of *The American Sociological Review*.

The chairman appointed B. O. Williams as chief teller, and H. W. Dunham, A. R. Lindesmith, F. W. Hoffer as assistant tellers. R. N. Ford, C. E. Moore, W. W. Argow and P. B. Boyer were appointed to distribute and collect the ballots.

The following officers were elected:

President: Robert M. MacIver, Columbia University

First Vice-President: Stuart Queen, Washington University

Second Vice-President: James H. S. Bossard, University of Pennsylvania

Executive Committee: Robert S. Lynd, Columbia University

J. K. Folsom, Vassar College

Editorial Board: Donald Young, University of Pennsylvania

Pauline V. Young, University of Southern California

The secretary read a letter from G. A. Lundberg indicating his desire to withdraw as candidate for election to the Editorial Board.

Carl Kelsey presented the following report for the Committee on Resolutions:

The American Sociological Society desires to express its appreciation of the courtesies and service given by the Benjamin Franklin Hotel. The thanks of the Society are extended to the local Committee on Arrangements for the meeting.

The Committee further suggests approval of the following:

WHEREAS: We understand that there is a movement in the field of engineering education to establish a closer relationship with the social sciences; and

WHEREAS: We believe that such a relationship would be of mutual advantage; therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the American Sociological Society express its interest in, and sympathy with, the aforesaid movement, and its readiness to further it in any legitimate way.

CARL KELSEY, *Chairman*

This report was approved by the Society.

J. H. S. Bossard presented the report of the Committee on Organization.

H. P. Fairchild moved that the report be accepted and that the Committee be continued to determine how it may be brought to the further consideration of our membership. This motion was approved.

C. C. North moved that we instruct the Committee to obtain the sentiment of the membership by mail ballot. J. H. S. Bossard recommended that the ballot be divided to cover the four sections of the report, and that the vote should be on each section. The motion with this recommendation was accepted.

Dwight Sanderson moved that after the poll is completed the Committee should draft amendments to the Constitution in conformity with the wishes of the Society. Motion passed.

E. A. Ross moved that the poll be taken not later than October 1st, 1940. Motion passed.

Dwight Sanderson moved that the Society obtain by mail the date concerning each member on degree, publications, and other achievements. Motion was seconded and passed.

Meeting adjourned at 1:15 P.M.

Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Secretary*

### THIRD MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 29, 1939

President MacIver presided at the final meeting of the Executive Committee in Room 210; other members present were: Donald Young, E. H. Sutherland, W. E. Gettys, H. P. Fairchild, F. H. Hankins, J. K. Folsom, and J. H. S. Bossard.

The following matters of Society policy were settled:

(1) to change the fiscal year from December 15 to July 1st; (2) to institute a Clearing-house Committee on Positions in Sociology; (3) to publish membership list in April rather than the February *Review*; (4) to index the Proceedings; (5) to institute a Program Committee.

The question of inducing members to pay dues more promptly was also discussed.

Meeting adjourned at 3:05 P.M.

Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Secretary*

### ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR, DECEMBER 15, 1938 TO DECEMBER 15, 1939

Details of the Society's activities are presented as usual in the special reports of its delegates, representatives, and committees. Of general interest to our membership are the preliminary report of the Society's committee on Organization, the in-

stitution by the American Association for the Advancement of Science of a Council on Human Relations to which J. L. Hypes and O. T. Duncan were appointed as delegates, and the organization of the Conference on Inter-American Relations in the Field of Education under the Division of Cultural Relations of the Department of State.

At the last meeting of the Committee of Secretaries of the American Council of Learned Societies, the following problems in a Society's activities and program were discussed: (1) Incorporation of Learned Societies; (2) Confusion and duplication of work involved in a Society's maintenance of several offices and addresses; (3) Budgetary procedure and accounting methods; (4) Meetings of the executive committee (other than during the annual Convention); (5) Exchange of reports and programs; (6) Regional societies; (7) Procedures in program making; (8) Publicity at annual meetings; (9) Attendance of nonmembers at annual meetings; (10) Membership; (11) Research and Publication; (12) Popular Education.<sup>1</sup>

During the year the following matters were brought to the attention of the officers of the society: 1. A request for a small grant from Society funds to assist in the development of a Section's program; 2. Adoption of some symbol or emblem to identify members at the annual meeting; 3. The suggested organization of a new section on social problems; 4. An exchange service for the distribution of unpublished research monographs; 5. An invitation from the American Association for the Advancement of Science to participate in its summer meetings to be held in Seattle, June 17-22, 1940.

**Membership Statement.** At the end of the current year, the total membership of the Society was 999. This figure represents a loss of 26 members from the total of 1938, which was 1025. As indicated in the tabular summary and in the treasurer's report, subscriptions to life memberships were made by George A. Lundberg and Harold A. Phelps at the current rate of \$100.

COMPARISON OF MEMBERSHIP, 1938 AND 1939

1938		1939					
Classes	Number	New	Transfers	Resigned	Deceased	Dropped	Number
Single	850	77	-4	16	6	67	834
Student	106	28	0	1	0	38	95
Joint	18	0	0	0	0	2	16
Subscribing	5	0	+2	0	0	0	7
Life	28	0	+2	0	1	0	29
Honorary	7	1	0	0	1	0	7
Exchange	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Chapters	8	0	0	0	0	0	8
Totals	1025	106	0	17	8	107	999

MEMBERSHIP SUMMARY

Year	Total Membership	Number Resigned	Number Unpaid at End of Year
1938	1025	13	127
1939	999	17	115

(See *Review*, 1938, 3:79-80 for previous years.)

<sup>1</sup> The full discussion of these topics is presented in the *Proceedings Number*, American Council of Learned Societies, Bulletin 29, July 1939, 93-104.

In addition to the membership committee, the Society is indebted to the following members who recommended candidates for membership: Theodore Abel, Herbert Blumer, R. V. Bowers, Hugh Carter, C. M. Case, V. E. Daniel, Maurice Davie, Wilson Gee, Samuel Jameson, Collerheo Krassovsky, F. E. Lumley, W. A. Lunden, R. M. MacIver, E. W. Montgomery, William Metzler, S. C. Ratcliffe, Ruby Jo Reeves, Lemo D. Rockwood, Dwight Sanderson, Thorsten Sellin, T. Lynn Smith, Florence Stewart, E. V. Stonequist, E. H. Sutherland, B. F. Timmons, Arthur J. Todd, Donald Young, Kimball Young, C. C. Zimmerman.

**Necrology.** The following deaths were reported for the year: Gilbert W. Campbell, Walter J. Campbell, Francis W. Kennedy, Clayton C. Kohl, Porter R. Lee, Frederic Siedenburg (Life Member), Edwin R. A. Seligman, Eugene T. Stromberg, Edward A. Westermarck (Honorary Member).

A membership list for the current year, including new members who join during the early weeks of 1940, will appear in the February 1940 *Review*.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Executive Committee, a second complete collection of the Society's *Proceedings* has been assembled with the exception of Volumes II and III.

**Invitations for Future Meetings.** For the 1940 meetings, invitations have been received from Chicago, Columbus, Hollywood, Long Beach (Calif.), Memphis, New York, St. Louis, Tampa, Toronto, Tulsa, Washington, and Havana; and for the 1941 meetings, from Atlantic City, Pittsburgh, and Washington.

Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Secretary*

#### ANNUAL REPORT, MANAGING EDITOR, *American Sociological Review*

FOR THE FISCAL YEAR, DECEMBER 15, 1938 TO DECEMBER 15, 1939

On December 15, the volumes of *Papers and Proceedings* on hand were:

Volume	Copies	Volume	Copies
I	13	XXI	219
VIII	10	XXII	81
X	34	XXIII	79
XII	11	XXIV	292
XV	115	XXV	317
XVI	1	XXVI	69
XVII	20	XXVII	284
XIX	186	XXVIII	105
XX	39	XXIX	99
		Total	1974

The total number of volumes, 1974, is 54 less than the number reported last year. During the year, 21 copies were added to this inventory, 18 were deducted and are being held as a second set of *Proceedings* for the Society's records, and 57 were sold, adding \$92.70 to income.

Upon the vote of the Executive Committee recommending that the Secretary should collect and eventually bind a second set of *Proceedings*, eighteen copies were deducted from the Society's stock as indicated above; Volumes 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, and 24, 1, were purchased; and Volumes 7 and 18 were donated by the Secretary to this collection. To date, it has been impossible to obtain copies of Volume 2 and 3 at a price within a reasonable allowance for such purchase, and the second set is complete with the exception of these two volumes.

On December 15, the number of copies of the *American Sociological Review* on hand were as follows:

Volume I (1936)	1652	Volume III (1938)	798
Volume II (1937)	1250	Volume IV (1939) <sup>1</sup>	1121
Total			4921

Of the total *Reviews* (4921), the number in stock at the Banta Press is 3834, the remainder (1087) is held in the office of the Managing Editor. The total (4921) is 757 more than the total reported for last year. In this total, the chief significant change is the addition to Vol. I, No. 1, by purchase. The number of copies available for sale of Vol. I, No. 1, is five. This inventory does not include a complete bound set of each volume and five copies of each number held as permanent stock.

Eighteen hundred copies of each number of Volume IV were printed. The average distribution of *The Review* does not differ markedly from that reported in the last report.

Receipts accruing to *The Review* from general Society operations are listed separately in the appended report of finances.

Respectfully submitted,  
HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Managing Editor*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TREASURER FOR THE FISCAL YEAR  
DECEMBER 15, 1938 TO DECEMBER 15, 1939

As indicated in the schedules of the Balance Sheet and the Profit and Loss Statement which are appended to this report, the total income of the Society for the year was \$8,657.96. Total expenses were \$7,893.29. The net profit was \$764.67; the net change in surplus: \$1,269.62, and the current net worth, \$3,524.26.

Changes in the Society's operations which will explain the above figures are the following: upon the recommendation of the auditor and the approval of the Finance Committee, all life memberships have been segregated in a Life Membership account; the total amount represented by the payments of living life members to this account is \$1,875.00 (which consists of \$1,205.10, the amount paid in earlier years, and \$469.90 and \$200, which amounts were added to a separate Life Membership account in recent years); the total amount invested is \$2,113.59, and the income from this source is \$138.50. Thus, to this year's surplus, \$1,205.10 was charged.

Similarly, upon the recommendation of the auditor, the December 1938 *Review* was charged to surplus, and the current 1939 *Review* was charged to the expenses of this year. Heretofore, the practice of charging for the six issues of *The Review* in the order of December of the previous year through October of the current year was introduced and followed during the last three years in order to meet one portion of the Society's indebtedness.

Thus, in summary,

Life memberships charged to surplus.....	\$1,205.10
December (1938) <i>Review</i> charged to surplus.....	829.19
Total Charge.....	\$2,034.29
Less profit for the year.....	764.67
Net change in surplus.....	\$1,269.62

<sup>1</sup> A total of 180 surplus copies is credit to Volume IV for the uninventoried December 1939 *Review*.

Because of these two changes in the Society's audit, the summary figures as given in the opening paragraph of this report are not comparable with previous annual summaries in the two items, *Net Change in Surplus* and *Net Worth*.

During the current year, the Society purchased two shares of U. S. Steel preferred, at a cost of \$226.76, making a total of \$532.41 invested in this stock. This investment represents the \$200 paid by the two new Life members and the additional sum was taken from general Society funds.

A total of 70 Certificates of Indebtedness were refunded. With this payment all of the original 136 Certificates have been repaid. The numbers of the Certificates which were repaid this year are 63 to 74 inclusive, 76 to 100 inclusive, and 103 to 136 inclusive. The Society has in its records the cancelled checks for all these 136 certificates, except four which were repaid in other ways than by check. Adequate records for these four exceptional cases are maintained. The Society has the cancelled Certificate or a letter acknowledging the receipt of the refund in all but 27 cases.

With the repayment of these Certificates and the payment of the December 1939 *Review* from current funds (the December 1938 *Review* being deducted from surplus), the entire original debt of the Society amounting to \$2,121.73 has been repaid.

The Society's investment of \$500 in Northwestern Electric 6's has been called for payment, and accordingly the new Committee on Investments will be obliged to reinvest this amount prior to May 1, 1940.

Respectfully submitted  
HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Treasurer*

# REPORT OF THE AUDITOR, 1939

## BALANCE SHEET—DECEMBER 14, 1939

### Assets

Cash		
On Deposit.....	3,680.30	
Petty Cash Fund.....	25.00	3,705.30
Accounts Receivable.....		49.92
Inventory, at Values Estimated by Treasurer		
1975 Copies of <i>Proceedings</i> at 50 cents.....	987.50	
4921 Copies of <i>Review</i> at 25 Cents.....	1,230.25	2,217.75
Investments, at Cost		
\$600.00 Hyde Park Baptist Church of Chicago 6/46....	600.00	
\$500.00 Northwestern Electric Company 6/45.....	500.00	
3 Shares American Telephone and Telegraph Company Common.....	296.00	
5 Shares U. S. Steel Corporation 7% Preferred.....	532.41	
2 Shares West Penn Electric Company 7% Preferred..	185.18	2,113.59
Office Furniture and Fixtures.....	227.49	
Less: Reserve for Depreciation.....	174.24	53.25

## OFFICIAL REPORTS AND PROCEEDINGS

97

Prepaid Expense	
Advances to University Post Office.....	4.03

Total Assets.....	8,143.84
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*Liabilities and Surplus*

Accounts Payable	
Printing December, 1939 <i>Review</i> .....	804.99

## Deferred Income

Dues.....	1,275.50	
Subscriptions.....	659.34	
Postage.....	4.75	1,939.59

Life Memberships.....	1,875.00
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Surplus.....	3,524.26
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Total Liabilities and Surplus.....	8,143.84
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STATEMENTS OF INCOME, EXPENSE, AND SURPLUS  
FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 14, 1939*Income*

	Total	Allocation	
		Society	Review
Dues			
Single.....	4,990.00	1,678.00	3,312.00
Student.....	384.00	146.50	237.50
Joint.....	112.00	84.00	28.00
Subscribing.....	70.00	42.00	28.00
Chapter.....	10.00	10.00	
Subscriptions to <i>Review</i>			
Library.....	1,046.85		1,046.85
Student.....	132.84		132.84
General.....	164.42		164.42
Sale of Publications			
October, 1937 <i>Review</i> .....	185.70		185.70
Other Issues of <i>Review</i> .....	263.50		263.50
<i>Proceedings</i> .....	92.70	92.70	
Advertising in <i>Review</i> .....	850.25		850.25
Income from Investments.....	138.50	18.50	120.00
Royalties.....	44.45	44.45	
Contributions to Budget.....	10.00	10.00	
Net Increase in Inventory of Publications..	162.75		162.75
Total Income.....	8,657.96	2,126.15	6,531.81

*Expense*

Honoraria			
President.....	25.00	25.00	
Secretary.....	300.00	300.00	
Assistant to Managing Editor.....	100.00		100.00

## AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

*Expense (Cont'd.)*

Clerical Aid to Secretary and Managing Editor.....	743.60	371.80	371.80
Cost of Printing <i>Review</i> , Volume 4.....	4,665.70		4,665.70
<i>Proceedings</i> Purchased.....	12.61	12.61	
Discounts Allowed on Publications.....	128.79		128.79
Printing and Stationery.....	395.01	197.51	197.50
Postage, Telegraph, Telephone, Express....	297.29	148.64	148.65
Depreciation, Office Furnishings.....	22.75	11.38	11.37

	Total	Allocation	
		Society	<i>Review</i>
Other Office Expense.....	38.32	19.16	19.16
Editor's Office Expense.....	225.55		225.55
Book Review Editor's Office Expense.....	306.81		306.81
Traveling Expense.....	171.80	171.80	
Annual Meeting Expense.....	62.83	62.83	
Public Relations Committee Expense.....	50.00	50.00	
Organization Committee Expense.....	166.92	166.92	
Dues to American Council of Learned Societies.....	35.00	35.00	
International Index to Periodical Literature.....	60.00		60.00
Auditing.....	25.00	12.50	12.50
Miscellaneous Expense.....	60.31	30.16	30.15
Total Expense.....	7,893.29	1,615.31	6,277.98
Net Income.....	764.67	510.84	253.83

*Surplus*

Balance, December 15, 1938.....		4,793.88
Addition: Net Income for Fiscal Year.....		764.67
		5,558.55
Deductions		
Transfer to Life Memberships account of Payments Made by Present Life Members, in Prior Years, for Said Memberships.....	1,205.10	
Cost of Printing December 1938 <i>Review</i> .....	829.19	2,034.29
Balance, December 14, 1939.....		3,524.26

## MAIN AND COMPANY

Accountants and Auditors  
Pittsburgh, Pa.

December 15, 1939

To the Executive Committee of the  
American Sociological Society:

We have examined the balance sheet of the American Sociological Society as of December 14, 1939, and the statements of income and surplus for the fiscal year then ended, have re-

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viewed the accounting procedures of the society and, without making a detailed audit of the transactions, have examined or tested its accounting records and other supporting evidence by methods and to the extent we deemed appropriate.

In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and related statements of income and surplus present fairly the position of the American Sociological Society at December 14, 1939, and the results of its financial operations for the fiscal year, in conformity with generally accepted Accounting principles.

Main and Company  
ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS

#### REPORT OF THE BUDGET AND INVESTMENT COMMITTEE

To the Executive Committee and Members of the American Sociological Society:

As indicated by the report of the Treasurer, the financial condition of the Society is the best in many years. All debts are paid. The cost of the December, 1939, *Review* has been included in this year's statement, and our surplus has been increased without drawing upon it as the budget anticipated. This has been due to the economical management and sacrifice of personal time of our treasurer and the editors of the *Review*.

During the year, all Certificates of Indebtedness were repaid, involving \$700 instead of \$350 as budgeted.

Against the Cash on Hand, Dec. 14, 1939, of \$3,705.30 there is chargeable \$2,744.58 of Deferred Income and Accounts Payable, leaving Net Cash of \$1,006.54. This is a decrease of \$45.82 from the same item for a year ago, but it should be remembered that \$350 more than budgeted was paid on Certificates of Indebtedness and the account includes payment of \$804.99 for the Dec. 1939 *Review*, so the cash on hand really represents a very much better situation than last year.

The budget provided for expenses of \$7,800. The actual expenditures were \$7,893.29, plus repayment of \$700 for Certificates of Indebtedness, or \$8,593.29, against cash receipts of \$8,495.21. The net income, or profit, for the year was \$764.67, which with \$829.19 paid for the December 1938 *Review*, gives \$1,793.86 as the Net Change in Surplus, comparable with \$1,605.14 for 1938.\*

Your Committee is not versed in accounting statements, but it feels that the annual auditor's report should show the cash receipts and cash expenditures in such a manner that the layman may be able to ascertain what they are without having to compare the Balance Sheet of two years to discover them. Thus, the Auditor's Statement of Expenses for the current year does not include \$700 paid out for retiring Certificates of Indebtedness. This expenditure is revealed only by comparing the Balance Sheets for 1938 and 1939, the latter revealing that the Liabilities have been decreased by the amount of this item. This may be a correct accountant's statement, but it is not enlightening to the layman. We recommend that the Secretary take this matter up with the accountants and endeavor to devise a statement which will clearly reveal the expenditures from cash received.

As reported by the Treasurer, upon advice of the Committee, he purchased two shares of U. S. Steel 7% preferred stock at a cost of \$226.76, with \$200 paid for two new life memberships and the balance from the treasury.

Your Committee feels that if the present financial condition of the Society is maintained for the first six months of 1940, an additional amount of \$150 should be added to the budget submitted for clerical help for the secretary-treasurer, and an additional \$100 be paid on his honorarium. At present, the secretary-treasurer is re-

\* See *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Feb. 1939, p. 106.

quired to spend too much of his personal time on clerical work which should be paid for by the Society.

Your Committee presents the following budget for 1940 and recommends its approval. This provides for increased expenditures of \$800 over the 1939 budget, but is the actual expenditures for 1939, and practically equals the cash receipts for the past year.

Your Committee has examined the Auditor's Report, has seen the certificate of approval of Main and Co., accountants and auditors, and finds them correct.

Respectfully submitted,

DWIGHT SANDERSON, *Chairman*

BUDGET AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR 1939 AND  
PROPOSED BUDGET FOR 1940

	1939 Budget	1939 Account	1940 Budget
<i>Income:</i>			
Treasurer's Account:			
Dues.....	\$5,700.00	\$5,566.00	\$5,775.00
Proceedings Sold.....	50.00	92.70	50.00
Interest on Investments.....	128.00	138.50	135.00
Royalties.....	22.00	44.45	40.00
Contribution to budget.....	—	10.00	—
	\$5,900.00	\$5,851.65	\$6,000.00
Review Account:			
Subscriptions.....	\$ 900.00	\$1,344.11	\$1,350.00
Sale of <i>Review</i> .....	300.00	449.20	400.00
Advertising.....	700.00	850.25	850.00
	\$1,900.00	\$2,643.56	\$2,600.00
Total Income.....	\$7,800.00	\$8,495.21	\$8,600.00
<i>Expenditures:</i>			
Treasurer's Account			
Clerical Aid.....	\$ 450.00	\$ 371.80	\$ 450.00
Secretary, honorarium.....	300.00	300.00	300.00
Postage, telegraph & express.....	150.00	148.64	210.00
Printing & stationery, total.....	150.00	192.51	210.00
Program.....			{ 115.00 }
Membership List.....			{ 25.00 }
Miscellaneous.....			{ 70.00 }
Office expense.....	25.00	19.16	25.00
Multigraphing.....	125.00		
Travel, Secretary.....	90.00	171.80	150.00
Convention expense.....	10.00	62.83	75.00
President, honorarium.....	25.00	25.00	25.00
Dues and subscription.....	55.00	35.00	40.00
Bank charges.....	25.00	—	5.00
Auditor.....	25.00	12.50	125.00
Bad debts.....	—	—	25.00

# OFFICIAL REPORTS AND PROCEEDINGS

101

Depreciation of Furn. & Fix.....	—	11.38	25.00
Public Relations Committee.....	—	50.00	50.00
Committee on Organization.....	—	166.92	200.00
Census of Research.....	(included in printing)		80.00
Miscellaneous.....	30.00	30.16	30.00
Certificates of Indebtedness.....	350.00	[700.00]*	—
Purchase of Proceedings.....	—	12.61	15.00
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$1,910.00	\$1,615.31	\$2,140.00
		(plus \$700	
		certificates)	

## Review Account

Editor: Total.....	\$ 425.00*	\$ 225.55	\$ 350.00
Clerical help.....	{ 300.00 }*		{ 250.00 }
Postage & incidentals.....	{ 70.00 }*		{ 50.00 }
Travel.....	{ 50.00 }		{ 50.00 }
Book-review Editors: Total.....	375.00*	306.81	350.00
Clerical aid.....	{ 300.00 }*		{ 300.00 }
Postage & incidentals.....	{ 75.00 }*		{ 50.00 }
Managing Editor			
Clerical aid.....	450.00	371.80	450.00
Postage, tel., & express		{ 148.65	150.00
Printing & Stationery	300.00	{ 197.50	200.00
Miscellaneous		{ 120.15	50.00
		{ 19.16	
Geo. Banta Publishing Co.....	4,600.00	4,665.70	4,700.00
Discounts allowed.....	40.00	125.79	150.00
International Index.....	60.00	60.00	—
Assistant honorarium.....	100.00**	100.00	50.00
Depreciation in office furn.....	—	11.37	(see Treasur-
Auditing.....	—	12.50	er's account)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total.....	\$6,250.00	\$6,277.98	\$6,450.00
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total Expenses.....	\$8,160.00	\$7,893.29	\$8,590.00
		(plus \$700	
		Certificates of	
		Indebtedness)	

\* This item does not appear in the Auditor's Report of Expenses, but is covered by its omission from Liabilities in the Balance Sheet.

\*\* See Treasurer's Account in 1939 Budget.

Note: The total of the above 1939 budget does not agree with that published in the April 1939 *Review* which was an error.

## REPORT OF THE MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE

At the beginning of the current year, a new Membership Committee of 24 persons was appointed to carry on this function of the Society.

In harmony with the policy of the Society, the Committee limited its contacts to persons directly concerned with teaching or research in sociology and its allied fields.

This report is based upon the returns of 23 members, one being obliged to discontinue because of illness.

In summary, the Committee has a record of 686 personal contacts with prospective members, in addition to 23 nonmembers who were registered at the Detroit meetings.

Of the 105 new members added to the Society's list this year, about one third may be traced to the communications of last year's committee, a third to the present committee, and a third to recommendations of our general membership. There are 36 new members for the year 1940 (not included in the 105 stated above) which are largely traceable to the work of the present Committee.

It is highly desirable that the personnel of the Committee should be continuous over a period of years, and it is likely, too, that this personnel should be increased to cover territories, as well as special fields of interest, not now adequately represented.

Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Chairman*

#### REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SECRETARIES OF REGIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETIES

In accordance with the 1938 report of this Committee, the annual dues of Regional Societies that are affiliated with the American Sociological Societies have been abolished.

Other recommendations of this report and all questions relative to regionalism have been referred to the Committee on Organization.

Officers of regional societies were consulted during the formation of the Committee on Organization with respect to their representation on this Committee, and all matters of mutual interest to regional societies and the national society will be incorporated in the minutes of the Committee on Organization.

For more than a decade, regional and specialized societies have been organizing in every section of the country and in all the large learned societies. There are two primary factors in this movement. One is geographical separation and the second is the impossibility of arranging annual meetings of large societies in other than the major metropolitan communities which have adequate hotel facilities. A third but apparently minor factor is specialized professional interests.

The subject of regional societies was reviewed at the last meeting of the Secretaries of the American Council of Learned Societies, of which this Society is a constituent member. Since the problems involved in this development are shared in common by most of the societies affiliated with the Council, it is probable that an articulate policy will shortly be formulated for the guidance of all affiliated groups.

Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Chairman*

#### REPORT OF THE RESEARCH PLANNING COMMITTEE

This Committee is a continuing organization of the Society. It was established originally to assume responsibility for, and to aid in the direction of, the research interests and activities of the Society. Another objective is to solicit financial support for these researches or to endorse them for such support when they are brought to the attention of Foundations. In the past, such problems of general interest to the Society as Regional Societies and Opportunities for Trained Sociologists have been brought to the attention of this Committee.

No general problem has been referred to this Committee during the past year.

There are, however, several questions of importance to the Society, as indicated in the report of the Committee on Organization, which may eventually become problems of the Research Planning Committee.

One specific research project was submitted to the Society, and was referred by the Executive Committee to the Research Planning Committee for its consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD A. PHELPS, *Secretary*

#### REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL RESEARCH

The major work of the Committee on Social Research during 1939 was the preparation of the Annual Census of Current Research Projects. The schedules were mailed to all the members of the Society on March 20 and the final report was completed on May 10. In order that the census material would be of immediate use in the preparation of the Christmas program, the complete report was mimeographed and sent out on May 20 to the President and Secretary as well as to the chairmen of the various divisions and sections of the Society. The final report of the Census was published in the August issue of *The American Sociological Review*. The 1939 Census listed 416 projects—the largest number reported since the practice of conducting a Census of Research was begun.

The Committee on Social Research also prepared the program of the Division of Social Research for the annual meeting.

Respectfully submitted,

CALVIN F. SCHMID, *Chairman*

#### REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

The Council prosecuted during 1938-39 a program of research with the twofold purpose of improving the capacity for achievement of the social sciences and of applying existing capacity in the service of society.

The first of these objectives involved undertakings with respect to research personnel, research organization, research materials, research methods, and the advancement of scientific knowledge.

**In Relation to Research Personnel**, the Council maintained five predoctoral fellows in the second year of graduate study, all of whom had held Council fellowships during their first graduate year, in the amount of \$7,230; maintained sixteen fellows for predoctoral field training in the amount of \$32,826, made nineteen appointments for 1939-40, and assured awards for 1940-41; maintained four postdoctoral research training fellows, in the amount of \$9,846, made ten appointments for 1939-40 (one jointly of man and wife), and assured awards for 1940-41; issued a directory of all fellows, postdoctoral, predoctoral, agricultural, and Southern, who have been appointed by the Council; established a committee to examine problems of research training; provided forty-one Council grants-in-aid to assist in the completion of research by mature scholars, in the amount of \$21,640, made three supplementary and thirty-eight new awards for 1939-40, and assured awards for 1940-41; provided eight grants-in-aid under geographical limitations to the South, in the amount of \$2,700, made ten awards for 1939-40, and assured awards for 1940-41.

**In Relation to Research Organization**, the Council began an examination of organization for research in the United States.

**In Relation to Research Materials**, the Council stimulated development and use of methods of reproduction other than print, and study of copyright law in relation

to reproduction of materials; completed a demonstration of the possibilities of publication on a sliding scale of prices according to number of advance subscriptions and costs under various types of print or offset; developed plans and advised on use of WPA labor in the improvement of materials for research; made studies in areal problems of union cataloging.

**In Relation to Research Methods**, the Council secured a number of critical analyses of outstanding American studies of recent years; held conferences in relation to three of the studies and analyses; and published materials on Thomas' and Znaniecki's *Polish Peasant*.

In endeavoring to apply the social sciences to immediate service to society, the Council engaged in the following activities.

**In the Field of Social Security**, the Council prosecuted numerous studies and communicated results promptly to administrative officials, national, state and local; published studies on the coordination of the various social insurances in Great Britain and Germany, on problems and procedures of unemployment compensation, on trends, causes, and effects of labor turnover, and on seasonal variations in employment; completed for publication a study of old age security abroad; issued mimeographed suggestions for research on relief, and an outline of policy questions in relief.

**In Relation to Public Administration**, the Council published reports on administration of old age assistance and on public employment services; completed studies of the manager government in various cities, and published as separates a number of them in advance of comprehensive publications; completed a survey of bureaus of governmental research; continued a study of the administration of the Department of Agriculture, and a survey of training for public administration; continued planning of research in specific areas and stimulation of its execution by individual scientists.

**In Relation to Economic Stability**, the Council continued support of a series of studies on credit and banking in relation to stability; under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research, work was completed on a handbook of statistical data on urban residential real estate, and two pamphlets on special phases of real estate financing were published by the Bureau; initiated an analysis of factors in employment, involving the general economic system of the country.

Conferences were held during the year on fiscal aspects of the business cycle; on industrial relations; on cultural islands; on urbanism; in the South, on population problems; and on the Pacific Coast, on research related to war.

Work of the Council during the year was generously supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the General Education Board, the Julius Rosenwald Fund, and the Russell Sage Foundation. New grants to the Council totaled \$60,000; \$5,000 for general administration; \$20,000 for research in social security; \$20,000 for research in public administration; \$15,000 for Southern grants-in-aid.

Prepared in the office of the

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

#### REPORT OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE

The Public Relations Committee came into being in 1938 as a service agency of the Society. It was organized to interpret to the press the papers read before the thirty-third annual convention. The Committee was expanded by President E. H. Sutherland and given a similar assignment this year.

While much of the work of the Committee has already been done, most of the results of that work will not be apparent until the newspapers for the next few days are published. Thirty-nine papers were received in advance, carefully read and ana-

lyzed from a press viewpoint as well as from the standpoint of the Society's public relations problems, and converted into a form that would be readily assimilable by the press.

Since only *nine* of these thirty-nine papers had been received by the Chairman from their authors (via the Secretary) by December 18, you can appreciate the amount of work that had to be done within a very brief period. This burden of work could have been greatly lightened had papers been forwarded *more immediately after preparation* to the Secretary and this Committee's Chairman.

The Committee's activities have also embraced widespread advance publicity for the convention, including notes in the local newspapers of participants in the convention telling of their role, and above all the making of special arrangements with science editors for newspapers and newsgathering agencies through correspondence and personal contacts.

The following paragraph from the Committee's 1938 report indicates the general policies that have guided its efforts:

In all our activities, we have scrupulously avoided any effort to sensationalize the materials we have had at hand. "Publicity"—as measured in yards of newspaper clippings—has not been our object, even though the press has been quite receptive to our offerings. Such an object would not have been helpful and would necessarily have involved some distortion of the papers entrusted to us.

Not all of the papers read before the Society are adaptable for popular interpretation. The Committee has exercised great care on this point. Whether a paper is adaptable for press interpretation or not, however, the Committee was anxious to obtain a copy of it because it wished to be in a position to do one of three things for every participant. The Committee wished to be able (1) to advise reporters that a given paper is too technical for popularization, or (2) to furnish reporters with several suitable paragraphs from the paper, or (3) to supply reporters with an adequate press review of the author's paper.

As a result of its efforts, the Committee believes that useful strides have been made towards establishing the Society's annual convention as a source for scientific news. The volume of editorials, feature stories, news articles, and radio comments a year ago and the interest exhibited this year by newspaper people suggests that constructive interpretation can be done through the press in this highly controversial professional field.

A supplemental report will be submitted after the convention to indicate the quality and volume of cooperation obtained from the press this year.

In closing, the Committee wishes to make these specific points:

1. The \$50.00 expense allotment for its work has been helpful but quite inadequate. The Committee's expenses for mimeographing, addressing, mailing, general typing, and messenger service have been well over \$150.00. This naturally does not include the services of volunteer workers.
2. In the event that a similar committee is appointed for another year, it is urged that a minimum of \$150.00 be set aside for its mimeographing, addressing, mailing, general typing, and messenger service expenses. Any smaller allotment will mean a curtailment of activities.
3. The techniques utilized to interpret convention papers to the press could also be of service to *The American Sociological Review*.

Respectfully submitted,

ALFRED McC. LEE, *Chairman*

READ BAIN

C. C. BOWMAN

W. W. EHRLMANN

ELIZABETH B. LEE

ROBERT E. PARK

HAROLD A. PHELPS

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

C. C. VAN VECHTEN

M. M. WILLEY

JAMES WOODARD

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARIES

## REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION

The Sixty-first Annual Conference of the American Library Association proved no exception to the trend of American professional and learned societies toward greater and greater specialization within the limits of a particular field. In this respect, the Library Association runs parallel to the American Sociological Society. It is regrettable that continual increase in efficiency in achieving the immediate objectives within such fields cannot be better adjusted to broader, interrelated aspects of society as a whole. The outside specialist is beginning to find himself as much a stranger at the Library Conference as he does at a meeting of the National Conference of Social Work, the N.E.A. or the American Bar Association. It is well for us to keep in mind that this is as much our fault as it is the fault of the other organizations. The way out cannot be found merely by sending a representative to a conference with no specific commission.

The Library Conference included many section meetings dealing with problems of vital interest to sociologists, especially in the fields of so-called applied sociology. Other sections could well have considered the changing needs of sociologists for research and teaching material supplied by libraries. For example, there was a "College Libraries Subsection" with papers on "Two Thousand Freshmen and the Library," and "The Function of Rare Books." There were sections on "University Library Extension Service," and on "Adult Education."

The brightest spot from the point of view of the foregoing criticism was a joint program with Pacific Coast members of the "Society of American Archivists and the Historical Records Survey." Here the program brought together, in a planned way, historians and others along with specialists within the libraries to the great advantage of all concerned.

Your representative recommends the consideration of ways and means through which the needs of sociologists and the services of libraries may be brought into closer harmony.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES N. REYNOLDS, *Representative*

## REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

The Advisory Council on Human Relations was provided for by the American Association for the Advancement of Science at the Richmond, Virginia meeting in 1938. The Council, as established by the Organizing Committee of the A.A.A.S. and the cooperating Societies, consists of not more than ten members and is authorized for a period of not longer than five years.

The function of the Council is "in general to act as a central advisory and coordinating body for research into the human-relations problems of reforestation and soil conservation and such other problems as may arise." The Council is basically autonomous, though responsible to the Executive Committee of the A.A.A.S. It recognizes a moral obligation to the United States Forest Service because of the activity of that agency in effecting its establishment.

The present membership of the Council is as follows: Douglas Fryer, New York University, University Heights, New York City, for the American Association for Applied Psychology; F. C. Pederson, Box 1368, University Station, Charlottesville, Va., for the Society of American Foresters; Horace B. English, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, for the American Psychological Association; Charles E. Lively, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, for the Rural Sociological Society; W. M. Krogman, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Chi-

cago, Illinois, for the American Anthropological Association; Carle C. Zimmerman, 200 Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, for the A.A.A.S., Section K; R. E. Coker, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for the National Research Council; J. L. Hypes, Connecticut Agricultural College, Storrs, Conn., for the American Sociological Society.

The first meeting of the Council was held in Washington, D. C., on July 13, 1939. At this meeting organization was effected, Horace B. English of Ohio State University, being elected Chairman and C. E. Lively of the University of Missouri, Secretary. Each was elected for one year. After a consideration of the general orientation of the Council, the Chiefs of several Sections of the U. S. Forest Service presented their problems and a discussion of the human aspects of these problems occupied the time for the remainder of the meeting. Maximum attention was given to the problems of fire control in the forests of the United States.

The Council recognizes definite opportunities for the service of social science in solving the problem of fire prevention in the forest areas. The fires are largely man-made and the roles of ignorance, illiteracy, thoughtlessness, and peculiar folkways, are easily discernible as troublesome factors. The Council has under consideration a number of problems for field studies of this problem—studies which will utilize some of the techniques of the anthropologists, the sociologists, and the clinical psychologists. One such study was made during the past summer by John P. Shea, Psychologist of the U. S. Forest Service in the Talladega National Forest. It should be borne in mind that the Council does not conduct, or even supervise, research projects; rather, its function is advisory and the success of its activities is dependent to a large degree upon the extent to which such agencies as the U. S. Forest Service adopt and carry out its recommendations.

Although the Council is at present concerned primarily with the problems of the U. S. Forest Service, which requested its appointment, the authorization of the Council by the A.A.A.S. implies that it may be consulted by any public agency. The extent to which that may be done is yet to be determined.

Because of lack of financial backing, the Council has held no meetings since July.

Respectfully submitted,

C. E. LIVELY, *Secretary*

#### REPORT OF THE DELEGATE TO THE AMERICAN DOCUMENTATION INSTITUTE

Delegates from more than fifty national learned societies and government agencies attended the annual meeting of the American Documentation Institute in January 1939. This organization was established in 1937 for the promotion of documentation in all scholarly and scientific fields. The Director reported on the three main activities of the Institute, namely: The study and fixing of copyright policies; operation of the nonprofit Biblofilm Service, largely for copying research extracts; and operation of the service of Auxiliary Publication of unpublished materials. This last mentioned activity makes it possible for scientists to secure the publication of manuscripts, theses, and other reports which cannot be handled through the regular periodicals because of length or costliness of publication.

Sociologists should be particularly interested in the Biblofilm Service which was set up for the purpose of copying research materials for scientists and scholars. Books, sets of scientific journals, short extracts from manuscripts, theses, newspapers, tabulations of statistical data, and other material in institutions here and abroad can be made available to the scientist at relatively low cost. The desired material is reproduced on microfilm about one inch high and can be read with the aid

of a "hand viewer" or a "reading machine" which is available in most libraries. Or, if desired, photoprints legible without optical aid may be secured. Stationary microphotographic copying machines are operated in four large libraries in the United States and orders for copying material in this country as well as from foreign countries are received and executed here.

Recent activities of the American Documentation Institute include the development of a method for producing microfilm in color and the appointment of a Committee on Cultural Relations to acquaint scholars in foreign countries with the services available to them and to bring about the establishment in foreign countries of means by which American scholars may obtain foreign material.

Through a special grant, Biblionfilm Service is now copying sets of noncurrent scientific journals consisting of 10 or more volumes at the rate of  $\frac{1}{4}$ -cent per page. Members of this Society who wish to take advantage of this service are advised to place their orders as soon as possible. The Institute welcomes suggestions as to material which should be placed on microfilm either for purposes of preservation or to make it available to social scientists. Order blanks and rates for copying work may be obtained from Biblionfilm Service, care of U. S. Department of Agriculture Library, Washington, D. C.

Respectfully submitted,

MILDRED PARTEN, *Delegate*

#### REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE

Your representative attended the meetings of the A.A.A.S. in Milwaukee in June, 1939. Sociology was represented on the program by several sessions devoted principally to population problems, migration, and rural relief.

The Council considered whether the summer meetings of the Association should be abandoned at least as regards certain sections, on account of the difficulty of getting desirable contributions to the program. A committee was appointed to consider the matter further.

Respectfully submitted,

GEO. A. LUNDBERG, *Representative*

#### REPORT OF ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE, 1939

**I. Membership.** The American Sociological Society shall consist of two main classes of persons: Fellows and Members.

Fellows of the Society shall be persons who are engaged primarily in the advancement of Sociology as a science.

Members shall be persons who are interested in the advancement of Sociology through research, teaching or practical programs.

The general class of Members shall include Honorary, Life, Emeritus, Joint, Sustaining and Subscribing Fellows and Members as at present constituted. These groups shall be designated as such among the Fellows and Members.

The original division of the present membership of the American Sociological Society between Fellows and Members shall be made by a Classification Committee.

The Classification Committee shall consist of the President of the Society at the time of the submission of this amendment, his predecessor, his successor, the Secretary, Treasurer, and one member to be elected by the Society.

The duties of the Classification Committee shall be to prepare a list of Fellows

and Members and submit it to the Society for acceptance at the next annual meeting following its organization.

In the division of the present membership into Fellows and Members, the Classification Committee shall not consider the conditions for Fellowship fulfilled in the absence of:

- a. Possession of a Ph.D. degree in Sociology, granted by an accredited institution of higher learning, or what, in the judgment of the Classification Committee, shall be considered equivalent academic qualifications.
- b. A publication qualification, such as a meritorious research monograph or report (other than thesis) or volume in Sociology.
- c. Position as Instructor in Sociology of five years or more tenure, or of higher rank, in an accredited institution of higher learning: or its equivalent in governmental or private affairs.

The term accredited institution shall be interpreted to mean institutions which are members of the Association of American Universities and those other approved institutions whose qualified graduates are admitted to graduate schools of the Association of American Universities. (Cf. "Accredited Higher Institutions, 1938," U. S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Education, *Bulletin 1938*, No. 16, pp. 14-17.)

For the guidance of the Classification Committee, it shall be understood: (1) That qualifications a, b, and c, as above stated, are minimum and not automatic qualifications; (2) the burden of proof of the above qualifications shall rest upon the candidate.

After the division between Fellows and Members shall have been made by the Classification Committee, and shall have been accepted by vote of the Society, this Committee shall cease to exist.

Future additions to or changes in fellowship or fellowship status shall be made on the basis of the above minimum qualifications.

Such additions or changes shall be made, after the Classification Committee has ceased to exist, by a Fellowship Committee of five members.

This Fellowship Committee shall be established originally by the Executive Committee. In selecting these five members, the Executive Committee shall select one member to serve for one year, one for two years, one for three years, one for four years, and one for five years.

Each year subsequently, the Fellows of the Society shall elect, in the same way in which other officers of the Society are elected, one member to serve for five years on the Fellowship Committee.

The Fellowship Committee shall consider all applications for fellowship, and shall make all nominations for fellowship in the Society.

Applications for fellowship in the Society must be endorsed by at least two Fellows of the Society, and must be submitted to the Secretary, for the Fellowship Committee, not later than October 1 of the year in which it is to be acted upon. Such applications shall contain complete information concerning the applicant's academic and professional history, together with references to the applicant's published research.

All names nominated by the Fellowship Committee shall be presented to the Society in written form at its annual business session; and action upon such nominations shall be taken at its annual business session. Election to Fellowship shall be by majority vote of a mail ballot of the Fellows of the Society.

The Fellowship Committee shall have the privilege of originating nominations for Fellowship.

Members shall be elected by the Fellowship Committee after application to the

Secretary of the Society. Election as Members shall be by majority vote of the Fellowship Committee.

A Fellow may transfer to the Status of a Member upon application to, and approval by, the Fellowship Committee.

The dues of Fellows shall be \$10 per year; and those of Members shall be \$5 a year. Both Fellows and Members shall be entitled, upon payment of their annual dues, to receive *The American Sociological Review*, and Fellows shall receive other regular publications of the Society.

Fellows shall have full voting power, be eligible for election to office, and be entitled otherwise to full participation in the affairs and management of the Society.

Members shall have all privileges of Fellows excepting holding elective offices and voting on constitutional changes.

**II. Relation to Regional and Specialized Societies.** Affiliation with the American Sociological Society of regional Sociological Societies, now existing and whose organization includes parts of at least five states of the Federal Union, is hereby authorized, subject to the following conditions:

- a. The American Sociological Society assumes no responsibility for the administration or the financial affairs of any affiliated organization;
- b. affiliated organization shall determine its own membership requirements, and shall exercise such control over its membership so that membership in the affiliated organization shall not imply membership or fellowship status in the American Sociological Society;
- c. In the event that an affiliated organization meets at the same time or place as the American Sociological Society, the program of the affiliated organization must be coordinated with that of the American Sociological Society;
- d. In the event that the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society believes that the conditions of affiliation are not being fulfilled by any given affiliated organization, or that such affiliation is no longer to the best interests of the American Sociological Society, the Executive Committee may recommend to the Society a termination of the affiliation, and, if such recommendation is approved by a majority vote of the Fellows present at any duly authorized business meeting of the Society, such affiliation shall be terminated.

The Rural Sociological Society and other specialized Societies shall have the opportunity for affiliation with the American Sociological Society upon the same conditions as above stated.

Other similar societies shall have the right of application for affiliation subject to the same conditions as above stated. Local chapters may also affiliate with the American Sociological Society upon the same conditions as above stated.

Affiliation of societies other than those above specified is hereby authorized when approved by a two-thirds vote of the Fellows present at an Annual Meeting, provided the petition for such affiliation shall have been made to the Society, at least one year prior to final action. Such societies shall not have representation on the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society as provided hereafter.

Each affiliated society except affiliated local chapters, may elect one member to represent it on the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society, provided that such elected representative shall be a Fellow of the American Sociological Society. Such elections shall be for a period of three years. This article shall be operative only in case the American Sociological Society shall organize an Administration Committee as hereafter and herein provided.

The President, the Secretary and the Treasurer of the American Sociological Society, or their representatives, shall attend, upon invitation, meetings of affiliated societies.

**III. Reorganization of the Executive Committee.** The Executive Committee

shall consist of members as at present provided for, plus the representatives elected by affiliated societies, as herein recommended.

The Executive Committee shall constitute each year an Administrative Committee from among its Fellows. This Committee shall consist of the President, the Secretary, the Treasurer of the Society, the Editor of the *Sociological Review*, and three other members, to be elected by the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee shall delegate to the Administration Committee the power to act for it when the Executive Committee is not in session, subject to such general directions and instructions as it may choose to give.

The Executive Committee shall elect the Secretary, the Treasurer, Editor, the Managing Editor, and two Assistant Editors of *The American Sociological Review*.

**IV. Miscellaneous.** The approval in principle of the election of officers of the Society by a vote taken by mail of all Members of the Society. The details for nominations and elections of officers shall be worked out after the reorganization of the Society as herein recommended.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD, *Chairman*

## CURRENT ITEMS

### ERRATA

For the benefit of those who intend to use the bibliography of John Gillin's article, "Personality in Preliterate Cultures" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 4: 681-702, Oct., 1939), the following typographical errors which slipped by the author in reading proof are mentioned: second date in Item 2 should read, "1939"; the last name of the author of Items 40 and 41 is Devereux; the date in Item 132 is 1937; the initials of the author of Item 229 are L. C.

**A Communication.** On October 20, 1939, the editor received a letter from Mr. Kirchheimer in which he took issue with a review of his book (with Mr. George Rusche), *Punishment and Social Structure*, published in the Oct. 1939 *Review*, 722-723. The letter concluded with the statement "... at this point he is not attacking underlying philosophy, but scholarly integrity." This letter was sent to Mr. Timasheff, the reviewer, who prepared the reply below. Mr. Kirchheimer saw Mr. Timasheff's reply and prepared a statement of his own, which Mr. Timasheff answered briefly.

Although such correspondence is contrary to our general policy, matters of some importance seem to be involved in this instance, so we are publishing the three statements. They contain some methodological considerations as well as some factual information of interest.—R. B.

#### MR. TIMASHEFF'S STATEMENT

Mr. Kirchheimer requests me to give some proof of my statement, "It is certainly wrong that the last quarter of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century was a period of decrease in criminality." My statement referred to the contention of the authors on page 139 of their book that "The number of offenses and convictions decreased everywhere, or at least remained stationary." I shall substantiate my statement by the use of official statistics of several countries, just as Mr. Kirchheimer claims to have done.

In Germany, the movement of criminality from 1882 to 1912 was as follows:<sup>1</sup>

	Number of convictions	On 100,000 inhabitants over the age of 12
1882	315,849	996
1900	456,479	1164
1912	573,926	1224

The increase of both absolute and relative figures is evident. As early as in 1889, the outstanding German criminologist, F. Liszt, based his famous article *Kriminalpolitische Aufgaben*, which can be considered as the manifesto of the sociological school, on the proposition that criminality was increasing in a dangerous way.<sup>2</sup> In 1912, it was officially stated that the number of convictions was steadily increasing since the beginning of the compilation of official statistics for the Empire.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Criminal statistics for the German Empire were begun in 1882; 1912 was the last year such statistics were published before the war. German statistics cover only felonies and misdemeanors against federal law.

<sup>2</sup> *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft*, vol. 9, 1889.

<sup>3</sup> *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich*, vol. 267, I, 5.

The figures for Italy are as follows:

	Number of convictions	On 100,000 inhabitants <sup>4</sup>
1881	305,593	?
1887	316,065	1784
1900	395,392	2526
1912	506,486	2765

The increase of both absolute and relative figures is evident.

In regard to France, facts may appear to be somewhat different to students who take into account only the statistics of major offenses, for the number of persons convicted by courts of assizes and by courts of corrective police did not increase during the period in question. The situation changes, however, if petty offenses are also taken into consideration, and this must be done because of the ever increasing use of the practice of *correctionalisation* and *contraventionalisation*, these terms meaning artificial shifts of offenses from the class of felonies to that of misdemeanors and from the class of misdemeanors to that of petty offenses. Therefore, the figures concerning felonies and misdemeanors show not a decrease in criminality, but rather an increasing laxity in repression which has been frequently mentioned and disapproved in the official reports of the Ministry of Justice attached to the annual criminal statistics.<sup>5</sup> In order to understand the actual movement of criminality, the figures of convictions by courts of all types are relevant, and these figures are as follows:

1881	599,629
1900	630,878
1912	736,479

Facts are against the proposition which Mr. Kirchheimer would like to maintain, and yet his proposition is also based on official figures. How can this be explained? Only in this way: In order to prove the *general* decline of criminality during the period studied, Mr. Kirchheimer uses figures which pertain only to *one* type of criminality, that against property. The corresponding figures certainly decline, both absolutely and relatively, in several countries,<sup>6</sup> but to use them to prove a general proposition concerning the movement of criminality is an obvious *pars pro toto*.

The great criminological movement of the later 19th century was a social reaction to the challenge to society by criminals, especially habitual and persistent criminals, and the very existence of the movement could not be explained were the facts such as those assumed by Mr. Kirchheimer.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

#### MR. KIRCHHEIMER'S REJOINDER

In order to prove his contention that "it is certainly wrong that the last quarter of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century was a period of decrease in criminality," Mr. Timasheff presents some statistics of criminal convictions.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The computation of relative figures was begun in 1887.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. for instance, *Rapport sur l'administration de la justice criminelle en France pour l'année 1900*, pp. xxxi and lvii. The increasing leniency of the repression is fully recognized in the book.

<sup>6</sup> Thus, for instance, in Germany, there were 434 convictions for offenses against persons and 448 for offenses against property per 100,000 inhabitants over the age of 12 in 1882, and 633 and 386, respectively, in 1900.

<sup>7</sup> I should like to point out that, as far as Italy is concerned, our book specifically states on pages 148-149 that Italy is an exception to the general trend of development.

He bases his entire argument on general crime figures over a large period of time and contends that the procedure of the book is an "obvious *pars pro toto*." Nevertheless, this procedure is an established principle in dealing with criminal statistics. Ever since the time of Georg von Mayr and von Oettingen, students of criminal statistics have insisted on the worthlessness of general crime figures, "block figures," as von Mayr called them.<sup>8</sup>

Thorsten Sellin, who has made a particular study of this problem, wrote in 1931:

It is clear that an index of criminality can be based only on the rates of a few selected crimes which constitute a particular danger for the public welfare, which are of public nature, and where a maximum of collaboration between the damaged or interested party and the police is to be expected.<sup>9</sup>

Figures of total convictions over a large period are practically without value because changes in legislation and criminal prosecution, and, above all, the disproportionate weight of the small contraventions which belong to administrative rather than to criminal law, do not allow any conclusions to be drawn from general figures.

A detailed analysis of the figures of France will illustrate the general proposition. If we break down Mr. Timasheff's own figures for France, we get the following picture:

	1881	1900	1912
Convicted by assizes	3,183	2,248	2,180
Convicted by <i>tribunal correctionnel</i>	193,586	187,024	222,978
Convicted by <i>tribunal de simple police</i>	432,960	455,813	574,560

In the first place, Mr. Timasheff's reasoning that it is the artificial shift from higher to lower categories which makes it necessary to take petty offences into consideration is clearly wrong. The increase in convictions by the *Tribunal correctionnel* of 29,392 from 1881 to 1912 can hardly be explained by the drop of 1003 in the number of convictions by the assizes. Nor can a shift in jurisdiction explain the increase of 141,609 in conviction by the police court. Furthermore, I have been unable to find any evidence in the French statutes and commentaries of an increasing use of the practice of *contraventionalisation* before the Poincaré decrees of 1926.

The *Tribunal de Police* can only mete out maximum sentences of 5 days imprisonment or 15 Frs. fine. Most of the increase in convictions by the *Tribunal de Police* between 1900 and 1912 can be broken down as follows:

Increase in cases of drunkenness	26,783
Increase in violations of the law regarding closing hours of inns	6,556
Increase in violations against traffic regulations for horse-drawn vehicles	19,621
Violation of traffic laws by bicycles and cars	16,615
Violation of labor regulations	9,691

(These last two categories did not exist in 1900)

The only type of case handled by the police court which could properly be included in an index of criminality is the category of minor assaults. This category shows a decrease between 1900 and 1912 from 33,393 to 28,812 convictions.<sup>10</sup> In sum, these figures clearly bear out the standard view that the *Tribunal de Police* statistics cannot be included in a study of criminality. It is worth noting that the official report

<sup>8</sup> Georg v. Mayr, *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre*, vol. III, 414 and 418.

<sup>9</sup> Thorsten Sellin, "Die Grundlagen eines Kriminalitätsindexes," *Zeitschrift für Kriminalpsychologie und Strafrechtsreform*, 1931, 582.

<sup>10</sup> Figures taken from *Rapport sur l'administration de la justice criminelle en France*, 1881, 148; 1900, 103; 1912, 105.

of 1900, page lxx, states "the number of contraventions offers only a very relative interest from a social viewpoint; the number depends more or less on the tolerance of local authorities."

As for the increase of 35,954 convictions by the *Tribunal correctionnel* between 1900 and 1912, 9242 were cases due to 21 new laws which did not exist in 1900 and 7011 to changes in the practice under the Railway Administration Code of 1845.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the convictions for larceny rose from 42,127 in 1900 to 48,349 in 1912; conviction for assaults on officials dropped slightly from 13,191 to 13,069; and conviction for common assaults rose from 36,592 to 37,575 in 1912. In relation to the growing population, these figures actually do not constitute an increase in crime. The very report which Mr. Timasheff quotes, states on page xlvii that "if the curve of delicts and crimes has diminished since 1894, it is to be supposed that real criminality has diminished." The report for 1910, page xxvi says: "It is easy to realize that offences tried by the *Tribunal correctionnel* in the course of the last fifteen years show no noticeable augmentation. The situation remains the same for offences against persons, property, and morals."

This is obviously not the place for a similar analysis of other countries. I should like to make but one point with regard to Germany. In 1883, the criminal statistics for the German empire reveal violations of 27 special Reichsstatutes outside the criminal code with 5718 convicted, in 1900, 53 with 22,593 convicted, in 1912, 76 with 59,006 convicted.<sup>12</sup>

If the general conviction figures are thus no basis for a study of trends of criminality, the question arises: Is it justified to choose property violations as the most significant index? The proportion of all indictable offenses tried in England and Wales which were offences against property follows: 1896-1900, 93.2%; 1900-1905, 93.5% 1906-1910, 93.8%; 1937, 92.4%.<sup>13</sup> It seems reasonable to me to believe therefore that, at least in the society in which we are living, offences against property are fairly representative of the curve of crime as such. Even here, more than less breaking down of the statistics is essential.

As regards Mr. Timasheff's concluding remark about the reform movement, a study of the books and articles of Liszt, Prins, Aschaffenburg, and others shows that they started from the following position: In spite of relatively favorable economic conditions and a corresponding decline in first offences, current penal practice has led to an increase in recidivism. There is no inconsistency therefore between the existence of this reform movement and the position of the book that there was a decline in criminality at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER

#### MR. TIMASHEFF'S REPLY

I have to add just a few more words to my paper in order to fully answer Mr. Kirchheimer's objections.

First, I do not agree with those scholars who deny the significance of general crime figures, for the general level of criminality is the resultant of two relevant social forces: 1. the pressure of the law on the population, and 2. the distribution of revolting and submitting attitudes in the population. In their book, Messrs. Rusche and Kirchheimer speak of the decline in the number of offenses and convictions without any further specification.

<sup>11</sup> Figures taken from above *Rapport*, 1900, 54; 1912, 56.

<sup>12</sup> *Statistik des deutschen Reiches*, vol. XII (*Kriminalstatistik für 1883*) 143; vol. 139, 1900, 168; vol. 267, 1912, 308.

<sup>13</sup> *Criminal Statistics for England and Wales*, 1910, 27; 1937, 21.

Secondly, I maintain that it is scientifically incorrect to speak of the general movement of criminality on the basis of figures concerning only one type of criminality; if the offenses against property were representative for offenses in general, the respective curves would coincide; but, as mentioned in my paper, they do not.

Thirdly, I do not explain the increase of the number of convictions in French courts of medium and lowest jurisdiction by a decrease in the number of convictions in the courts of assize; my contention is that the general number of convictions increased during the years studied and that the distribution of convictions among jurisdictions was affected by the practice of shifting cases from higher to lower courts by the prosecutors who intentionally omitted certain aggravating aspects of the offenses in order to establish the competence of the lower (and quicker) court. The Poincaré decrees of 1926 were only a partial legalization of a practice which had been frequently applied for decades.

Finally, the increasing number of convictions in France recognized by Mr. Kirchheimer in his rejoinder cannot be explained by "growing population," because actually there was no growth of population in France; according to the census figures, it was 39.0 millions in 1901 and 39.6 millions in 1912, thus remaining practically stationary.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

#### MEETINGS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

**Research Council on Problems of Alcohol**, 330 W. 42d Street, New York, is engaged on a comprehensive research project to determine the facts and possible remedies relative to alcoholism and alcoholic psychoses. The Carnegie Corporation has granted \$25,000 for a critical survey of all work done to date on the effects of alcohol upon the individual. This is under the direction of Dr. Norman Jolliffe, of the New York University College of Medicine. The American Philosophical Society is financing a study of the toxic factors in alcoholism. This is directed by Dr. George A. Jervis of the New York Psychiatric Institute. The Dazian Foundation for Medical Research is furnishing funds for investigating alcohol's relation to liver cirrhosis. This will be done at N. Y. U.'s College of Medicine.

Dr. Karl M. Bowman, Director of Psychiatry at Bellevue Hospital, is chairman of the Council which is closely affiliated with the A.A.A.S. The newly elected executive committee of the Council consists of the following persons: Dr. Forest R. Moulton, Permanent Secretary of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Lawrence Kolb, Division of Mental Hygiene, United States Public Health Service, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Hans T. Clarke, Professor of Biochemistry, Columbia University; Dr. Luther Gulick, Director of the Institute of Public Administration; Mr. Leonard Harrison, Director of the Committee on Youth and Justice; Dr. Nolan D. C. Lewis, Professor of Psychiatry, Columbia University; Mr. Austin H. McCormick, Commissioner of Correction, New York City; Dr. A. T. Poffenberger, Professor of Psychology, Columbia University; Dr. Robert W. Searle, General Secretary of the Greater New York Federation of Churches; and Mr. Albert W. Whitney, Consulting Director of the National Conservation Bureau. Dr. Bowman is Chairman.

**The American Political Science Association** held its thirty-fifth annual meeting at the Wardman Park Hotel, Washington, D. C., Dec. 28-30, 1939. Charles Grove Haines, of the University of California, was the 1939 president.

**American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc.** will hold its seventeenth annual meeting at Boston, Mass., February 22-24, 1940, at the Hotel Statler. All communications should be addressed to Dr. Norvelle C. Lazar, Sec., 149 E. 73d Street, New York City, N. Y.

**American Sociological Society.** Notice concerning change of address should be sent to the office of the Managing Editor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., at least one month prior to the date of publication for which the notice is to be effective. In each change of address, please give the old as well as the new address.

*The American Sociologist*, which may be addressed at 62 Faculty Exchange, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., has just issued numbers 3 and 4 of volume I.

The subscription price is 50 cents which should be sent to the above address. I think most sociologists will find the publication interesting. The sponsors plan to continue their policy of discussing "the issues most vital to the welfare of sociology" but also hope to be able, if enough sponsors come forward, to present "at least one fundamental article each issue which will review and constructively criticize outstanding scientific trends in sociology."—R. B.

*Brook Farm Reports and Documents*. Arthur Eugene Bestor, Jr., Box 386, Teachers College, Columbia University, is editing these materials and solicits librarians, scholars, and collectors to aid him in locating manuscripts. He is particularly interested in letters written to and from Brook Farm and diaries kept by members of the community. All materials will be promptly returned by registered mail and full acknowledgement will be given in the volume.

*The Bureau of the Census* has just released two reports which should be of interest to all sociologists. They are: "Periodic and Special Reports Issued by the Division of Population since the Fifteenth Decennial Census of Population, 1930," and "Urban Population in the United States from the First Census (1790) to the Fifteenth Census (1930)." These pamphlets are available at the Census Bureau upon request.

*The Child Research Clinic of The Woods Schools*, Langhorne, Penn., held its Sixth Institute on the Exceptional Child on Tuesday, October 24, 1939. The general topic of the Institute was "Progress of Scientific Research in the Field of the Exceptional Child." Dr. R. D. Matthews, University of Pennsylvania, was chairman of the morning session, and Dr. Russell S. Boles, University of Pennsylvania Hospital, presided at the afternoon session.

The speakers were: A. Irving Hallowell, University of Pennsylvania, "The Child, The Savage, and Human Experience"; W. E. Blatz, University of Toronto, "What is An Exceptional Child?"; Bruno Klopfer, Rorschach Institute, New York, "The Interplay Between Emotional and Intellectual Level—Comparisons Between Rorschach and Binet Analyses"; Dr. J. Louise Despert, The New York Hospital, "Research in the Nursery School"; and Charles M. Morris, The Woods Schools, "A Special School Looks at Special Education."

The Woods Schools, which this year celebrates its twenty-fifth anniversary, founded the Child Research Clinic five years ago to further a wider knowledge in scientific and lay circles of all phases of the problem of the exceptional child.

*The National Conference on Family Relations* held its second annual meeting in Philadelphia, December 26-27, 1939. Members are entitled to a year's subscription to the magazine *Living*, beginning with its first issue in January 1940. The significant papers presented in Philadelphia will be published in later issues of *Living*. Ten major papers were given and seven conference committee reports were presented. Six of these reports were formulated under the direction of William Hodson, E. R. Groves, Frederick Osborn, Mrs. Stuart Mudd, Harriet S. Daggett, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.

The program was organized under the leadership of Dr. Adolf Meyer, the eminent psychiatrist, who is president of the N. C. F. R. The central theme was "The Functions of the Family in a Democracy," with addresses by L. K. Frank, Sidney E. Goldstein, Carl G. Hartman, Karen Horney, Katherine Lenroot, Adolf Meyer, Max Rheinstein, Una B. Sait and C. C. Zimmerman.

Conference committees discussed significant subjects of special interest, including the economic basis of the family, education for family living, eugenics and the family, family counselling, marriage and family law, marriage and family research, and youth and its problems.

The annual dues are only two dollars. If you wish to join, please remit dues to E. W. Burgess, Secretary, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois.

*The International Institute* is continuing plans for the meeting of the Fourteenth International Congress of Sociology. More papers are wanted from American sociologists on: village; city; village and city; methodology; research; and teaching of the social sciences.

Papers should be sent prior to March 31 to the President, D. Gusti, 6, Piata Romena, Palatul Academiei Comerciale, Bucarest, Romania.

**The Liberal Survey**, 4309 Third Street, Washington, D. C., has published a *Directory for Liberals* at 50 cents (on a non-profit basis) "which gives factual data about 141 national organizations interested in and working for civil liberties, unionization of workers, aiding foreign victims of war and oppression, peace and less strained international relations, consumer cooperatives, and better race relations."

I do not know under which of the above categories the American Sociological Society is placed by the editors, but it is one of the 141—number 27, to be exact. However, the factual data and statement of our purposes are correct: "To encourage sociological research and discussion and to promote the association of persons engaged in the scientific study of society."  
—R. B.

**Mexican Seminar.** The Fifteenth Annual Seminar in Mexico will be held in Mexico City, July 5-25, 1940. The date is tentative; detailed arrangements will be announced later. Tentative arrangements are also being made for the Second Institute on Inter-American Affairs to be held in Argentina and Chile in the summer of 1940.

Those who are interested should communicate with Hubert Herring, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York.

**The Michigan Sociological Society** held its third annual meeting at Wayne University Detroit, on Nov. 3, 1939.

**The National Archives** has made available to its employees in service training courses in correspondence and report writing, Federal administrative history, and the history and administration of archives. The last-mentioned course is given in cooperation with American University and is under the joint direction of Solon J. Buck and Ernst Posner. Dr. Posner was formerly on the staff of the Prussian *Geheime Staatsarchiv* at Berlin-Dahlem and is now a lecturer at American University.

A list of recent acquisitions will be mailed on request.

**Public Affairs Committee.** Laws restricting trade between the states have much the same effect as tariffs in curtailing living standards and retarding recovery, according to F. Eugene Melder, of Clark University, a leading authority on interstate trade barriers. Although the Constitution prohibits states from levying tariffs against each other's goods, individual states have imposed many restrictions on trade which are as effective as duties on imports from foreign countries. Among the barriers listed are: laws forcing state governments to buy home products and employ home labor; quarantine laws which have no relation to plant or animal diseases but which exist solely to give preference to home products; conflicting state laws on trucks which discourage interstate trucking; special taxes on chain stores and other outside agencies; "excise taxes" on out-of-state margarine; and numerous special restrictions on out-of-state liquor. Consumers are seen as the chief victims of such legislation. These matters are discussed in *State Trade Walls*, the thirty-seventh of a series of factual, popular, 10-cent pamphlets published by the Public Affairs Committee, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City. This was the November issue in the monthly series. The December publication was *The Fight on Cancer*, by Dr. Clarence C. Little, managing director of the American Society for the Control of Cancer.

In quantity, these pamphlets may be obtained at less than the regular rate of 10¢ each.

**The Sociological Research Association** met in Philadelphia, Dec. 27-29, 1939. Its program dealt with the research treatment of life history materials, by Herbert Blumer and Richard T. LaPiere; methods of community research, by Kimball Young, with special reference to his extensive study of the Mormon community; the city and sociological research, by Robert E. Park and Thomas C. McCormick. The recent works of Thorndike, Mumford, and Queen were the center of the discussion.

**Town Hall, Inc.**, 123 W. 43d Street, New York, has recently run a contest with \$1000.00 cash prizes on the subject "What Does American Democracy Mean to Me?" Mrs. Henry Morgenthau, Sr., gave the prize money. This was open to everybody, the essays being limited to 1000 words. Mrs. Walter E. Meyer gave \$1000.00 for a similar contest for high-school students.

Those who do not listen to the regular broadcasts of "The Town Hall's Meeting of the Air" are missing one of the most stimulating forums in the country. They are usually given on Thursday, 9:30-10:30 EST over the NBC Blue Network.—R. B.

*Consumers Union of the United States* is now publishing *Consumer Quiz*, a monthly consumer education aid. Each issue contains at least two projects for consumer education classes, as well as discussion questions based on *Consumers Union Reports*. For example, the September issue offered projects on comparison of approval seals, a study of mayonnaise and salad dressings, and discussion questions on food, automobiles, health, and clothing. Free sample on request. Address, Consumers Union of U. S., 17 Union Square West, New York City.

*U. S. Department of State, Division of Cultural Relations*, held a conference at Washington D. C., Nov. 29-30, 1939, on "Inter-American Relations in the Field of Publications and Libraries." This Division was created July 27, 1938, to "encourage and strengthen cultural relations and intellectual cooperation between the United States and other nations." However, it "specializes" on the American republics.

#### NEWS FROM COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

*Barnard College, Columbia University*. The Public Service Fellowship for 1940-1941 should be of interest to all recent women graduates of colleges. It offers a sum of \$1300 for a year of graduate study at an approved college or university in one or more of the related fields of economics, government, history, and sociology. The award is made annually by the faculty of Barnard College to a woman who has graduated during the past five years and who shows promise of usefulness in the public service (ordinary fields of teaching not included).

Requests for further information and for application blanks should be addressed to Maude A. Huttman, Chairman of the Faculty Committee, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York.

*Beloit College*. Lloyd V. Ballard has been appointed to the newly created State Board of Public Welfare. At its 1939 session, the Wisconsin legislature brought all of its state welfare services into one department under the supervision of a seven member appointive Board. This Board functions as an advisory, regulatory, and policy-forming body. The administration of the various welfare services is vested in a State Director of Public Welfare and six professionally qualified division heads, namely, those of Public Assistance, Child Welfare, Mental Hygiene, Corrections, Adult Blind, and Administration and Research.

*University of Chicago*. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the dedication of the Social Science Research Building, Dec. 1-2, 1939, a series of interesting meetings were held. Charles E. Merriam discussed "Urbanism"; Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society and Culture"; Louis Wirth, "The Urban Society and Civilization"; Wesley C. Mitchell, "The Social Sciences, One or Many"; Frederick C. Mills, "Quantification: The Quest for Precision"; Carl C. Brigham, "Training for Social Science Research"; W. F. Ogburn, "Social Trends"; L. L. Thurstone, "Factor Analysis as a Scientific Method: With Special Reference to the Analysis of Human Traits"; Morris R. Cohen, "Generalization in the Social Sciences"; John H. Williams, "Social Science and Social Action."

Other scholars not on the staff of the University of Chicago who were invited to speak, preside, or take part in round table discussions were: Donald Young, Frederic Woodward, Ray Lyman Wilbur, L. J. Henderson, E. L. Thorndike, Beardsley Ruml, E. H. Sutherland, Isadore Lubin, James Bonbright, Mark A. May, Robert S. Lynd, Robert T. Crane, Stuart, A. Rice, Robert C. Angell, Malcolm M. Willey, Richard H. Shryock, John D. Black, Melville J. Herskovits, E. B. Reuter, W. Rex Crawford, Calvin B. Hoover, Filmer P. C. Northrope, Talcott Parsons, Sumner Slichter, and William Line.

The retirement of Dr. Fairs from active teaching at the University of Chicago took place at the end of the Summer Quarter. In order to mark their appreciation of his work as a teacher and an administrator, representatives of the Society for Social Research, Zeta Phi, and the Sociology Club gave him a testimonial dinner in Chicago on Saturday evening, October 28, 1939.

The banquet was held in Ida Noyes Hall, 59th Street between Kimbark and Woodlawn Avenues, at 6:30 P.M. The speakers included: Robert E. Park; Edward S. Ames, formerly chairman of the department of Philosophy and now pastor of the University Church of the Disciples of Christ in Chicago; Harvey A. Carr, Professor Emeritus of Psychology; and Mrs. Grace E. Chaffee of the University of Iowa. Communications from James R. Angell and W. I. Thomas were read by the toastmaster, since they were unable to attend in person.

The committee presented Professor Faris with a bound volume of the addresses delivered and the letters and telegrams from those who could not attend the banquet.

**University of Cincinnati.** The department has received a \$30,000 WPA grant to continue the census tract analysis of the city. James A. Quinn and Lois Elliott are in charge of this work. Hamilton County is now included in the census tract system. It is one of the first counties in the United States to be thus included.

Doubleday, Doran and Company has published a revision of *Introduction to Western Civilization*, the text of the general orientation course in the Arts College. This book was first published in 1931. It was written by fourteen faculty members, three of whom are in the sociology department.

**Cornell University.** Ralph Linton, professor of anthropology at Columbia University, gave a public lecture at Cornell University, November 6, on the subject "Culture and Personality." Mr. Linton also met seminars of advanced students in sociology and anthropology.

**Franklin College,** Franklin, Indiana. W. G. Mather is secretary of the recently organized Indiana Rural Life Council.

**Hofstra College,** Hempstead, Long Island, N. Y. J. S. Roucek has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science and sociology.

**Kent State University,** Kent, Ohio. Edwin Lemert has been added to the staff as instructor.

**University of Illinois.** Maurice T. Price, formerly head of the Human Dependency Unit, surveying Indian reservations for the U. S. Soil Conservation Service, has joined the staff of the department as visiting lecturer in sociology.

Hans Gerth was a member of the summer school staff and is now serving as visiting assistant professor. Mr. Gerth is presenting courses on European sociological theory and on social classes.

A curriculum in Social Administration has been organized at Illinois this year. This curriculum is administered by a committee of which B. F. Timmons is chairman. Those teaching in the curriculum have been added to the department of sociology. New appointments for the curriculum are associate professor E. E. Klein, who came from the University of Iowa, and Miss Lecie Gordon, recently social caseworker for the St. Louis Provident Association.

E. T. Hiller has recently published a monograph entitled: *Houseboat and River-Bottoms People*, University of Illinois Press.

D. R. Taft is completing his *Criminology* which will be published by the Macmillan Company.

The McGraw-Hill Book Company recently published *Public Opinion* by William Albigh of this department. In October, Albigh was appointed Chairman of the division of the social sciences of the University of Illinois.

**University of Kentucky.** Morris G. Caldwell, who joined the faculty in 1935, has left to become director of the Division of Corrections in the Department of Public Welfare of Wisconsin. He formerly taught at Ashland College, Ashland, Ohio, and Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri.

**Miami University.** The Stanford University Press has announced the publication of *The Railroader*, by W. F. Cottrell. This study investigates the occupational personality types developed by this industry. It is chiefly based upon participant observer data supplemented by such objective material as are available. It indicates that further research by more refined and scientific methods is needed in this entire field.

Paul W. Tappan has just completed his degree at Wisconsin. The title of his thesis is "Mormon-Gentile Conflict: A Study of Ingroup-Outgroup Interaction with Special Reference to Polygamy."

**University of Louisville.** The work in sociology and social work is now handled in separate departments, with Margaret K. Strong continuing as director of the Graduate Division of Social Administration and Robert I. Kutak as head of the sociology department.

Gardner F. Cook has been added to the staff to handle courses in group work and child welfare. Lois Blakey will devote all her time to social administration.

Samuel C. Newman, secretary-treasurer of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society, and recently instructor at Ohio State University, has been added to the sociology faculty.

Louisville is one of the twenty-two universities participating in the Cooperative Study in General Education of the American Council on Education. The sociology department is co-operating in the social science aspects of the study.

**Marietta College,** Marietta, Ohio. Laile Eubank has been appointed to fill the vacancy left by Albert Blumenthal's acceptance of a call to the Missouri State Teachers College, Maryville, Mo. Miss Eubank, one of Earle's three talented daughters, studied at the London School of Economics and was associated last year with the International Labor Organization at Geneva.—R. B.

**Ohio State University.** Lloyd A. Cook was on the staff of the Progressive Education Association Workshop during the summer.

John Gillin taught at the Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Michigan this summer.

Florence Greenhoe was visiting instructor in educational sociology at Central State Teachers College, Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, for the summer session.

Three members of the department received their Ph.D. degrees in the summer and have left for new positions: Rupert C. Koeninger to Central State Teachers College, Mt. Pleasant, Michigan; Edwin M. Lemert to Kent State University, Kent, Ohio; and S. C. Newman to University of Louisville, Louisville, Ky. All three of these ex-Ohio-Staters will still be within the area of the regional society.

Enrollment in all sociology courses exceeds that of the corresponding quarters last year. The total departmental enrollment is the highest in history.

**Peabody College,** Nashville, Tenn. H. C. Brearley, formerly on the faculty at Clemson A. & M. College, has been appointed professor in charge of the newly-created department of sociology.

**Pennsylvania State College.** George E. Simpson, recently of Temple University, has been added to staff as associate professor.

**University of Rochester.** A Social Science Research Committee was organized last spring and is conducting an interdepartmental social science seminar on methods of research. Raymond V. Bowers is its chairman for the current year.

**State College of Washington.** Paul H. Landis has been made professor of rural sociology and dean of the Graduate School.

H. Ashley Weeks received the Ph.D. degree at the University of Wisconsin last summer and has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor.

Henry J. Meyer, of the University of Michigan, has been appointed instructor.

Donald Bogue, of the University of Iowa, has been appointed fellow in the department.

**Western Reserve University.** C. E. Gehlke became ill last June and was confined to his bed during the summer. He has been granted a leave of absence for the first semester. He and Mrs. Gehlke left for Arizona early in November.

W. E. Lawrence spent the summer at the Yale Institute of Human Relations working on the Cross-Cultural Survey.

*West Virginia University.* Beginning in September 1939, a new graduate Department of Social Administration was put into operation. This development is an out-growth of the expansion last year of our department of sociology into the department of sociology and public welfare, including a number of semiprofessional courses for the training of social workers. E. M. Sunely, of the University of Chicago, who came to us in 1938, is the director of the new graduate course. He also continues to teach part time in the department of sociology and public welfare.

The enrollment in the undergraduate preprofessional course has increased this year more than first percent over last year, so far as majors are concerned, probably as a result of the offering of this additional training for prospective social welfare workers.

### OBITUARY NOTICE

EDWARD ALEXANDER WESTERMARCK (1862-1939)

*Edward Westermarck*,<sup>1</sup> like Havelock Ellis, was almost a historical character. The greatest works of Westermarck and Ellis were known to an earlier generation of sociologists. Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* found a publisher because it had been highly praised by Alfred Russel Wallace, the renowned co-discoverer of evolution. That was in 1891. Ellis's *Man and Woman* had been published even earlier. What we may forget is that Westermarck and Ellis were in their twenties when their work became known to our fathers. When I expressed surprise at Westermarck's youthful vigor a dozen years ago—for he lacked Ellis's patriarchial beard—he confessed that he was often mistaken for his "own son." He smiled because I knew he was a life-long bachelor.

American sociologists have heard little from Westermarck since the World War. There was a pirated edition of *Human Marriage* in the 1920's, followed by the *Short History* when the depression set in. His later Moroccan studies and his occasional essays, published in England, were not reprinted here. Even his *Future of Marriage* must be unknown to many American sociologists whose work he cites. Westermarck's death, as late as September 1939, came as a surprise, then, a few weeks after the death of his friend Ellis.

Physically, Westermarck did not impress one as a scholar. He was bulky and angular, almost rectangular, with a head that approached a square. He smiled readily and warmly. He generally looked as if he enjoyed life. Indeed, he wrote in his memoirs that, if he had the choice of a life to live again, he would choose his own.

One speaks of Westermarck, like Ellis, as English. But he was even less English than Ellis, who was at least a native Englishman. Westermarck was a Swedish Finn and always maintained his Finnish connections. In fact, he frequently represented the interests of the Finnish people in international relationships and played no small part in the struggle for Finnish freedom. Finland was his official home; to Finns and Swedes he was known in his later years as the Rector of Abo Academy.

<sup>1</sup> Westermarck, Edward Alexander. Born Helsingfors, Finland, November 20, 1862; son of Assessor N. Chr. Westermarck and Constance Blomqvist; educated at Svenska Normallyceum, Helsingfors; University of Finland, Ph.D., Helsingfors, 1889; Hon. LL.D. (Aberdeen and Glasgow). Publications: *The Origin of Human Marriage*, 1889; *The History of Human Marriage*, 1891, 1921; *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, 1906, 1912; *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco*, 1914; *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, 1926; *A Short History of Marriage*, 1926; *The Goodness of Gods*, 1926; *Memories of My Life*, 1927, 1929; *Wit and Wisdom in Morocco*, 1930; *Ethical Relativity*, 1932; *Early Beliefs and Their Social Influence*, 1932; *Pagan Survivals in Mohammedan Civilisation*, 1933; *Three Essays on Sex and Marriage*, 1934; *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation*, 1936; *Christianity and Morals*, 1937. Died September, 1939.

If Westermarck was Finnish by nationality, he was Moroccan by affection. He knew Morocco intimately after his extensive journeys as a young man, knew it better than practically any European traveler of the time. He was sympathetic with Arab culture, with the Arab attitude on life. He enjoyed talking of his publications about Morocco. In England, he seemed anxious to return to his villa at Tangier; the African sunshine was more expressive of his personality.

Westermarck would never have continued his close English connections but for the sociological interests of a Scotchman, Martin White, who was attracted by Westermarck's ideas. It was White who, seeing among his fellow members of the House of Commons a pitiful ignorance of sociological learning, endowed the chair which Westermarck held for a quarter century at the London School of Economics. The reason for his professorship was a source of continuing amusement to Westermarck.

Westermarck never seemed quite at home in England. To be sure, he was fond of his cottage at Box Hill in Surrey, fond of many of his English friends. To be sure, he ate the typical food with gusto—at the Gypsy Tea Room off Southampton Row and later, when he walked less, at the Thackeray Hotel opposite the British Museum. To be sure, his command of the English idiom, in writing, was surprising for one who spoke English with a marked Scandinavian accent; his conversation, normally slow, was occasionally halting. But in spirit he was far from the typical Englishman. Maybe he visualized the English too largely in terms of the "regulars" at the British Museum. Observing some obvious English social responses, he would wink at me (also an alien) and remark, "These English!" He took an impish delight in shocking their complacency, in burlesquing their sense of propriety.

Take two examples. Called to testify before a commission investigating indecency in Hyde Park, Westermarck was asked what he thought of placing additional bright lights throughout the park. His reply was, "The cure for public indecency is to remove the lights." Or again, one rainy day he was eating his homemade sandwiches at lunchtime on the porch of the British Museum. At the end of his repast, he offered me a drink from his flask of whiskey, but he himself went to the fountain at the entrance and poured a stiff drink into the public drinking cup. I asked him why. "Oh, I like to think of the face of that English spinster who's going to come along now and use the cup."

Westermarck did not feel toward Americans the way he felt toward the English, possibly because he did not know them. In all his travels, he never reached America. He literally knew more about the distinctive habits of the Manhattan Indians than about the peculiarities of the present inhabitants of New York. He was an honorary member of the American Sociological Society; he was once offered a lectureship at Harvard; his principal books are part of our American scientific library. However, for a person thus well known to Americans, his questions about America were surprisingly naïve. Largely because of the limited collection of American works in European libraries, his reading of American sociological literature was severely limited, at least until his later years. Consequently, his appraisal of the works of American sociologists may seem distorted; he accepted as scholars some of our articulate contemporaries whose objectives are patently unscientific.

He accepted them, in his tolerant way, until he knew them. When he learned to know them, the fires of his indignation would rise. A case in point is his attitude toward Robert Briffault, an outsider to the European scientific tradition who has since found his metier in fiction. Briffault introduced himself to Westermarck a full two years after the publication of *The Mothers*, naturally expecting Westermarck to know of his attacks upon his theories. He did not realize that Westermarck de-

ferred reading current sociological literature until he wished to make use of it. In consequence, the meeting was pleasant. It was not until Havelock Ellis had pointed out to Westermarck some of Briffault's inaccuracies in attacking him and until Victor Calverton had taken up Briffault's cause in American publications that Westermarck became incensed. He stopped being jovial on the subject and shot back with masterly invective at Briffault and Calverton.

For a person who was generally tolerant of errors in the work of others, Westermarck was highly critical of himself. He considered the success of *The History of Human Marriage* to be partly fortuitous. He recognized the inadequacies of the first edition, considered the 1923 edition as a completely new work, and was glad that his reputation in the field would rest on the later publication. But even so, he knew that *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* was a superior piece of work to his more famous publications on marriage. He regretted that it never attained comparable recognition and depreciated *Human Marriage* when he spoke of *Moral Ideas*.

Westermarck was meticulous about his methods of work. He scanned great numbers of books for possible references, carefully noting the beginning and end of useful passages by scratches on the marker slips. After preparing a manuscript, he would personally verify every citation and quotation, apologizing to the library assistants for stacking his desk with mountains of books. Possibly because of his difficulties with the reference work of other authors, he was prissy about indexing. The results are encyclopedic. He spent six weeks writing *A Short History of Marriage*, he told me, and eight weeks in preparing the index.

Westermarck gave a regular lecture course in the summer (spring) term at the School of Economics. Notwithstanding his language difficulty, the course was popular. In informal speeches, he exhibited a sly humor and a gracious informality. In seminar groups, which he held in the office he shared with Hobhouse, he was completely at ease. He participated but little in the discussions; he was less a component, more a catalyst. Yet it was because of him that the group gathered; they respected him and they were fond of him. His seminars were international in complexion and catholic in range of subjects. Scholars like Malinowski and Ginsberg rubbed shoulders with ingenuous graduate students.

Although thousands of English and American students came to know Westermarck personally, and many more thousands knew him through his work, one wonders how many knew him intimately. Possibly the same reserves that made it difficult for him to know us made it difficult for us to know him. Possibly he was so retiring a person that even his own countrymen could not know him well. His memoirs, warm and human like his own personality, devoted far more space to his early years and to his adventures in Africa than to his scholarly activities and associations. He would spend hours with an interested colleague day after day, discussing common interests and exchanging comments on commonplace human activities. Although he knew many distinguished scientists, he seemed not to seek their company, friendly as he felt toward them. In England, at least, he surrounded himself with none of the trappings of distinction, no gilded names, no eccentricities, no worshipful disciples. Havelock Ellis exhibited himself as the portrait of a man of learning, in an elaborate frame, admired by devotees; Westermarck, in contrast, was a sort of bas-relief, rough sculptured, with few lights and shadows.

American sociologists knew Westermarck largely through two monumental works. They will continue to know his works because they are accurate compendiums of useful material. Westermarck himself was probably interested in his own publications not as works of reference but as expressions of ideas. We shall probably

never know how these ideas evolved. We know that Darwin, Wallace, and others influenced him. We know that he had contacts with leading thinkers of the past generation and of this. We do not know how much his ideas developed from such contacts, how much from armchair thinking after library hours. We know the products; some of us felt we knew the mechanism; we shall probably never know the motivation.

Westermarck will be remembered not as the founder of a school of social thought but as an individual. He is important as a sociologist because of the things he brought to sociology—an inquiring mind, an interest in people, an incomparable ubiquity.

GEOFFREY MAY

# BOOK REVIEWS

## BOOK REVIEW EDITORS

HOWARD BECKER AND T. C. MCCORMICK  
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

<i>Symposium on the Work of Sigmund Freud. American Journal of Sociology</i> , November, 1939. Read Bain.....	127
Vialatoux: <i>De Durkheim à Bergson</i> ; Durkheim: <i>L'Évolution Pédagogique en France</i> , Vol. I; Ray, ed.: <i>Annales Sociologiques</i> , Série C, Fascicule 3. Harry Alpert.....	129
Bernard: <i>Social Control; In Its Sociological Aspects</i> . Richard Hays Williams.....	131
Mosca: <i>The Ruling Class</i> . Howard Becker.....	132
House: <i>Development of Sociology</i> . Alexander von Schelting.....	134
Belin: <i>La Logique d'une idée-force; l'idée d'utilité sociale et la Révolution française (1789-1792)</i> ; Belin: <i>Les Démarches de la pensée sociale d'après des textes inédits de la période révolutionnaire (1789-1792)</i> ; Sartiaux: <i>La Civilisation</i> . Harry Alpert.....	141
MacIver: <i>Leviathan and the People</i> . Read Bain.....	143
Bouglé, Aron, Halbwachs, et al.: <i>Inventaires III</i> . Carle C. Zimmerman.....	144
Whitehead: <i>The Industrial Worker</i> . Goetz A. Briefs.....	146
Armstrong: <i>The Health Insurance Doctor</i> . Joseph Hirsh.....	148
Strecker and Chambers, Jr.: <i>Alcohol: One Man's Meat</i> . Joseph Hirsh.....	148
Groves: <i>Financing Government</i> . M. C. Elmer.....	149

## UNSIGNED BOOK NOTES

Park, ed.: <i>An Outline of the Principles of Sociology</i> .....	149
Weiss: <i>Reality</i> .....	150
Perry: <i>Toward a Dimensional Realism</i> .....	150
Sutherland: <i>Principles of Criminology</i> .....	150
Wilson and Pescor: <i>Problems in Prison Psychiatry</i> .....	150
<i>The Offender in the Community: Yearbook of the National Probation Association, 1938</i> ...	151
Embree: <i>Indians of the Americas, Historical Pageant</i> .....	151
Childe: <i>Man Makes Himself</i> .....	151
Jankélévitch: <i>L'Alternative</i> .....	152
Gérin-Ricard: <i>L'Histoire des Institutions Politiques de Fustel de Coulanges</i> .....	152
Anderson and Eells: <i>Alaska Natives</i> .....	152
Espinosa: <i>Spanish Folk-Tales From New Mexico</i> .....	153
Riggs: <i>The Romance of Human Progress</i> .....	153
Sohrab, ed.: <i>The Bible of Mankind</i> .....	153
<i>Mensch en Maatschappij</i> . Vol. XV, No. 4, July 15, 1939.....	154
Frazer: <i>Totemica. A Supplement to Totemism and Exogamy</i> .....	154
Nogué: <i>L'Activité Primitive du Moi</i> .....	154
Stewart, Dewhurst, and Field: <i>Does Distribution Cost Too Much?</i> .....	155
Lindstrom: <i>The Church in Rural Life</i> .....	155
Rotha: <i>Documentary Film</i> .....	155
Carter and Ogden: <i>Everyman's Drama</i> ; McCleery and Glick: <i>Curtains Going Up</i> .....	156

*Symposium on the Work of Sigmund Freud.* AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, November, 1939. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. 309-451. \$1.00.

This issue contains eleven short appraisals of Freud's work by eleven eminent students. Both the followers and negative critics agree that Freud has profoundly influenced the thought of the modern world.

Ellis, in one of his last articles, gives Freud credit for helping to crack our sanctity-obscenity reaction to sex. It would have come, of course, without Freud. Since, as Ellis says, Freud's emphasis was largely pathological on the one hand and amateurish on the other, I personally believe the recognition of sex would have been more scientific, and thus healthier and sounder if Freud had not, to a considerable degree, stolen the show from men like Ellis. Ellis says Freud was more artist than scientist, but that his influence in the latter field was by no means unimportant—chiefly, I should say, as a stimulus and a challenge.

Brill writes of Freud's influence in the United States. One gets the impression that this was largely due to Brill's thirty-one years of active exposition as translator, practitioner, and lecturer.

Jelliffe regards Freud's contributions to psychiatry as skepticism of the hereditary etiology of neuroses and psychoses, his techniques for uncovering their etiology, and his Id-Ego-Superego triad to reveal the bio-sociological conflict as the basis of personality conflict. His early writings (25 articles) were all neurological. At present, Freud's ideas have become a constituent part of American psychiatry.

Zilboorg concludes that psychoanalysis has a potentially great contribution to make to sociology. The great obstacles are the rejection of instincts and the tendency to speak of social neuroses and psychoses in the same sense as Freud speaks of individual neuroses. Freud never intended this. The real contribution of Freud to the understanding of social phenomena is found in the doctrine of the "return of the repressed." This substitutive, compensatory type of behavior may manifest itself in social as well as individual behavior. Most sociologists, I think, are more likely to go "forward with Horney" than back with Zilboorg to the Freud of the intrauterine drives, death wish, murder instinct, and so on.

Burgess's discussion of Freud's influence on American sociology is more likely than Zilboorg's to appeal to sociologists. He calls 1909 to 1919, the "period of resistance," due to the feeling that sex was overemphasized as a motive, thus violating the antiparticularistic point of view; the emphasis upon instinct rather than culture; the apparent absurdity of some basic concepts such as the castration complex, penis envy, "money equals feces," father-murder, etc.; doubt as to the scientific nature of the therapy; the absorption of sociologists in their own work, which was departing in method and theory from the introspectionist approach. This is represented by the human document method of dealing with the "subjective" factor and the statistical method of dealing with the "objective" factor.

Since 1920, more interest in psychoanalysis has been shown by sociologists. Many of its terms have been adopted, even though the general theory

has not; attempts have been made to test Freudian theories, largely with negative or inconclusive results; and some significant work has been done pointing toward a sort of synthesis of psychoanalysis and sociology, as in the work of Healy, Horney, Malinowski, Mead, and others. Needless to say, the sociological-psychoanalytic approach involves revisions quite unpalatable to orthodox Freudians. Burgess holds that Freud's main contributions to sociology are emphasis on the role of the unconscious, wish fulfillment, and the formation of dynamic patterns in personality development, especially during the early years.

Lasswell emphasizes the importance of the "intensive insight interview" for the social sciences, and the necessity for a more precise definition and use of terms than Freud supplied. Lasswell's essay is something of a contribution itself—one of the most suggestive in the symposium.

Burke finds Freud "suggestive almost to the point of bewilderment." His essay on "Freud—and the Analysis of Poetry" is bewildering to me—too many words for what he seems to be saying. I could get more out of his abstract than from the article itself, which is the longest and "least suggestive" of the eleven. He criticizes Freud for regarding art as a dream derivative, for emphasizing the patriarchal and neglecting the matriarchal factors, and for underemphasizing the communicative (the poem as prayer and chart) aspects of art. One of his main criticisms is of the Freudian symbols. This is all very good (and obvious) and could have been said better in half the space.

Healy holds that psychoanalysis has been overvalued in connection with behavior problems, but that this is not the fault of Freud. That the unconscious "dynamisms," as Healy prefers to call them, play a major part in behavior is now incontrovertible, but that these are all or largely due to repressed sex is highly dubious, and the Freudian symbolisms involved are perhaps still more doubtful. He pleads for a closer collaborative relation between psychiatry—with its newer psychoanalytic understandings—and sociology.

Horney's attempt to define neurosis is also a contribution rather than a historical-critical evaluation like all the other articles except Lasswell's. However, her statement is essentially the same as she has made elsewhere.

Wittels is essentially "orthodox" in his condemnation of the "neo-Adlerians"—those who emphasize the social situation in the etiology of neuroses. Since Adler emphasized this, he says, these "new" discoveries are really rediscoveries, and their proponents cryptomnesiacs who substitute "Free Will," "the Dignity of Man," etc., for the scientific determinism of Freud. So Wittels, with Jung's collective unconscious in one hand and infantile sexuality in the other, makes a masculine protest against the social situation theorists and cries "Forward to Freud!"

Kroeber, who reviewed *Totem and Taboo* twenty years ago, returns to questions it raised then without having had to change his mind. He mentions Freud's confusion of the historical and psychological (the primal parricide), his indifference to the relation of his theories to other scientific knowledge, and the all-or-none attitude of his followers (Jones's reaction to

Malinowski's studies; Roheim's remarks on coitus posture), as reasons why only some of Freud's concepts have found their way into the general scheme of science. Freud himself was more open-minded and tolerant than many of his followers. His was "one of the greatest minds of our day."

This is a too brief indication of what will be found in this special issue of *The American Journal of Sociology*. The editors are to be congratulated for having printed these papers. The general conclusion I draw is that Freud was primarily a stimulator. He started something. He himself was an artist with a tolerant, exploratory, extremely ingenious mind, essentially scientific in his attitude, but not very scientific in his performance. Certainly he himself was not a cultist, but he founded a cult, or perhaps one should say a cult grew up among those who identified themselves with Freud as a father image; and other cults grew up among those who rejected him and committed the psychic (or poetic) counterpart of the primal parricide. On the other hand, scientists have tended to join neither cult—i.e., they have remained scientists, accepting and rejecting on the basis of evidence. Both types of reaction are represented in this symposium.

READ BAIN

*Miami University*

*De Durkheim à Bergson.* By J. VIALATOUX. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1939. Pp. 197. 18 frs.

*L'Évolution Pédagogique en France, Vol. I: Des origines à la Renaissance.* By ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1938. Pp. 223. 25 frs.

*Annales Sociologiques, Série C, Fascicule 3.* Ed. by J. RAY. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1938. Pp. 138. 40 frs.

Every culture develops its own sociology, its own theories, more or less systematic, more or less conscious, of the nature of institutions, of the relations between the individual and the group, and of other such social questions. For a social structure must of necessity be supported by an ideological framework which resolves these problems and thus facilitates group practices. The existence of this culturally developed and culturally oriented sociology renders more difficult, however, the tasks of a *scientific* sociology, since in most regards the fruits of scientific sociological investigation will conflict with, or at the very least will call into question, the prevailing cultural beliefs. Witness the incessant struggle between the Durkheim school of French sociology and the apologists of Christianity. First it was Depløige who, in certain respects of what is one of the most incisive analyses of Durkheimian sociology, invokes Saint Thomas Aquinas to prove Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl in error. Now it is M. Vialatoux who calls upon Bergson to reveal the sterility of any naturalistic, i.e. scientific, sociology that denies that "life has a meaning, that the search for this meaning is possible, that philosophy is this very search, and that, finally, this search ends in an 'experience of God' which is not a chimerical fable-creation, but a fact, and a gift of Love" (p. 180).

*From Durkheim to Bergson* aptly indicates M. Vialatoux's bias. Durk-

heim's sociology, the last hope of an everywhere thwarted positivism, the dying gasp, so to speak, of naturalism, is stripped of all its pretentiousness, is exposed in all its glorious impotence by Bergson's *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. This is M. Vialatoux's thesis. Part I consists of two chapters, the first briefly summarizing the Durkheimian views of ethics and religion and of sociological methodology, and the second critically evaluating—devaluating, to use a play on words of M. Vialatoux—the Durkheimian position. Part II follows a symmetrical pattern, a first chapter outlining Bergson's famous volume on *The Two Sources*, the second offering M. Vialatoux's reflections. A concluding chapter of "Final Reflections" begins by explaining Durkheimism as an historical event in terms of "a sort of psychoanalysis of the contemporary soul" (p. 182), and ends by urging the need to cap social science by a "social reflection" which would consist of "entering progressively into Being by entering into Love and of recognizing that it is all one" (p. 194).

Persons interested in Durkheim's and Bergson's views would do better to consult the original sources; they have merits of clarity and literary finesse that M. Vialatoux's own style lacks. As for his critical comments, there is little to be gained from them by those familiar with other sources.

Durkheim seems to continue to dominate the French sociological scene, even from the grave. To the already significant list of posthumous works from his pen, there is now added, thanks to the editorial labors of Professor Halbwachs, Durkheim's lectures, delivered at the University of Paris in 1904-05, on the history of French secondary education. Published under the rather pretentious title of "Pedagogical Evolution in France," they constitute a most significant monographic contribution to the sociology of educational institutions and serve further as an object lesson in how historical investigation, carefully exploiting primary as well as secondary sources, can be brilliantly illumined by a sociological conceptual frame of reference. Durkheim's point of departure is the principle that pedagogical systems are the result of determinate social states, that the organization, methods, and contents of schools are responses to the social conditions of the times. With this sociological principle as guide, he traces in this first volume the changing nature of France's secondary education from the early Church and monastic schools, through the Carolingian educational systems, to the founding and flowering of the University of Paris. A second volume brings the story down to the opening of the twentieth century. Of particular significance are Durkheim's observations that pedagogical changes are the result of social changes, that pedagogical procedures are subject to a process of ossification, i.e., they tend to become stereotyped and mechanically routinized, that, consequently, the history of curriculum changes has been the history of one formalism succeeding another, and that the rate of pedagogical change appears to be slower than that of economic, political, and technological change, hence the appearance in our school systems of "cultural lags." This is sociological history at its best.

The *Annales Sociologiques* continue the excellent critical bibliographical

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services for which the *Année Sociologique* was so justly famous. The third fascicle of Series C, devoted to Juridical and Ethical Sociology, reviews recent publications in the fields of law, ethics, political organization, criminology and penology, international law, family organization, and moral statistics. In addition, there are two monographs. The first, by Professor Henri Lévy-Bruhl, son of the late Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, examines the sociological notion of "collective personality" as it is reflected in law. The author urges the rejection of the individualistic thesis that the law is not concerned with groups as such, but only with individuals. The jurist, he concludes, "can find in the principles of sociologists the support necessary to rid himself, once and for all, of the individualistic prejudice, and to affirm categorically the existence of collective personalities" (p. 13). The second monograph, by Jean Ray, editor of Series C, examines the idea of "international community" as revealed in treaties from the sixteenth century to our own times. Although it underestimates the growing strength of nationalistic sentiments, it does call attention to the value of treaties as sociological source materials.

HARRY ALPERT

*College of the City of New York*

*Social Control; In Its Sociological Aspects.* By L. L. Bernard. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939. Pp. viii+711. \$4.00.

This book purports to be a study of social control as a special discipline, or "sub-science," which is assigned to the general science of sociology.

The following specific criticisms apply to Bernard's methods and concepts presented in Part I, the first three chapters of the book.

The field of social control is defined in relation to problems of classification of the social sciences. Such discussions are apt to be sterile unless pursued with methodological acumen. No such acumen is displayed. As a result, social control itself is not clearly defined. The classification he gives is based on traditional academic distinctions. One of the most unfortunate results of this approach, in *Social Control*, is identification and confusion of the concepts "psychological" and "subjective." (See especially pp. 6-7, 46-47.)

The "outline statement of the field of Social Control" (pp. 7-9) rests upon a distinction between "Conditioning Factors in Social Control" and "Techniques of Social Control." The author seems to assume that the important distinction between conditions and means is self-evident. But the inclusion of institutions, symbols, and attitudes under conditions is highly problematical.

The crucial distinction between objective and subjective points of view is treated in an off-hand manner. A typical statement in this respect is as follows: "It is essential only that the theorist in social control should recognize the operation of social control processes" (p. 12). The resulting confusions are particularly conspicuous in the discussions of aims and ends, the "effectiveness" of social control, freedom from value judgments, knowledge

vs. technique, and tradition *is* science. (See especially pp. 13, 16, and all of chapter II.)

Chapters II and III amount to an hypothetical history of a hypothetical mankind in which one "criterion" or one "technique" of social control "rises from" and "follows" another. A miraculous evolutionary trend runs throughout this "history." Its "sociological gradient" is a "gradual development" from force to fear, to fraud, to super-natural power, to custom and ritual, to regimentation, to utilitarian and ethical sanctions, and finally to *science*. Bernard seems to think that social scientists will enlighten mankind, and will effect the complete triumph of ethical control. Perhaps it is refreshing to find a positivistic and evolutionary optimist in times such as these!

In the first place it may be criticized on pedagogical grounds. It is written on a very elementary level. Most courses in social control are offered as part of the senior division program, and an elementary knowledge of the field is certainly to be pre-supposed. The problems of social control are of such a character, both theoretically and empirically, that they can be used as an avenue of transition between introductory presentations of sociology and studies in advanced sociological theory. This book fails to meet this pedagogical need. It amplifies, but does not deepen, sections on social control to be found in elementary texts.

In the second place, it may be criticized on grounds of general style. It contains far too many quotations from other works. Parts II and III amount to a source book on various means of social control. Some continuity may be found, but it is weakened in this way. Are we approaching the dark ages of compilations of compilations?

These two criticisms point to a third, which is the most fundamental. The book is not based on any clear-cut *analytical* schema. Such schemas already exist, and it is squarely up to the writer in this field to criticize and develop them, or to propose alternatives and demonstrate their scientific superiority.

It may be objected that this book is intended as a textbook for undergraduates. It does contain many interesting readings in social control. But in the opinion of this reviewer, textbooks should at least be based on an analytical schema, even though this schema is not developed explicitly and in full detail. The subject matter of this book is an important one, and Bernard has contributed to its development by this compilation of descriptive material; but in terms of the contentions made above, he has not gone far enough.

RICHARD HAYS WILLIAMS

*University of Buffalo*

*The Ruling Class*. By GAETANO MOSCA, translated by HANNAH D. KAHN. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939. Pp. xli+514. \$4.50.

Livingston's services in connection with Pareto's *Mind and Society* will be gratefully acknowledged by everyone, including those who feel that the

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effort expended in Englishing the "Karl Marx of Fascism" was not entirely worth while. Whatever reservations one may have with regard to Pareto, however, are cast aside in studying this magnificent version of Mosca. The translator, Hannah D. Kahn, seems to have done full justice to Mosca's Ciceronian periods, even though sometimes compelled to resort to the heroic expedient of chopping them in two or three pieces. Livingston's introduction is far more than the usual "stand up, shut up, and sit down" sort of thing that editors plaster on books for the sake of getting a little recognition in return for a minimum of work. It is quite apparent that Livingston has done very careful research into the whole biographical and literary context of the present treatise, and has succeeded in expressing the results of his labors in a genuinely distinguished manner.

Mosca has been slighted by American social scientists. Altogether apart from the question as to whether or not Pareto plagiarized him, there can be no doubt that he has exercised a literally tremendous influence on Italian political scientists, historians, economists, and the occasional forlorn sociologist who has been permitted to exist in the land of Il Duce. Michels, for example, must have leaned heavily on Mosca in his epochal treatise on the sociology of political parties (the title was impiously translated as "The Law of Oligarchy in Political Parties" by some Englishman who apparently identified sociology with Herbert Spencer).

The burden of Mosca's argument is that any social organization inevitably engenders a controlling elite in whose hands the actual destinies of the organization reside. Formal political structure, whether of parliamentary, collectivistic, or other character, never functions without the men behind the scenes who carry out their purposes regardless of checks and balances, official restrictions, and the like. His method is not comparative in the best sense, but rather, illustrative. This is indeed a serious defect, for by the judicious selection of examples one can prove almost anything. Nevertheless, the wealth of material brought in support of the various theses is so great that the charge of *ex parte* argument is hard to sustain. The case might be better proven, but proven it undeniably is. Here we have Giddings's old championing of protocracy taken up by a writer far removed from him in intellectual background and social milieu, and carried through to a triumphant conclusion which Giddings would have been the first to acclaim.

The only serious doubt raised by the proof has to do with Mosca's avowed liberalism of the "representative system" type. He has so thoroughly exposed the glaring weaknesses of any parliamentary liberalism that it is somewhat difficult to see how he can justify his proclaimed allegiance. But after all, it is perhaps unfair to require a destructive analyst to provide something new to take the place of the programs he demolishes. If we do not impose this demand on Mosca, our approval can be very far-reaching indeed.

HOWARD BECKER

University of Wisconsin

*Development of Sociology.* By F.N. HOUSE. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1936. Pp. viii+456. \$4.00.\*

The purpose of this "review" is to deal with House's book (somewhat belatedly, I fear) to the end of pointing out some problems, difficulties, and "prejudices" generally involved in any attempt to present a history of sociology.

In the preface the author says: "It is inevitable that, in the preparation of such an account, considerable reliance will be placed upon secondary sources," the literature being "too extensive for any one person to have first-hand acquaintance with all of it" (p. v). If one takes sociology in a very indefinite and broad sense, the statement quoted above may be correct. What can be demanded, however, is this: The "secondary" information must be "first-class," and the historian of sociology must have, at least, an exhaustive "first-hand acquaintance" with, and a real understanding of, all the *important* authors and theories. The value of his achievement may be proportionate to the extent of his own studies of the original material. This means that a definite principle of qualitative selection is needed. The first condition of meeting successfully the requirement of qualitative selection and "reduction" of the historical material to a reasonable size is, of course, that one has a clear idea of what "sociology" is, or ought to be. I find no such idea in the book.

In Chapter II (Part II) on the "Beginnings of Political Theory," House seems to look down with some disdain on this "early" epoch of intellectual history, though he admits that in some branches of Greek culture the attainments were "rather [!] high" (p. 15 ff.). Though the treatment of Aristotle is fairly adequate, very little information is given about the content of his theories, and one wonders in what sense he was a "Platonist" (p. 16).

The same applies, on the whole, to the treatment of social thinkers in the "Period of Social Theory from 300 B.C. to 1300 A.D." (Chap. III). One wonders what this curious periodization may mean and how it can be justified! An epoch of intellectual history is not constituted simply by putting together two arbitrary dates. One wonders why Cicero, Zeno, Polybius, and St. Augustine should be counted in the *same* period of intellectual history. . . .

In Chapter IV the "turn" of political theory to "objectivity" is treated. "Objectivity" itself receives here a new definition as compared with one previously given.<sup>1</sup> "Objectivity" is limited here to "practicable" knowledge, "practicable" in terms of human "needs" (which are "subjective," of course!). No attempt is made to substantiate this "pragmatic" position. House seems to take it for granted. It is obvious, however, that false,

\* Editorial note: This review has been reduced to less than one half its original length [H.B.]. The book was placed in the reviewer's hands in 1936.

<sup>1</sup> "Objectivity" is defined there (p. 11) as "an attitude of mind" which regards features of the environment as "objects" or "things" behaving according to the laws of their nature and in response to the impact of external forces rather than as animate beings! One wonders to what school of philosophy House owes this curious definition!

non-provable, or fully unreal "ideologies" have often proved to be more "practicable" and practically more efficient than most scientific, objective truths have ever been. It is also obvious that the application of the principle of "practicability" necessarily involves a great *limitation* of scientific interest, and, therefore, a restriction of objective cognition. Similar remarks might be made about the two succeeding chapters, but House does not bother about questions like that.

Part III of the book deals with "Social Science in Europe from 1700 to 1914." One wonders again about the peculiar periodization! In the first chapter (VI) of this division devoted to the "Differentiation of Economic from Political Theory" (p. 61), no serious attempt is made clearly to define this distinction between the "political" and the "economic" and their relation to sociology.

The next chapter (VII) treats the "Progress of Historiography." Beginnings of historiography, several great political historians, and, later on, "Natural History of Institutions" (Chap. XIII), and "Development of Human Geography"<sup>2</sup> (Chap. XII), etc., are extensively treated without any real clarification of what all this has to do with the development of sociology or with the actual contents of this science (and what variety of it).

The absence of a clear distinction between the "origins" of sociological thinking, that is, the *first becoming aware of sociological problems*, on the one hand, and the *sources* of sociology—that is, previously and elsewhere accumulated, sociologically relevant knowledge and materials, either actually utilized or utilizable—on the other, has, again and again, its unfortunate influence on this book.

In the main, it is in various *historical* sciences, in cultural anthropology and in social statistics, that the sociologist can find important "sources" of sociologically relevant materials; the "origins" of sociology, however, in the sense indicated above, have much to do with those systems of ideas which are usually labeled "philosophy of history." But House does not see the difference clearly. Though his book contains a special chapter (VIII) on the "Philosophy of History," the essential fact does not come out distinctly; namely, significant problems of the new science called sociology originated in the philosophy of history. It is from Hegel and Marx, as philosophers of history, for instance, that an important branch of sociological research and theory has received powerful stimulation: viz., the "sociology of culture," especially the theory of "ideologies" and the so-called "sociology of knowledge."

Just as the chapter on the "Differentiation of Economic from Political Theory" lacks a clear conception of this distinction, also the chapter (IX) on "Society and the State" suffers from the indefiniteness of its basic concepts. I believe that *a history of sociology cannot be successfully written without the author's having achieved conceptual clarity about the basic phenomena in question. He must have some theory of his own concerning them.* It is not suffi-

<sup>2</sup> Ibn Khaldun is mentioned in this chapter, but one misses him in the chapter on the philosophy of history.

cient simply to use traditional terms without making their meaning and contents precise.

Chapter XI, on "The Organic Analogy," in essence deals only with Herbert Spencer. The other "organologists" (even the interesting Schaeffle) are barely mentioned. The exposition, apparently based on Lichtenberger's and on Small's work on Spencer and on Spencer's own *Principles of Sociology*, is fairly satisfactory. The same applies to the rather good presentation of Gumpłowicz's sociological theories in Chapter XIV, on "Social Darwinism," which is interesting enough to lead to the reader to study the original. Also the exposition of the main doctrines of Gabriel Tarde and Ferdinand Tönnies can be considered as satisfactory, though it is not exhaustive and occasionally is not very clear.

And finally, the reports on the sociological work of Durkheim, LeBon, and McDougall presented (with Tarde again) in a chapter (XVII) entitled "The Beginnings of Collective Psychology," are fairly adequate and interesting. One surmises the presence of "first-hand" information in these cases.

What is really disturbing in all these chapters of the book, as well as in the preceding and the following ones, is that this "history of sociology" produces again and again the painful impression of being a mere collection of divergent "opinions."<sup>3</sup> No attempt is made to test, to evaluate, and to compare the relative intrinsic value of various theories and conceptions which have been produced in the long "development of sociology." We are told occasionally that this or that "opinion-like" theory has been "accepted" or "refuted" by such and such a sociologist, or by a group of sociologists, or by "a majority"; that such and such a conception has gained a considerable "numerical" influence, etc. But it is in vain that we repeatedly ask the questions: What is the *inner meaning* of this acceptance or refutation? What are the logical and/or empirical grounds on which acceptance or refutation of a theory can or can not be based? What are their claims to validity? House appeals occasionally to a majority of "opinions." *He almost never appeals to reason, logic, and empirical facts!* The result is that, when reading his book, we seem to move all the time in a sphere of "non-obligatory" beliefs. Any one of them seems to be just as good as any other. Intellectual giants and pitiful pigmies are quoted in the same breath. Everybody is "allowed" to have an "opinion" without any visible substantiation and justification.

It is not much different with House's treatment of the *factual* development of sociology: the origin, the succession, and the relative influence of ideas. It is often difficult, or even impossible, to derive from his presentation of various currents, schools, and authors in theory and research what their influence might have been in the "development of sociology."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> On p. 380, for instance.

<sup>4</sup> Examples of these are the chapters on the "Development of Human Geography" (XII), though here some connection with the "ecology" of our day is established; and chapter (XV) on "Some Antecedents of Psychological Sociology," in which Herbart, Steinthal, Lazarus, Wundt, and Ribot are assembled. I was unable to find out what particular kind of sociology this "psychological sociology" represents, especially since later on Tarde, Tönnies, and even Max Weber are also considered as "psychological" sociologists.

As far as estimates of influence are given, they seem to me to be arbitrary and to lack substantiation. Comparatively little importance is attributed to Comte, Spencer, and Marx, whereas the significance of Gumpłowicz, W. I. Thomas, and Sumner seems exaggerated. *It often remains obscure, of course, whether House's evaluations refer to the inner value or to the extent of the influence of various theories.* For the most part, House inclines to follow in his estimates some rather superficial criteria, such as are the growing number of textbooks or teachers accepting a theory, etc. (see p. 359).

In any case, there is in this book *no clearly distinguishable central core of problems that could be considered as the main objects of sociological cognitive endeavor, and around which the discussion of the historical material could be centered in order to demonstrate the changing or developing solutions and treatments given to those problems in various periods, in various places, and by various representatives of the "development of sociology."* This is, however, a way in which a history of sociology can really be written. The precondition of its application is, however, that one has an idea of what "sociology" is, and especially that one is conscious of a group of still living, pertinent, and fundamental problems, the development of which is to be followed in intellectual history. All this, unfortunately, is not the case with House.

The consequence is that there is no real "inner" order in this book, no systematic "cohesion." Valuable *comparisons and parallelizations* of various attempts to approach the *same*, or a similar, fundamental problem (though possibly treated under a different name!) are absent.<sup>5</sup>

Part IV (Chaps. XVIII, ff.) of the book is devoted to "American Sociology before 1918." We have here again a rather curiously manifold principle for the repartition of the historical material in individual chapters; it is partly historical-epochal, partly systematic-problematic, partly topical, partly geographical (European and American sociology). The result of this method of treating and dividing the historical material into epochs, problems, topics, and regions is a considerable amount of repetition.<sup>6</sup>

But House offers here some interesting factual information and a reasonable interpretation of factors which have stimulated sociological interest in the United States. Especially important is the reference to American

<sup>5</sup> House has become the victim of labels and does not dare to disregard them even when the subject seems to require it. He is puzzled again and again whether or not so-called "social psychology" (see Chap. XXVII on "American Social Psychology") really "belongs" to sociology, without offering any clear answer to the question, in spite of his somewhat obscure distinction of several kinds of "social psychology." He does not see that divisions between the sciences are not simply due to a kind of allotment to them of objectively different, independent, and exclusive subject matters, but to specific *problems* (see p. 295). He does not see either that the departmental divisions of teaching, by which he is also much puzzled, cannot be expected to demarcate *logically* pure scientific types. The combination of scientific material offered in the departments follows traditionally established lines and practical needs of education and instruction.

<sup>6</sup> The chapters especially affected by this procedure are: "Some Antecedents of Psychological Sociology" (Chap. XV, Part III), "Beginnings of Collective Psychology" (Chap. XVII, Part III), "Social Forces and Instincts" (Chap. XIX, Part IV), "American Social Psychology" (Chap. XXVII, Part V).

"humanitarianism" and its critique of society as over against the *laissez-faire* economists and "social Darwinists."<sup>7</sup>

In addition, several accounts and discussions of individual authors here and in the last part (V) of the book are rather adequate and are apt to stimulate reading of the original.<sup>8</sup>

In other points, however, this part of House's book, as the last one (V) on "Specialization and Research in American Sociology," presents the same weak points. In his discussion of the shift from "speculation" to research he leaves the reader entirely in the dark as to what *his* viewpoint is on the question of the eventual "completion" of research by theory and on the desirability of their coexistence. One is unable to understand whether this "completion" is not taking place, *will* not, or *should* not take place (p. 294).

When, however, House occasionally *does* express more definite opinions and makes judgments of value, they sound curious enough. We quote here, as an example, his statement on Znaniecki's *Method of Sociology*: [It] "is in some respects the most profound discussion of sociological methodology that has been developed to the dimensions of a fair-sized volume in the English language up to the time of its publication" (p. 384). We quoted, *nota bene*, House's statement *exactly* as it stands.

House seems to wonder (p. 281 and elsewhere) that Sumner, whom he considers an "individualist," shows interest in, and even treats scientifically, "collective" and "mass" phenomena. House seems to believe that "individualism" and recognition of the existence of "collective phenomena" are incompatible. Professing "individualism," in any one of the possible meanings of the term, does not involve any moral or logical obligation to deny that "collective" phenomena also exist and require investigation! Something like an incompatibility between the two is created only when the absurd assumption enters the mind that "collectivities" are independent "entities," existing in addition to, or "behind," or "beyond," the single individuals and their mutual relationships constituting a "collectivity."

Of course in a sense any "collectivity," any social group, does "possess" this "super-real," "super-individual," "mystical" quality of an independent "entity" existing in addition to or beyond any single or all single individuals in it. It "possesses" such a quality for the *naïve individual members of the group*, and "exists" in the *vague ideas* or "*feelings*" they have about the "whole" to which they belong.

There are some more disturbing points in the last parts of House's book.

<sup>7</sup> See Chap. XVIII on "The Rationalization of Philanthropy and Social Reform."

<sup>8</sup> This applies especially to the reports on W. G. Sumner, and as far as I can judge, on William James, J. M. Baldwin, C. A. Ellwood (Chap. XXVII on "American Social Psychology"), whereas C. H. Cooley's sociological and epistemological ideas are rendered inadequately. They are more important than they appear to be in this book. Less satisfactory, as it seems to me, is the treatment of L. F. Ward and A. W. Small (Chap. XX on "The American Science"). The exposition of the main contents of LePlay's sociology is interesting and stimulating (Chap. XXXII on "Statistical Methods and Case Studies"), and the mention of Durkheim in this chapter as a sociologist making adequate use of statistics is correct and valuable (p. 369 ff.). First-hand information seems to have been a favorable influence here, too!

(1) Repeatedly, House inclines to a *confusion between "theory" on the one hand and "speculation" or "philosophy" on the other* (see pp. 377-379). He does not seem to see the difference between *mere speculation* and well-founded, logically necessary generalizations. It is curious to see that "generalization" has become a term for vagueness and "speculation" (see pp. 382, 384, 377-379). Every physicist, chemist, botanist, etc., knows that his *exact and empirical science is a system of generalizations!*

(2) Still worse is the confusion between *sociological theory* (or "systematic" or "general" sociology)<sup>9</sup> and *methodology* (see pp. 300, 302, 377-379, 382, 384). It must be stated most categorically that the two are not intrinsically bound up with each other, even though one and the same sociologist may devote himself to both in the same book, and even though this is highly desirable. Logically, theoretical sociology as well as "social research" are in a sense the *subject-matter* of methodology, which critically analyzes the logical meaning of their actual *procedure* and then "prescribes" that which is logically required. Building up of concepts like *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, for instance, is a task of sociological theory. The same holds true for the question of whether or not the contents of these concepts are in keeping with the social realities they refer to, etc. The general question, however, about the *logical nature* of such concepts, the question, for instance, whether they are "generic" (class) concepts or "constructed types," the general problem of the role which such concepts fulfill in our thinking about social reality, etc., belong to the methodology (or the logics) of sociology.

(3) The treatment which House gives to the difference between the "case method" and the "statistical method" (Chap. XXXII) must be equally refuted. It reproduces the frequently expressed, uncritical assertion of the incompatibility between the "statistical approach" and *Verstehen* ("understanding," p. 375). The "case method," on the other hand, is almost identified with what House terms the *method* of understanding. It should be clear, however, that no contradiction exists between statistics and *Verstehen*; there is no reason whatever why *typical* motives and motivational complexes of meaning of *many* individuals in *mass-conduct*, as studied by statistics, should be *less* "understandable" than those of a *single* person in a *specific* case of *individual* conduct. In truth, the opposite is often the case.

The other chapters of the last part (V) of the book, "Specialization and Research in American Sociology," are devoted to the following topics: "Social Evolution and Progress" (Chap. XXVI), "Social Pathology and Criminology" (Chap. XXVIII), "Urban and Rural Sociology" (Chap. XXIX), "Population and Race Relations" (Chap. XXX), "The Family, the Child, and the School" (Chap. XXXI). As far as I can see, House gives here a fairly complete account of the existing literature. What is surprising here is that the author does not ask the question: Why just *these* topics? And why just "topics," and not *problems*? And in spite of the character

<sup>9</sup> It is not quite clear, of course, whether all these terms mean the same thing in House's usage, hence the obscurity in the mutual relations of Chaps. XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXIII.

presented by this topical differentiation, House thinks he is entitled to talk about *systematic* research (p. 381) in American sociology. "Systematic" in what sense? One is tempted to ask: Should the following topics and problems, which do not appear in House's book, be considered as belonging to the main objects of sociological endeavor in theory and research? (1) A typology of social actions and social relationships; (2) the nature of associations, institutions, and other social formations; (3) the sociological analysis of state, church, sect, political party; (4) leagues, unions, guilds, clubs, secret societies, etc.; (5) the problems of social classes, estates, castes; class-struggle, "social conflict," social movements, revolutions, wars; (6) the problems of elites and ruling groups; (7) the study of the various types of domination and the problems of leadership; (8) the problem of power, authority, and prestige of persons and groups; (9) the problems of social mobility and "advancement"; research on proletariat, peasantry, middle class, "bourgeoisies," and "aristocracies"; (10) sociology of friendship, love, educational relationships, etc.; (11) the study of usages, customs, conventions, fashion; etc., etc., etc.

Had House been clearly aware of the existence of such objects of sociological studies, *then* he would have been able to discover much that is interesting in the work of some modern sociologists. For example, his presentation of Pareto, Simmel, and Max Weber, which is definitely inadequate, would have gained much. The awareness of the kind of topics and problems listed at random above would also have helped House to make his historical regressus into the past of social thought more efficient and interesting; in other words, it would have helped him really to discover sociology in the past!

Our critical comments here and elsewhere should not be misunderstood, however. We are less interested in a critical "destruction" of House's work than in giving some suggestions *pro futuro*. In addition, it must be stated that in spite of all the inadequacies which, in fulfilment of the critic's duty, we were obliged to point out, usefulness cannot be absolutely denied to House's work. Much preliminary factual information can be looked up with profit in his book, and the well-prepared index makes it distinctly usable in that respect.

One can also agree with the idea expressed by House in the introduction (p. 3 ff.): "... the social science of a time and place represents the attempt of thoughtful people to make intelligible ... the circumstances in which they are placed, particularly as those circumstances are thrown into relief by change." The application of this idea, in a historical study of social thought, would lead in the direction of *Wissenssoziologie*, especially if by "circumstances" socio-structural conditions are meant. House's formulation is not specific enough, however, and one could not say that his general insight is concretely applied in his study of the development of social theory. In spite of some occasional interpretations which seem to follow this idea, it cannot be considered as *the* viewpoint from which the book is written.

ALEXANDER VON SCHELTING

Columbia University

*La Logique d'une idée-force; l'idée d'utilité sociale et la Révolution française (1789-1792).* By JEAN BELIN. Paris: Hermann et Cie., 1939. Pp. 635. 120 frs.

*Les Démarches de la pensée sociale d'après des textes inédits de la période révolutionnaire (1789-1792).* By JEAN BELIN. Paris: Hermann et Cie., 1939. Pp. 99. 20 frs.

*La Civilisation.* By FÉLIX SARTIAUX. Paris: Collection Armand Colin, 1938. Pp. 224. 17.50 frs.

Fouillée's name comes immediately to mind when one thinks of "idée-force," but Belin's important contributions are more in the tradition of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl. In 1898 Durkheim wrote that "there is a whole branch of sociology which should study the laws of social ideation" and added that this was a task as yet to be undertaken. In the intervening years, many pioneers, Scheler, Mannheim, Pareto, Lévy-Bruhl, and Durkheim himself, have assiduously pushed back this almost unconquerable frontier of sociological investigation. In the necessary give-and-take between theoretical formulation and empirical research by which a scientific discipline advances, Belin's systematic and judicious exploitation of the archives of the early French revolutionary period is heartily welcome. Here, at last, are made available to the sociologists of knowledge the dominant thought patterns, the major ideational orientations, the compelling modes of reasoning of an exciting and crucial historical moment.

Although he has limited himself to the four-year period 1789-1792, Belin has wisely rested his analysis not only on an examination of the reasoning processes of the members of the Constituent Assembly, but also on the more popular types of thinking observable in the petitions and addresses of interested parties and in the deliberations of local bodies. A comparison of these two different sources permits Belin to note the more spontaneous, the more affective, practical, and collective nature of the chains of thought in the popular documents.

Around the focal concept, or as Belin says, the "sovereign notion" of Social Utility or Public Good develops a whole series of axiomatic ideas summarized in such words as constitution, liberty, equality, sovereignty, law. The deputies utilize these axioms as the basis of their program of action in "regenerating" the state. Sometimes these ideas are viewed as expressions of social utility; at other times social utility is invoked to limit the full application of the practical implications of these notions. Thus the doctrine of public safety is deemed sufficient to justify entrusting the government, i.e., the right to vote, only to those who have a property stake in society. Likewise appeal is made to social utility in order to exclude the colored races in the colonies from enjoying the rights of man contained in the famous declaration on that subject. The petitioners also make social utility king, but they, too, do not follow a strict logic and allow practical considerations, sentiments, and conflicting values to interfere with the logical train of ideas.

Belin pursues this process of interference more analytically in the shorter work. In language reminiscent of Lévy-Bruhl, he describes the

alogical character of the thought of the revolutionary period, its violation of the principle of contradiction, its lack of concern for rigorous causal nexuses, its use of affective categories. Social thought, Belin maintains, rests on a human interpretation, has a human coefficient, and hence cannot be analyzed in terms of the traditional logic. His data confirm the view that Lévy-Bruhl's analyses pertain not to a type of mentality peculiarly primitive, but to all "folk" or "social" mentality.

Two methodological observations are in order. Belin assumes that the petitions contain the opinions of the people. This ignores the selective character of these documents. They represent the will, not of all the people, but only of the literate, energetic, and politically articulate section of the population. At one point Belin introduces equations to schematize the connection of ideas, but he does not assign to them mathematical meanings. This is confusing. In employing mathematical formulations, one should respect the mathematical properties inherent in them.

Belin has produced an encyclopedia of French Revolutionary ideas, an invaluable source book into which the sociologist of knowledge can readily dip with profit.

Civilization is in disrepute. Not only is the phenomenon itself being given but a short life by our present prophets of disaster, but the concept, too, is finding survival extremely difficult, especially among American sociologists. It is gratifying, therefore, to read Sartiaux's introductory materials wherein we find not only a brief etymological history of the concept "civilization" but also an irrefutable plea for the need to make certain fundamental distinctions. Civilization cannot be used in social science, Sartiaux urges, unless we first divorce value judgment from existential descriptions, substitute the scientific for the moralistic method, adopt an integrative, interactional rather than a simplistic, particularistic approach, distinguish the dynamic from the static point of view, sharply differentiate progressive trends from cyclical and other non-progressive types, and make allowance for the phenomenon of chance or accident in human history. Particularly valuable is Sartiaux's redefinition of progress as orthogenesis. This incisive analysis is followed by a bird's-eye view of civilization.

Sartiaux's study is a labor of compression. Several thousands of years in less than two hundred pages is a monument to the art of condensation. Small wonder, then, that Mayan civilization, for example, is described in a single sentence. Small wonder, indeed, that controversial and unsettled issues are presented with a glibness and facileness that lend to them the authority of established fact. Thus Americanists will be amazed at Sartiaux's lack of qualms about presenting the view that the New World was peopled via a series of Antarctic land bridges, and via migrations through a chain of tropical Pacific Islands, in addition to the more firmly established theory of a succession of migrations across Bering Straits. In the main, however, Sartiaux aims at caution, and in many instances confesses that we simply do not know.

In view of the commendable care with which he establishes his basic categories, one is surprised to find Sartiaux concluding on a passionately

pessimistic and somewhat bitter anti-democratic note. He attributes the decadence of civilizations to the glorification of "number," asserts that number inevitably submerges quality, and pleads for the reestablishment of the rule and control of elites. Perhaps the sociologist of knowledge will be able to explain this resurgence of the elite-principle among French intellectuals.

HARRY ALPERT

*College of the City of New York*

*Leviathan and the People.* By R. M. MACIVER. University, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1939. Pp. ix+182. \$2.00.

In three eloquent lectures of about one hundred pages, MacIver shows how and why the "New Leviathan," somewhat crushed to earth for a hundred years by laissez-faire liberalism, has risen again in resurgent power. There are two main species of this state-beast genus, Democracy and Dictatorship. MacIver anatomizes them with razor-edged logic and incisive insight, and presents his conclusions in beautiful, lucid diction. For one who hears as he reads, this little essay is a delight to the inner ear; for one who also sees and touches as he reads, the printers will be thanked for excellent paper, almost perfect printing, sturdy but artistic binding, and fine format. If all the Edward Douglass White Foundation Lectures in Citizenship maintain this standard as to form and content, Louisiana State should be congratulated.

In "The Genius of Dictatorships," MacIver points out that the common trait of all dictatorships is polar extremism. All human thought and action are reduced to these alternatives—the heaven of the dictatorship or the hell of the opposition. Life is all raw color—no tints or shades: "Those who are not for us are against us." Criticism, varieties of opinion, diversity of goals and methods, all the richness and creative possibilities of human aspiration and achievement are reduced to the drab operational performance of the dictatorial routine. Dictatorship is an example of the age-old dichotomy of utter good and unutterable evil—no gray cats in the world. It spawns myths, feeds on intolerance, fear, and suspicion, and waxes fat and ferocious on force and terror. Dictatorships are not alien to human nature, but are born out of the stresses to which the human nature of certain societies is subjected—insecurity, privation, servility, negation of responsibility, the crises of transition. When a considerable proportion of the people find themselves in such a situation, they seek for a messiah, for security by revelation, and the charismatic leader has his chance. However, this emergency state of mind, of over-tense emotionalism, cannot endure forever; the revolt against the dictatorship as a permanent way of life sooner or later ensues. In order to maintain itself, the dictatorship must create crisis after crisis, discover new devils and dragons, make purges and wars, propagandize ever more violently, live by continual shots in the arm of the body politic, and eventually die of its own venom.

In "The Genius of Democracy," MacIver draws a sharp contrast with dictatorship. After presenting a number of false concepts of democracy,

such as majority or mass rule, equality, popularity (by vote), spoils sharing, absence of class distinction, dead levelism, parliamentism, and so on, he finds its positive nature in (1) the separation of *community* and *state* with the latter subordinate and (2) the free expression of divergent opinions. This is a distinction sociologists can understand. When the *government* is identified with the *state* and the state assumes a hegemony among other institutions, denies the people free opportunity to change the government without seriously disturbing the state, and demands supreme allegiance to the state and the subordination of other institutional allegiances, then there is no democracy. Democracy implies voting and political parties, but democracy is not inconsistent with any particular form of government, class system, or economic order. MacIver inveighs against the vagueness and confusion of the term "economic democracy." It is usually a question-begging phrase connoting ends thought to be desirable but MacIver can see no analogy, even, between this and political democracy, which denotes some form of the state. The final argument for democracy is that it is a way of making power responsible, a discovery which MacIver rates among the most important thus far made by man. The great contribution of American democracy is its affirmation of the individual's trust in himself, its tolerance of differences, its lack of class consciousness, its distrust of the repressive powers of government, its irreverence for authority and rank, its refusal to worship the state, its fundamental faith in the common man, in the dignity and potentialities of humanity itself.

MacIver registers his disapproval of the doctrines of many well-known democratic spokesmen—Lippmann, Laski, T. W. Arnold, Cram, Babbitt, Lerner. This is one of the characteristics of democracy—that equally intelligent and serious-minded men should differ strongly about many things, including the meaning of democracy itself, and have a free and equal right, if not obligation, to publish those differences. While I find myself in general agreement with MacIver, I can understand how a fascist or nazimunist might regard this essay as a mass of meaningless maunderings. To them, nonsense; to me, a brilliant and inspired essay—with 70 pages of notes that add substantially to the text.

READ BAIN

*Miami University*

*Inventaires III.* By C. BOUGLÉ, R. ARON, M. HALBWACHS, *et al.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1939. Pp. 354. 20 fr.

Bougé points out in this inventory of the middle classes in western society that while the middle class always exists it has greater difficulties at some times than at others. Since it is between the upper class and the proletariat, any movements among these classes (particularly when the upper and lower get together) are generally at the expense of the middle group. Consequently, what is the middle class, and what is happening to it at the present? Raymond Aron follows with a general analysis of the concept of class. The dual class conceptions of Marx and Pareto (the ex-

ploiters and the exploited, or the governing and the governed) are, according to Aron, too narrow. A class may be characterized by its occupation, its income, its wealth, its place in production, its mentality, its standard of living, its social rank, or by a given *conscience collective* (in the Durkheimian sense). Aron points out the difficulties of a satisfactory definition and is finally driven to the semi-Marxian position that a working conception of a social class must always be in relation to the economic structure. However, he does show, contrary to the Marxian theory, that the proletariat and the bourgeois groups are both radical and both conservative, depending upon the situation. Neither the capitalist nor the laborer has a monopoly of the left or right wing positions.

The next essay, by Maurice Halbwachs, tries to differentiate the middle class, and concludes that it must be marked out entirely with reference to the bourgeois and the proletariat. While the middle groups are not the rulers, they have responsibility, and while not the chief entrepreneurs, they have initiative. The chief characteristic of the middle class is an "activity *technique*" which is "a body of precepts and rules which can be applied in a uniform manner to most problems." He finally paraphrases a statement by de Tocqueville to say that the middle class is essential to any civilization of virtue or grandeur. In other words, he means that a strong middle class is essential to the capitalistic free economy of the type existing from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries.

Then follow eight excellent chapters which deal with the condition of the middle classes in different countries. At the end of the work is a project by H. Mougin for investigating the middle class in France, an appendix on the middle class protective associations, and a good selected bibliography. The eight analyses by countries include Germany by E. Vermeil, Italy by Louis-R. Franck, England by P. Vaucher, United States by R. Marjolin, Belgium by R. Polin, Yugoslavia by D. Yovanovitch, Soviet Russia by V. Feldman, and Sweden by R. Gravier.

What is happening to the middle classes? The answer for most countries, possibly excepting Belgium, is that they are going down. A typical situation of middle class difficulty in a totalitarian or popular-front country is that of a revolt or new movement promising great gains to this class. Such were Fascism and Nazism. The middle classes form a balance in favor of these movements. Then the new governments become engrossed in the *real* issues of Leviathanism, and the middle class, being dispensable, is pushed toward the proletariat. A country in full military swing has no use for small inefficient shops and stores, or even for excess white-collared bureaucrats, no matter what may be their total contribution to the long-run character of the nation. What has taken place in the totalitarian states is also true of the semi-totalitarian and/or the popular-front countries, except possibly Belgium, where the ruling house, like the Danish House in regard to peasant proprietors during the feudal break-up, has championed the middle classes.

This work, while it is not exhaustive, is a model for such symposiums. Contrary to many others, repetition is negligible and the character of the

analyses is both high and uniform. Further, contrary to the general level of sociological writing in this century of crisis and change, the book is intellectual and thoughtful. The work is particularly interesting to the reviewer, who reached somewhat similar conclusions several years earlier (see *American Sociological Review*, April, 1938), but found himself in somewhat of an unpopular minority at that time. Robert Marjolin ends his very penetrating analysis of American life by the statement that while it is yet too early to reach final conclusions it is clear that "*les classes moyennes Américaines sont à leur tour passées à la défensive*" (p. 158).

CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN

*Harvard University*

*The Industrial Worker*. 2 Vols. By T. N. WHITEHEAD. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. Vol. I, xiv+265; Vol. II, viii+10+L-81. \$5.00.

"Management should know more about its human material." This insight prompted the Western Electric Company years ago into a series of experiments concerning the motives and activities of workers in industry. The responsible executive perceived that people "are far more sensitive" than materials of production are, and that the relation between a man and his environment is extremely complex. Hence the desire to examine workers under conditions "which are sufficiently typical of their daily experiences and yet which permit of an orderly investigation not restricted by the necessity of finding an immediate solution to a practical problem." Out of this investigation grew the present book. Its first volume is the analysis of the problem on hand and discussion of the method used; the second volume contains a series of charts presenting the statistical findings (prepared by Helen M. Mitchell).

The surprising and novel approach of this book is the use—in this field of research—of small samples. The group under consideration consists of five relay assemblers, women taken *somewhat at random* from the general relay assembly of the Hawthorne plant. In addition the investigation of this group extended over a period of five years, from 1927 to 1932; during these years the group was confined to a test room. This approach departs substantially from similar investigations—for instance, from the ones conducted by the German Association for Social Politics (*Verein für Sozialpolitik*) under the leadership of Max and Alfred Weber (1910-1914). In these investigations whole branches of industry or, at least, plants were studied with the particular viewpoint of selection of workers and their adjustment to changing industrial conditions. At the 1911 convention of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, the merits of these research undertakings were discussed on the basis of some outstanding contributions already published. Max Weber voiced here some ill-concealed skepticism as to the expectations of clear-cut and practically useful results; he remarked that in nine tenths of the cases the results would not justify the laborious work of statistical

analysis. He hoped, however, for an elite of idealists willing to submit to this laborious research work.

I am convinced that Whitehead is one of the elite Max Weber was visualizing. He must be credited with a very careful and reliable analysis. The present author profited not only from the task Dr. Whitehead had put himself and achieved to a high degree, but he confesses that he got a great many insights into the psychology and sociology of labor in this country—so far as the results of the research done permits generalization.

The objection, of course, is possible: What can such small samples prove at all? Is not this basis too narrow to yield any sensible and convincing results? Whitehead was well aware that here lies a vital problem; therefore he sets out to justify the use of them. To summarize his philosophy about the small sample: It gives no mathematical information as to the homogeneity of the statistical population; the single member in such a sample is the ideal size for gaining insight into the *functioning* of the individual members—provided it can be presupposed that the insights gained from any one member are substantially relevant to any other member. A small sample is sufficient if each member of the set is studied as an enduring organization and if its events are examined in their natural time sequence and in their functional relationships. I agree that the use made of the small sample in this book and the careful abstention from drawing any far-reaching generalizations from it suppresses the objections which are close at hand—objections which von Bortkiewicz, the famous statistician and mathematician from Berlin University, raised at the Convention of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in 1911 against the statistical analyses of the collaborators of Max and Alfred Weber's research into problems of industrial selection and adjustment. Whitehead presents to us an analysis of a *definite* group of five *definite* relay assemblers, and we notice the individual and group reactions on changing conditions of work. In fact, the test group became a kind of an "independent organism with its own processes and regularities." The conditions under which the test was taken favored such a development right from the start. No wonder that considerable gains in output were achieved by the group whatever changes in working conditions were introduced for the sake of the experiment. The group knew that they were a team gathered for a valuable piece of research work—when it lost this belief or got bored of it, it reacted correspondingly. Near the end of the experiment, when they were informed that they would be laid off in a few weeks, they adjusted themselves to the new social situation; they "lost their pride" as one member later on remarked, "and output fell dramatically." Here is a particular reaction of the team working under the very particular conditions set and prepared just for it: they responded with a dramatic decrease in output. If they had been working in the general department for relay assembling, they most probably would have thought it advisable to work unusually hard for the remaining weeks of employment.

Here, it seems to me, the limitation of the small sample is evident. Whitehead has written us a fine and scholarly analysis of a group of five

definite relay assemblers in Hawthorne plant between 1927 and 1932. With regard to this group we are on safe ground because of this study. However, the title of the book reads, *The Industrial Worker*.

GOETZ A. BRIEFS

Georgetown University  
Washington, D. C.

*The Health Insurance Doctor*. By BARBARA N. ARMSTRONG. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939. Pp. xii+264. \$3.00.

In recent years, there have been many books and reports on the principles, structural organization, and functions of health insurance systems abroad. To this list now comes Barbara Armstrong's pithy and highly informative *Health Insurance Doctor*. Her descriptions of health insurance in Britain, France, and Denmark are enhanced by the analysis of the status of health insurance doctors in these countries. To the cross-current of *opinion*, Mrs. Armstrong presents *facts* concerning the much controverted questions of fees, "free choice of physicians," and "doctor-patient relationship" that clarify many issues.

It is unfortunate that the consequence of much of the written and oral expression on health insurance has given rise to questions almost as extreme as Hamlet's. Too often do we hear "Shall we have health insurance or not?" Or "Shall we have a health insurance system like England or France?" Unheated minds do not want categorical answers to these questions. What they want to know is "How much health insurance?" and "How much like or how different from England or France?" Mrs. Armstrong's book helps towards this end by suggesting principles to adapt rather than offering blue-prints upon which an American system can be built.

JOSEPH HIRSH

New York

*Alcohol: One Man's Meat*. By EDWARD A. STRECKER and FRANCIS T. CHAMBERS, JR. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xvi+230. \$2.50.

This book makes two pleas, first, that the general public should not regard alcoholism as an ethical problem, "to be cured only by punishment or prayer," a plea that medical men have made in recent years in connection with venereal disease; and second, that there is a great need for popular understanding of the economic, mental, moral, and physical seduction of men (and women) by alcohol.

The first part of the book is devoted to a description of this seduction. Out of much verbiage, the single underlying motive that we can find for man's taking to drink is his desire to escape from the realities of life. Part II is given over to a discussion of treatment which has as its base the psychoanalytic principle of self-examination and self-expression.

The material presented in this book warrants a paper in a medical journal, not 230 pages. In their endeavor to prove their points, the authors

tend to overemphasize the entire problem, and in so doing, they become lush and prolix. The overemphasis, more than anything else, has left this reviewer with the feeling that "Drink to me only with thine eyes" was a saying well worth remembering.

JOSEPH HIRSH

*New York*

*Financing Government.* By HAROLD M. GROVES. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1939. Pp. xvi+777. \$3.75.

The objective of the book is to cover the principles, practices, and problems of public finance, primarily in order to meet the needs of the students, and secondarily, to present and define a point of view.

The book is divided into five parts: Part I, a brief introduction; Part II, discussion of public revenues; Part III, institutions and problems of the revenue system as a whole; Part IV, public expenditures; Part V, public borrowing. The book as a whole presents the problems of taxation, the shift in the application of specific taxes, administration, and jurisdictional problems.

The section of especial significance to sociologists is Part IV, which deals with the subject of public expenditures. Special attention is directed toward the mechanics of spending agencies, the institutions of public expenditure, and the function for which public money is expended. This section, like the rest of the volume, giving on the one hand factual information concerning the particular problems considered, goes a step further in an attempt to analyze the principles, practices, and problems involved in spending money for public purposes. Differing somewhat from a purely sociological analysis of the social aspects of expenditure for protection, public education, public works, public welfare, and various grants-in-aid, this volume does present a point of view which should balance and round out the more strictly sociological interpretation. The author has no particular program which he is advocating, but in a fair and scholarly manner has presented the situation clearly and effectively, pointing out weaknesses and advantages without giving the impression that he is propagandizing any particular point of view.

M. C. ELMER

*University of Pittsburgh*

#### UNSIGNED BOOK NOTES

*An Outline of the Principles of Sociology.* Ed. by ROBERT E. PARK. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1939. Pp. vi+353. \$2.00.

This book is one of the "outline" series and compares favorably with those in other subjects. With the exception of Part II, Human Ecology, it fulfills its purpose well. Part II takes more than its share of pages, frequently exploits the reader with fine print, and lacks the unpedantic clarity of the rest of the book.

Part I, Social Problems, although ably handled, has a few misleading statements; e.g. "The C.I.O. won many of the elections and A.F. of L. officials as well as employers hurled charges of bias and partiality at the N.L.R.B. members" (p. 38). It should be added that careful study of the facts will generally disprove such charges. And again: "The divorce rate in the United States has for some time been higher than that of any other country in the world" (p. 49). In the 1920's, at least, the U.S.S.R. and probably Japan had higher rates than our own.

Neither in Part V nor elsewhere do I find a clear description of the formalism-disorganization cycle in institutional life. The index is inadequate.

*Reality.* By PAUL WEISS. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1938. Pp. vii+314. \$3.50.

Conceived in the grand manner and performed in a subtilizing style, this wholesale speculation shuttles between theories of Knowing and Being. In its architectonic pretension is evidenced the persistence of Classical tradition; and, in a kind of enigmatic beauty, the influence of Whitehead. It is within a philosophical tradition that offers slim suggestion and no implementation to the mundane sociologist. Social scientists will add nothing to their working conceptions by an attempted reading of the work. But appraised as a contribution to the fine arts, it is very genteel, very esoteric, and not a little elegant.

*Toward a Dimensional Realism.* By CHARLES M. PERRY. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939. Pp. x+180. \$2.50.

Mr. Perry takes nothing less than the Universe for his province, analyzes it into "events," and pulls "dimensions" out of them. Within a philosophical "realist" tradition, the book refracts some of the mana of S. Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity*. The twenty-one page "dimensional interpretation of Society" is partially unintelligible, sociologically unenlightening.

*Principles of Criminology.* Rev. ed. By EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939. Pp. viii+651. \$3.50.

This is a revision of Sutherland's earlier *Criminology* (1924), and *Principles of Criminology* (1934). In this revision a new chapter on the theory of criminal behavior and one on behavior systems in crime have been added. In addition the statistical and factual material has been brought up to date. These chapters attempt to integrate more fully criminology with social theory and to classify crimes which are rolled together under the law into classifications according to their nature and according to the professional interests and attitudes of the perpetrators.

This remains one of the important texts in criminology.

*Problems in Prison Psychiatry.* By J. G. WILSON and M. J. PESCOR. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, 1939. Pp. 275. \$3.00.

Written by a senior surgeon (retired) of the United States Public Health Service, director, division of hospitals and mental hygiene, Department of

Welfare, Kentucky, and by the clinical director, United States Public Health Service Hospital, Fort Worth, Texas, this book is an attempt in thirteen chapters and an appendix to show how by psychiatric classification of prisoners and psychiatric treatment imprisonment may become a more perfect reformatory instrument. The authors point out that by means of the light which psychiatry throws upon the nature of the prisoner, discipline can be improved, education can be better adapted to the individual, and the work assigned to each prisoner can be adapted to the order of the institution and reformation be achieved. It is a much better book than Stearns *The Personality of Criminals*.

*The Offender in the Community: Yearbook of the National Probation Association, 1938.* New York: National Probation Association. Pp. viii + 396. \$1.25 (paper), \$1.75.

This volume consists of the papers presented at the thirty-second annual conference of the Association, held at Seattle, Washington, June 24-29, 1938. It is divided into ten parts: I. The Social Viewpoint in Crime Control; II, Training for work with Delinquents; III. Psychiatric Service; IV. Probation and Parole in Rural Areas; V. The Young Delinquent; VI. Boarding Homes for Delinquent Children; VII. The Individual in the Group; VIII. Teamwork for Delinquency Prevention; IX. Legal Digest; and X. The National Probation Association.

The papers are by authorities in their fields. Each year this Yearbook is perhaps the most important publication in the fields of parole and probation.

*Indians of the Americas, Historical Pageant.* By EDWIN R. EMBREE. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1939. Pp. xi + 260. \$2.75.

The author's purpose is to give a living description of several of the principal cultures of the Americas, both simple and civilized. The book's one drawback is that the style and presentation seem directed at 'teen-age minds, which is possibly intentional. Offsetting this defect is the author's proclaimed wish to be strictly accurate, which he has accomplished by seeking the help of the proper authorities. For this he is to be lauded; too many popular authors on Indians have invented the ethnographical background as they went along.

*Man Makes Himself.* By V. GORDON CHILDE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. xii + 275. \$1.75.

There is no better authority on later prehistoric times than Professor Childe, and none with a greater gift for presenting the simple facts of archaeology in their full historical meaning. The book is consequently an unsurpassed account of the first two steps toward civilization: the "Neolithic revolution," or man's subjugation of his food supply, followed by the Bronze Age appearance of large, complex communities and such vital inventions as the wheel, the plow, and writing. Babylonian and Egyptian writing and arithmetic are simply explained. It is a popular and a scientific book at the same time, a rare achievement.

*L'Alternative.* By VLADIMIR JANKÉLÉVITCH. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1938. Pp. 219. 30 frs.

This book seems to be of very little sociological significance. The author has been trained in that school of French philosophical tradition which places graceful paradoxes on a higher level than close and sustained analysis. The writer is undeniably a man of considerable erudition, but he is just a little too coy.

*L'Histoire des Institutions Politiques de Fustel de Coulanges.* By L. DE GÉRIN-RICARD. Paris: Société Française d'Éditions Littéraires et Techniques, 1936. Pp. 137.

Fustel de Coulanges is known to sociologists primarily for his *La Cité Antique*, translated by Willard Small as *The Ancient City*. His attempt to show strict parallelism between the development of Greek and Roman institutions was a failure, as was likewise the effort to subject all phases of Greek and Roman life to a unilinear religious explanation. Nonetheless, Fustel still is a major figure in the sociology of religion, as is demonstrated by the amount of attention devoted to him by Pareto. An erroneous theory, if it centers on vital points, is oftentimes more important and fruitful than a scrupulously correct theory that deals with the insignificant.

The present volume is devoted to an exposition of the content of one of Fustel's more obscure works, *L'Histoire des Institutions Politiques*. It contains, in addition to the exposition mentioned, several chapters of biographical character, as well as two that attempt to trace the influence of Fustel on his contemporaries and successors. The book is of little significance except for those sociologists who happen to be engrossed in the study of the minutiae of French intellectual development in the nineteenth century.

*Alaska Natives.* By H. DEWEY ANDERSON and WALTER CROSBY EELLS. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935. Pp. xvi+472. \$5.00.

The authors have presented a detailed report of an extensive research program sponsored by the Stanford School of Education, the United States Office of Education, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The research work was carried out in two seasons under considerable difficulties of travel. The report is presented in two parts. Part I is a sociological study of the Alaska Eskimos. The early social status is first discussed from the angles of habitat, physical types, material culture, social organization, economics, and others. The materials for this section were obtained largely from the existing ethnological literature. The second section on the present sociological conditions is largely a first-hand study and presents clearly the contrasts of modern versus ancient Eskimo life.

Part II is an educational study of the Alaska Eskimos. After a review of the school system today, the results of numerous intelligence and achievement tests are given (Stanford-Binet, Goodenough, Stanford Achievement, etc.). The authors are clearly aware of the limitations of such tests, and

are cautious in their conclusions. The final section is devoted to detailed educational recommendations.

*Spanish Folk-Tales from New Mexico.* By JOSÉ MANUEL ESPINOSA. New York: The American Folk-Lore Society, G. E. Stechert and Co., Agents, 1937. Pp. xix+222. \$3.50.

Interesting folk-tales are still remembered by the Spanish-speaking population of New Mexico. The Spanish have been part of New Mexico since the end of the sixteenth century, and in 1910 numbered 175,000. The tales included here were recorded by the author in 1931. They are printed as told in the Spanish language, with English summaries. Indian lore of New Mexico has absorbed many Spanish elements, but in spite of the long period of residence, the Spanish stories are largely European in origin. Over 80 percent have direct peninsular Spanish analogies, and not one can be attributed to a pure Indian source, although several do show Indian influence. The stories are arranged according to themes into such categories as Magic, Religious, Picaresque, and Anecdotal tales.

*The Romance of Human Progress.* By ARTHUR STANLEY RIGGS. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938. Pp. xix+405. \$5.00.

Archaeology, Old World and New, stone age and classic, is treated in the book not from a chronological or geographical angle but by topics such as food and drink, shelter, medical knowledge, hair-dressing, and religion. Not intended for the specialist, the book is directed towards answering in part the questions of the layman.

*The Bible of Mankind.* Compiled and edited by MIRZA AHMAD SOHRAB. New York: Universal Publishing Co., 1939. Pp. 743. \$5.00.

This is a Bahaist bible containing selections from the sacred books of all the world religions. Each of the nine sections into which it is divided has a preface by an outstanding representative of the religion in question, and in spite of the effort, here and there apparent, to exalt the personal faith of the introducer, a considerable degree of unity in diversity is achieved. This much said, let it also be noted that the sociologist as such will derive nothing but edification from the volume. Sacred books, to be understood properly, must be placed in the full socio-cultural contexts within which they have emerged. Simply to say that statements paralleling the Golden Rule, for example, are to be found in the writings of all religious seers tells us very little. To do unto others as we would that others should do unto us may be quite disastrous if the others in question do not share our own conceptions of the supremely desirable. The escape from cultural relativity does not lie in this direction. Some day in the far future the scales of value that now contend with each other for supremacy may have been worked into some all-inclusive pattern, but that day is not yet. In the meantime, we need understanding of divergence more than premature synthesis on the basis of superficial similarity.

*Mensch en Maatschappij*. Vol. XV, No. 4, July 15, 1939. "T Koggeschip," Amsterdam, Holland. Pp. 241-304. 10 florins yearly.

*Mensch en Maatschappij* is now in its fifteenth year, and it might be well to call the attention of American sociologists to the continuing existence of this very useful journal. As is well known, it has been the vehicle for many of Steinmetz's most significant articles, and an inspection of the current issue indicates that the impetus he gave it has continued to carry it in the right direction. "No empty speculation, but reports of sound empirical research informed by sophisticated theoretical orientation" seems an accurate diagnosis. In the issue under review, special attention should perhaps be called to the article by J. De Leeuwe dealing with inter-connections between mythical expression and the general mentality of people among whom such expression is current.

A word of encouragement to American sociologists who feel that, however excellent the journal, it is nevertheless inaccessible because of the language: As the result of personal experience, it can be said categorically that anyone who knows German and English thoroughly will have very little difficulty with Dutch. The spelling is the only real obstacle; once that has been overcome, it will be found that the vocabulary is so close to one or the other of the two languages mentioned that it will rarely be necessary to use a dictionary.

*Totemica. A Supplement to Totemism and Exogamy*. By SIR JAMES GEORGE FRAZER. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937. Pp. xii+518. \$6.50.

This volume contains numerous illustrations of totems, clan names, objects, and emblems, together with notes intended to clarify the meaning and function of such totems in each specific tribe. The material has been collected from the published literature and from friends and observers throughout the world, and is admittedly supplementary to the author's 1910 publication, *Totemism and Exogamy*. Illustrations are arranged geographically covering Australia, Melanesia, India, Africa, and North America. No comment or discussion of the subject of totemism is included. *Totemica* is purely a reference work.

*L'Activité Primitive du Moi*. By JEAN NOGUÉ. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1936. Pp. 232. 20 frs.

From the title of this treatise one might assume that it embodied empirical researches of the type made famous by Piaget, or at the very least discursive analyses like those identified with the name of Mead. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The starting point seems to be primarily Cartesian, and on this introspective basis, with occasional references to Bergson, Brunschvicg, and other French philosophers, the exposition proceeds in finished literary form. But for all its elegance and clarity—or perhaps because of these merits—one gets the feeling that the writer is simply playing with words. Moreover, the matter under consideration has been much better handled in Mead's article, "The Definition of the

Psychical," published in the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, 1904. No one would claim that Mead possessed the literary graces, and one needs an aspirin for every five pages, but he did have something to say.

*Does Distribution Cost Too Much? A Review of the Costs Involved in Current Marketing Methods and a Program for Improvement.* By PAUL W. STEWART, J. FREDERIC DEWHURST, and LOUISE FIELD. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1939. Pp. xvii+403. \$3.50.

These ten chapters, with 56 tables and 19 figures, probably present more factual information about the costs of distribution in the United States than any other single source of similar size.

About three-fifths of the consumer's dollar goes for the costs of distribution, yet only about two cents of this is profit; most of it is due to the inefficiency, duplication, swank, and ignorance of buyers, credit, advertising, "service," and other doubtful and unnecessary aspects of the distributive process. Chapter 11 is both a concise summary of the factual findings and an intelligent series of recommendations.

There is considerable doubt that there will be any marked improvement in this phase of our beloved economy of "free enterprise" very soon. The selling game, or racket, is the area of economic activity where the will-o'-the-wisp hope of profit drives men to almost unbelievable virtuosity in irrational, socially wasteful, and even criminal behavior—much running to stay in the same place. We do fairly well at production, but our distribution both of goods and income is badly bogging down and may eventually ruin our whole economy.

This book ought to help us to a saner procedure—but it probably won't. It has an excellent index—and don't forget the excellent Flow Chart in the back-cover pocket.

*The Church in Rural Life.* By DAVID EDGAR LINDSTROM. Champaign, Ill.: The Garrard Press, 1939. Pp. xiv+145. \$0.85.

This little book gives in concise summary a number of rural socio-economic facts and relates some of them to the rural church in a rather off-hand and by-the-way manner. It is rather a preparation for discussion about the problems of the rural church than an analysis of those problems. It is well documented and has suggestive questions and bibliography on each chapter, although the bibliographies contain few references to research on rural religious problems. Except for the questions and a few sketchy remarks in the text, the title is quite misleading. No index.

*Documentary Film.* By PAUL ROTH. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1939. Pp. 320. \$3.75.

Mr. Roth asks recognition for the fact that the story-film is only *one* kind of film and that "the technical and cultural achievements of the cinema of the future are more likely to come from the field of documentary

and journalistic film than from the studios of entertainment." While realizing the values of films in the instructional field, he "decided that in this present survey it would be wiser to deal only with the aims of the documentary film as a propagandist, social and illuminatory instrument."

A clear account of the background, aims, and methods of this modern art form is given. All of the important films of this nature which have been made in various countries throughout the world are discussed. In addition, the news reels, the March of Time, and the early propaganda films in the U.S.S.R. are discussed.

Mr. Rotha considers the cinema to have a very important place in our social world, and further, that the documentary film will continue to play an ever-increasing part in the development of society.

*Everyman's Drama.* By JEAN CARTER and JESS OGDEN. New York: American Association for Adult Education, 1938. Pp. xiii+136. \$1.00.

*Curtains Going Up.* By ALBERT MCCLEERY and CARL GLICK. New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1939. Pp. ix+412. \$4.00.

Both of these books are designed to show the development of the community and noncommercial theatre movement in the United States. The development of theatre in the colleges and universities is not discussed. They are written primarily for those increasing enthusiasts who find their "outlet" in community theatre work.

There is an interesting gossipy flavor running through both books. Although it is not "scientific," still a good description of successful projects is given.

Carter and Ogden took a field trip covering twenty-seven states and have based their report on the answers to questions regarding the policies of the noncommercial groups.

McCleery and Glick have written more comprehensively and completely. The first 321 pages give accounts of community theatres in all sections of the country. The book is written to preserve the spirit in which we tell "all" to those interested in our work. The development of each community group is outlined and explanations are given as to how they created their facilities, how they staged their productions, and what they have done and are doing. Inadvertently much suggestive information is given which would not be found in a more formal presentation. The last pages are given to a summing up with more formal discussion, figures, lists of groups, plays, sample constitutions, typical expenditures, etc.

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